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Message-ID: <a1c4ddcb-afbd-c0e4-2003-90590b10ea84@huawei.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:57:51 +0800
From: "Wangshaobo (bobo)" <bobo.shaobowang@...wei.com>
To: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@...il.com>
CC: <cj.chengjian@...wei.com>, Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@...wei.com>,
<yuehaibing@...wei.com>, <huawei.libin@...wei.com>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>,
Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@...il.com>,
"linux-bluetooth@...r.kernel.org" <linux-bluetooth@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:NETWORKING [GENERAL]" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: fix use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested()
在 2021/7/15 5:50, Luiz Augusto von Dentz 写道:
> Hi,
>
> On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 8:20 PM Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@...wei.com> wrote:
>> use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested() is reported:
>>
>> [ 179.140137][ T3731] =====================================================
>> [ 179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
>> [ 179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #54
>> [ 179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
>> [ 179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
>> [ 179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace:
>> [ 179.153301][ T3731] dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0
>> [ 179.154063][ T3731] kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0
>> [ 179.154855][ T3731] __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0
>> [ 179.155579][ T3731] lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
>> [ 179.156436][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
>> [ 179.157257][ T3731] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890
>> [ 179.158154][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
>> [ 179.159141][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
>> [ 179.159994][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
>> [ 179.160959][ T3731] ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420
>> [ 179.161834][ T3731] l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50
>> [ 179.162608][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
>> [ 179.163435][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
>> [ 179.164406][ T3731] l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050
>> [ 179.165189][ T3731] ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70
>> [ 179.166180][ T3731] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590
>> [ 179.167066][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
>> [ 179.168023][ T3731] ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560
>> [ 179.168818][ T3731] process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0
>> [ 179.169598][ T3731] worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370
>> [ 179.170346][ T3731] kthread+0x4ef/0x610
>> [ 179.171010][ T3731] ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0
>> [ 179.171828][ T3731] ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110
>> [ 179.172587][ T3731] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
>> [ 179.173348][ T3731]
>> [ 179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at:
>> [ 179.174409][ T3731] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0
>> [ 179.175373][ T3731] kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0
>> [ 179.176060][ T3731] kfree+0x3a5/0x1180
>> [ 179.176664][ T3731] __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80
>> [ 179.177375][ T3731] __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0
>> [ 179.178032][ T3731] sk_free+0x97/0x130
>> [ 179.178686][ T3731] l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0
>> [ 179.179457][ T3731] sock_close+0x150/0x450
>> [ 179.180117][ T3731] __fput+0x6bd/0xf00
>> [ 179.180787][ T3731] ____fput+0x37/0x40
>> [ 179.181481][ T3731] task_work_run+0x140/0x280
>> [ 179.182219][ T3731] do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60
>> [ 179.182930][ T3731] do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450
>> [ 179.183656][ T3731] get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0
>> [ 179.184344][ T3731] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10
>> [ 179.185266][ T3731] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560
>> [ 179.186136][ T3731] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60
>> [ 179.186984][ T3731] do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140
>> [ 179.187681][ T3731] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>> [ 179.188604][ T3731] =====================================================
>>
>> In our case, there are two Thread A and B:
>>
>> Context: Thread A: Context: Thread B:
>>
>> l2cap_chan_timeout() __se_sys_shutdown()
>> l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_shutdown()
>> l2cap_chan_del() l2cap_chan_close()
>> l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
>>
>> Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED,
>> and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has
>> excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call
>> l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C:
>>
>> Context: Thread C:
>>
>> sock_close()
>> l2cap_sock_release()
>> sock_orphan()
>> l2cap_sock_kill() #free sock if refcnt is 1
>>
>> If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again,
>> use-after-free happened.
>>
>> We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is freed, for telling teardown
>> operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we should
>> avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb().
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@...wei.com>
>> ---
>> net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
>> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
>> index c99d65ef13b1..ddc6a692b237 100644
>> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
>> @@ -1215,14 +1215,18 @@ static int l2cap_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>> */
>> static void l2cap_sock_kill(struct sock *sk)
>> {
>> + struct l2cap_chan *chan;
>> +
>> if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket)
>> return;
>>
>> BT_DBG("sk %p state %s", sk, state_to_string(sk->sk_state));
>>
>> /* Kill poor orphan */
>> -
>> - l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
>> + chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
>> + l2cap_chan_put(chan);
There is a problem here, the above sentence `l2cap_chan_put(chan)`
should put after
following sentence.
>> + if (refcount_read(&sk->sk_refcnt) == 1)
>> + chan->data = NULL;
> Instead of checking if it is the last reference here, wouldn't it be
> better to reset the chan->data to NULL on l2cap_sock_destruct?
Hi,
In my case it looks OK, this is the diff:
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index f1b1edd0b697..32ef3328ab49 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -1500,6 +1500,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_close_cb(struct l2cap_chan
*chan)
{
struct sock *sk = chan->data;
+ if (!sk)
+ return;
+
l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
}
@@ -1508,6 +1511,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct
l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
struct sock *sk = chan->data;
struct sock *parent;
+ if (!sk)
+ return;
+
BT_DBG("chan %p state %s", chan, state_to_string(chan->state));
/* This callback can be called both for server (BT_LISTEN)
@@ -1700,6 +1706,7 @@ static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->chan)
+ l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->data = NULL;
l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan);
But if it has potential risk if l2cap_sock_destruct() can not be excuted
in time ?
sk_free():
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc)) //is possible
this condition false ?
__sk_free(sk) -> ... l2cap_sock_destruct()
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