[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20210720014328.378868-1-yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2021 18:43:28 -0700
From: cgel.zte@...il.com
To: kuba@...nel.org
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org, dsahern@...nel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Yang Yang <yang.yang29@....com.cn>,
Zeal Robot <zealci@....com.cn>
Subject: [PATCH net-next] net: ipv4: add capability check for net administration
From: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@....com.cn>
Root in init user namespace can modify /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
without CAP_NET_ADMIN, this doesn't follow the principle of
capabilities. For example, let's take a look at netdev_store(),
root can't modify netdev attribute without CAP_NET_ADMIN.
So let's keep the consistency of permission check logic.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@....com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@....com.cn>
---
net/ipv4/devinet.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index 73721a4448bd..6238ab2dd3d1 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -2424,11 +2424,15 @@ static int devinet_sysctl_forward(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
int *valp = ctl->data;
int val = *valp;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
- int ret = proc_dointvec(ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ struct net *net = ctl->extra2;
+ int ret;
- if (write && *valp != val) {
- struct net *net = ctl->extra2;
+ if (write && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ ret = proc_dointvec(ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ if (write && *valp != val) {
if (valp != &IPV4_DEVCONF_DFLT(net, FORWARDING)) {
if (!rtnl_trylock()) {
/* Restore the original values before restarting */
--
2.25.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists