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Message-ID: <YQLXYVaWWdBfF7Sm@fedora>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2021 12:29:21 -0400
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
To: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@...il.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/Swiotlb: Add Swiotlb bounce buffer remap
function for HV IVM
On Wed, Jul 28, 2021 at 10:52:25AM -0400, Tianyu Lan wrote:
> From: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>
>
> In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, bounce buffer needs to be accessed via
> extra address space which is above shared_gpa_boundary
> (E.G 39 bit address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUID ISOLATION_CONFIG.
> The access physical address will be original physical address +
> shared_gpa_boundary. The shared_gpa_boundary in the AMD SEV SNP
> spec is called virtual top of memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below
> vTOM are automatically treated as private while memory above
> vTOM is treated as shared.
>
> Use dma_map_decrypted() in the swiotlb code, store remap address returned
> and use the remap address to copy data from/to swiotlb bounce buffer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>
> ---
> include/linux/swiotlb.h | 4 ++++
> kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 11 ++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> index f507e3eacbea..584560ecaa8e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> +++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> @@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ extern enum swiotlb_force swiotlb_force;
> * @end: The end address of the swiotlb memory pool. Used to do a quick
> * range check to see if the memory was in fact allocated by this
> * API.
> + * @vaddr: The vaddr of the swiotlb memory pool. The swiotlb
> + * memory pool may be remapped in the memory encrypted case and store
> + * virtual address for bounce buffer operation.
> * @nslabs: The number of IO TLB blocks (in groups of 64) between @start and
> * @end. For default swiotlb, this is command line adjustable via
> * setup_io_tlb_npages.
> @@ -89,6 +92,7 @@ extern enum swiotlb_force swiotlb_force;
> struct io_tlb_mem {
> phys_addr_t start;
> phys_addr_t end;
> + void *vaddr;
> unsigned long nslabs;
> unsigned long used;
> unsigned int index;
> diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> index 1fa81c096c1d..6866e5784b53 100644
> --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> @@ -194,8 +194,13 @@ static void swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem(struct io_tlb_mem *mem, phys_addr_t start,
> mem->slots[i].alloc_size = 0;
> }
>
> - set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, bytes >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> - memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> + mem->vaddr = dma_map_decrypted(vaddr, bytes);
> + if (!mem->vaddr) {
> + pr_err("Failed to decrypt memory.\n");
I am wondering if it would be worth returning an error code in this
function instead of just printing an error?
For this patch I think it is Ok, but perhaps going forward this would be
better done as I am thinking - is there some global guest->hyperv
reporting mechanism so that if this fails - it ends up being bubbled up
to the HyperV console-ish?
And ditto for other hypervisors?
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + memset(mem->vaddr, 0, bytes);
> }
>
> int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose)
> @@ -360,7 +365,7 @@ static void swiotlb_bounce(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t tlb_addr, size_t size
> phys_addr_t orig_addr = mem->slots[index].orig_addr;
> size_t alloc_size = mem->slots[index].alloc_size;
> unsigned long pfn = PFN_DOWN(orig_addr);
> - unsigned char *vaddr = phys_to_virt(tlb_addr);
> + unsigned char *vaddr = mem->vaddr + tlb_addr - mem->start;
> unsigned int tlb_offset;
>
> if (orig_addr == INVALID_PHYS_ADDR)
> --
> 2.25.1
>
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