netdev - Re: [PATCH net 1/3] netfilter: synproxy: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options

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Message-ID: <4ec99ea3-6ab1-eee4-be60-992cf2f9cd45@nvidia.com>
Date:   Thu, 10 Jun 2021 10:05:29 +0300
From:   Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@...dia.com>
To:     Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
CC:     Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
        Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@...sares.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
        Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@...filter.org>,
        Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...e.dk>,
        Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>,
        Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
        Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>,
        Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>,
        Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
        Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>,
        Peter Krystad <peter.krystad@...ux.intel.com>,
        Young Xiao <92siuyang@...il.com>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 1/3] netfilter: synproxy: Fix out of bounds when
 parsing TCP options

On 2021-06-09 17:51, Florian Westphal wrote:
> Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@...dia.com> wrote:
>> The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read
>> one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets
>> into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is
>> neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds
>> the length of 1.
>>
>> This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
>> out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").
>>
>> Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@...il.com>
>> Fixes: 48b1de4c110a ("netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target")
>> Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@...dia.com>
>> ---
>>   net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c | 2 ++
>>   1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c
>> index b100c04a0e43..621eb5ef9727 100644
>> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c
>> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c
>> @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ synproxy_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int doff,
>>   			length--;
>>   			continue;
>>   		default:
>> +			if (length < 2)
>> +				return true;
> 
> Would you mind a v2 that also rejects bogus th->doff value when
> computing the length?

Could you elaborate? The length is a signed int calculated as `(th->doff 
* 4) - sizeof(*th)`. Invalid doff values (0..4) lead to negative length, 
so we never enter the loop. Or are you concerned of passing a negative 
length to skb_header_pointer?

> 
> Thanks.
>