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Message-ID: <6df81737-38d8-4c91-358a-79bc5d5f9074@linux.alibaba.com>
Date:   Tue, 31 Aug 2021 19:05:12 +0800
From:   Hao Xu <haoxu@...ux.alibaba.com>
To:     Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@...il.com>,
        Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
        syzbot <syzbot+f9704d1878e290eddf73@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
        andrii@...nel.org, ast@...nel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
        daniel@...earbox.net, davem@...emloft.net, dvyukov@...gle.com,
        io-uring@...r.kernel.org, john.fastabend@...il.com, kafai@...com,
        kpsingh@...nel.org, kuba@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, songliubraving@...com,
        syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com, yhs@...com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] general protection fault in sock_from_file

在 2021/8/31 下午5:42, Pavel Begunkov 写道:
> On 8/31/21 10:19 AM, Hao Xu wrote:
>> 在 2021/8/31 上午10:14, Jens Axboe 写道:
>>> On 8/30/21 2:45 PM, syzbot wrote:
>>>> syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on:
>>>>
>>>> HEAD commit:    93717cde744f Add linux-next specific files for 20210830
>>>> git tree:       linux-next
>>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=15200fad300000
>>>> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c643ef5289990dd1
>>>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f9704d1878e290eddf73
>>>> compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.1
>>>> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=111f5f9d300000
>>>> C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1651a415300000
>>>>
>>>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
>>>> Reported-by: syzbot+f9704d1878e290eddf73@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>>>>
>>>> general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
>>>> KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
>>>> CPU: 0 PID: 6548 Comm: syz-executor433 Not tainted 5.14.0-next-20210830-syzkaller #0
>>>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>>>> RIP: 0010:sock_from_file+0x20/0x90 net/socket.c:505
>>>> Code: f5 ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 53 48 89 fb e8 85 e9 62 fa 48 8d 7b 28 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 75 4f 45 31 e4 48 81 7b 28 80 f1 8a 8a 74 0c e8 58 e9
>>>> RSP: 0018:ffffc90002caf8e8 EFLAGS: 00010206
>>>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
>>>> RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8713203b RDI: 0000000000000028
>>>> RBP: ffff888019fc0780 R08: ffffffff899aee40 R09: ffffffff81e21978
>>>> R10: 0000000000000027 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: dffffc0000000000
>>>> R13: 1ffff110033f80f9 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffff888019fc0780
>>>> FS:  00000000013b5300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>>>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>>> CR2: 00000000004ae0f0 CR3: 000000001d355000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
>>>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
>>>> Call Trace:
>>>>    io_sendmsg+0x98/0x640 fs/io_uring.c:4681
>>>>    io_issue_sqe+0x14de/0x6ba0 fs/io_uring.c:6578
>>>>    __io_queue_sqe+0x90/0xb50 fs/io_uring.c:6864
>>>>    io_req_task_submit+0xbf/0x1b0 fs/io_uring.c:2218
>>>>    tctx_task_work+0x166/0x610 fs/io_uring.c:2143
>>>>    task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
>>>>    tracehook_notify_signal include/linux/tracehook.h:212 [inline]
>>>>    handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:146 [inline]
>>>>    exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
>>>>    exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x256/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:209
>>>>    __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline]
>>>>    syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302
>>>>    do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
>>>>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>>>> RIP: 0033:0x43fd49
>>>
>>> Hao, this is due to:
>>>
>>> commit a8295b982c46d4a7c259a4cdd58a2681929068a9
>>> Author: Hao Xu <haoxu@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>> Date:   Fri Aug 27 17:46:09 2021 +0800
>>>
>>>       io_uring: fix failed linkchain code logic
>>>
>>> which causes some weirdly super long chains from that single sqe.
>>> Can you take a look, please?
>> Sure, I'm working on this.
> 
> Ah, saw it after sending a patch. It's nothing too curious, just
> a small error in logic. More interesting that we don't have a
> test case covering it, we should definitely add something.
> 
Saw your patch after coding my fix..😂
Since my email client doesn't receive your patch(only saw it in
webpage https://lore.kernel.org/), I put my comment here:
>  fs/io_uring.c | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c
> index 473a977c7979..a531c7324ea8 100644
> --- a/fs/io_uring.c
> +++ b/fs/io_uring.c
> @@ -6717,6 +6717,8 @@ static inline void io_queue_sqe(struct io_kiocb *req)
>  	if (likely(!(req->flags & (REQ_F_FORCE_ASYNC | REQ_F_FAIL)))) {
>  		__io_queue_sqe(req);
>  	} else if (req->flags & REQ_F_FAIL) {
> +		/* fail all, we don't submit */
> +		req->flags &= ~REQ_F_HARDLINK;
maybe set REQ_F_LINK here?
>  		io_req_complete_failed(req, req->result);
>  	} else {
>  		int ret = io_req_prep_async(req);
> -- 



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