lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <MWHPR21MB159348E5A5BE84C36E84800AD7CE9@MWHPR21MB1593.namprd21.prod.outlook.com>
Date:   Thu, 2 Sep 2021 00:16:34 +0000
From:   Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>
To:     Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@...il.com>,
        KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>,
        Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@...rosoft.com>,
        Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@...rosoft.com>,
        "wei.liu@...nel.org" <wei.liu@...nel.org>,
        Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>,
        "catalin.marinas@....com" <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        "will@...nel.org" <will@...nel.org>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "luto@...nel.org" <luto@...nel.org>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "konrad.wilk@...cle.com" <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        "boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com" <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        "jgross@...e.com" <jgross@...e.com>,
        "sstabellini@...nel.org" <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        "joro@...tes.org" <joro@...tes.org>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "kuba@...nel.org" <kuba@...nel.org>,
        "jejb@...ux.ibm.com" <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "martin.petersen@...cle.com" <martin.petersen@...cle.com>,
        "gregkh@...uxfoundation.org" <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>, "hch@....de" <hch@....de>,
        "m.szyprowski@...sung.com" <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
        "robin.murphy@....com" <robin.murphy@....com>,
        "brijesh.singh@....com" <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        "thomas.lendacky@....com" <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>,
        "pgonda@...gle.com" <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        "martin.b.radev@...il.com" <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
        "akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "rppt@...nel.org" <rppt@...nel.org>,
        "hannes@...xchg.org" <hannes@...xchg.org>,
        "aneesh.kumar@...ux.ibm.com" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com" <krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com>,
        "saravanand@...com" <saravanand@...com>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        "xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>,
        "rientjes@...gle.com" <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        "ardb@...nel.org" <ardb@...nel.org>
CC:     "iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org>,
        "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        vkuznets <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        "parri.andrea@...il.com" <parri.andrea@...il.com>,
        "dave.hansen@...el.com" <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH V4 03/13] x86/hyperv: Add new hvcall guest address host
 visibility support

From: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@...il.com> Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 10:21 AM
> 
> Add new hvcall guest address host visibility support to mark
> memory visible to host. Call it inside set_memory_decrypted
> /encrypted(). Add HYPERVISOR feature check in the
> hv_is_isolation_supported() to optimize in non-virtualization
> environment.
> 
> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>
> ---
> Change since v3:
> 	* Fix error code handle in the __hv_set_mem_host_visibility().
> 	* Move HvCallModifySparseGpaPageHostVisibility near to enum
> 	  hv_mem_host_visibility.
> 
> Change since v2:
>        * Rework __set_memory_enc_dec() and call Hyper-V and AMD function
>          according to platform check.
> 
> Change since v1:
>        * Use new staic call x86_set_memory_enc to avoid add Hyper-V
>          specific check in the set_memory code.
> ---
>  arch/x86/hyperv/Makefile           |   2 +-
>  arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c          |   6 ++
>  arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c              | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h |  17 +++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h    |   4 +-
>  arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c       |  19 +++--
>  include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h  |   1 +
>  include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h     |   1 +
>  8 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/Makefile b/arch/x86/hyperv/Makefile
> index 48e2c51464e8..5d2de10809ae 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/Makefile
> @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
>  # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> -obj-y			:= hv_init.o mmu.o nested.o irqdomain.o
> +obj-y			:= hv_init.o mmu.o nested.o irqdomain.o ivm.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_X86_64)	+= hv_apic.o hv_proc.o
> 
>  ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
> index eba10ed4f73e..b1aa42f60faa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
> @@ -603,6 +603,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_get_isolation_type);
> 
>  bool hv_is_isolation_supported(void)
>  {
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
> +		return 0;

Use "return false" per previous comment from Wei Liu.

> +
> +	if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV))
> +		return 0;

Use "return false".

> +
>  	return hv_get_isolation_type() != HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE;
>  }
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..a069c788ce3c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Hyper-V Isolation VM interface with paravisor and hypervisor
> + *
> + * Author:
> + *  Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/hyperv.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/bitfield.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <asm/io.h>
> +#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
> +
> +/*
> + * hv_mark_gpa_visibility - Set pages visible to host via hvcall.
> + *
> + * In Isolation VM, all guest memory is encripted from host and guest

s/encripted/encrypted/

> + * needs to set memory visible to host via hvcall before sharing memory
> + * with host.
> + */
> +int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
> +			   enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility)
> +{
> +	struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility **input_pcpu, *input;
> +	u16 pages_processed;
> +	u64 hv_status;
> +	unsigned long flags;
> +
> +	/* no-op if partition isolation is not enabled */
> +	if (!hv_is_isolation_supported())
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (count > HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT) {
> +		pr_err("Hyper-V: GPA count:%d exceeds supported:%lu\n", count,
> +			HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	local_irq_save(flags);
> +	input_pcpu = (struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility **)
> +			this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
> +	input = *input_pcpu;
> +	if (unlikely(!input)) {
> +		local_irq_restore(flags);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	input->partition_id = HV_PARTITION_ID_SELF;
> +	input->host_visibility = visibility;
> +	input->reserved0 = 0;
> +	input->reserved1 = 0;
> +	memcpy((void *)input->gpa_page_list, pfn, count * sizeof(*pfn));
> +	hv_status = hv_do_rep_hypercall(
> +			HVCALL_MODIFY_SPARSE_GPA_PAGE_HOST_VISIBILITY, count,
> +			0, input, &pages_processed);
> +	local_irq_restore(flags);
> +
> +	if (hv_result_success(hv_status))
> +		return 0;
> +	else
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(hv_mark_gpa_visibility);

In later comments on Patch 7 of this series, I have suggested that
code in that patch should not call hv_mark_gpa_visibility() directly,
but instead should call set_memory_encrypted() and
set_memory_decrypted().  I'm thinking that those functions should
be the standard way to change the visibility of pages in the Isolated
VM case.  Then hv_mark_gpa_visibility() could be static and it would
not need a stub version for ARM64.  It would only be called by
__hv_set_mem_host_visibility below, and in turn by
set_memory_encrypted()/decrypted().  

> +
> +static int __hv_set_mem_host_visibility(void *kbuffer, int pagecount,
> +				      enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility)
> +{
> +	u64 *pfn_array;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +	int i, pfn;
> +
> +	if (!hv_is_isolation_supported() || !hv_hypercall_pg)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	pfn_array = kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!pfn_array)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	for (i = 0, pfn = 0; i < pagecount; i++) {
> +		pfn_array[pfn] = virt_to_hvpfn(kbuffer + i * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
> +		pfn++;
> +
> +		if (pfn == HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount - 1) {
> +			ret = hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array,
> +						     visibility);
> +			if (ret)
> +				goto err_free_pfn_array;
> +			pfn = 0;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> + err_free_pfn_array:
> +	kfree(pfn_array);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * hv_set_mem_host_visibility - Set specified memory visible to host.
> + *
> + * In Isolation VM, all guest memory is encrypted from host and guest
> + * needs to set memory visible to host via hvcall before sharing memory
> + * with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility()
> + * with memory base and size.
> + */
> +int hv_set_mem_host_visibility(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool visible)
> +{
> +	enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = visible ?
> +			VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE : VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE;
> +
> +	return __hv_set_mem_host_visibility((void *)addr, numpages, visibility);
> +}

Is there a need for this wrapper function?  Couldn't the handling of the host
visibility enum be folded into __hv_set_mem_host_visibility() and the initial
double underscore dropped?  Maybe I missed it, but I don't see that
__hv_set_mem_host_visibility() is called anyplace else.   Just trying to avoid
complexity if it isn't really needed.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h
> index 2322d6bd5883..381e88122a5f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h
> @@ -276,6 +276,23 @@ enum hv_isolation_type {
>  #define HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT	HV_REGISTER_TIME_REF_COUNT
>  #define HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC	HV_REGISTER_REFERENCE_TSC
> 
> +/* Hyper-V memory host visibility */
> +enum hv_mem_host_visibility {
> +	VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE		= 0,
> +	VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_ONLY	= 1,
> +	VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE	= 3
> +};
> +
> +/* HvCallModifySparseGpaPageHostVisibility hypercall */
> +#define HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT	((PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(u64)) - 2)
> +struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility {
> +	u64 partition_id;
> +	u32 host_visibility:2;
> +	u32 reserved0:30;
> +	u32 reserved1;
> +	u64 gpa_page_list[HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT];
> +} __packed;
> +
>  /*
>   * Declare the MSR used to setup pages used to communicate with the hypervisor.
>   */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
> index 37739a277ac6..ffb2af079c6b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
> @@ -192,7 +192,9 @@ struct irq_domain *hv_create_pci_msi_domain(void);
>  int hv_map_ioapic_interrupt(int ioapic_id, bool level, int vcpu, int vector,
>  		struct hv_interrupt_entry *entry);
>  int hv_unmap_ioapic_interrupt(int ioapic_id, struct hv_interrupt_entry *entry);
> -
> +int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
> +			   enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility);
> +int hv_set_mem_host_visibility(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool visible);
>  #else /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
>  static inline void hyperv_init(void) {}
>  static inline void hyperv_setup_mmu_ops(void) {}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> index ad8a5c586a35..1e4a0882820a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
>  #include <asm/proto.h>
>  #include <asm/memtype.h>
>  #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> +#include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
> +#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
> 
>  #include "../mm_internal.h"
> 
> @@ -1980,15 +1982,11 @@ int set_memory_global(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
>  				    __pgprot(_PAGE_GLOBAL), 0);
>  }
> 
> -static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> +static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>  {
>  	struct cpa_data cpa;
>  	int ret;
> 
> -	/* Nothing to do if memory encryption is not active */
> -	if (!mem_encrypt_active())
> -		return 0;
> -
>  	/* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */
>  	if (WARN_ONCE(addr & ~PAGE_MASK, "misaligned address: %#lx\n", addr))
>  		addr &= PAGE_MASK;
> @@ -2023,6 +2021,17 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
>  	return ret;
>  }
> 
> +static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> +{
> +	if (hv_is_isolation_supported())
> +		return hv_set_mem_host_visibility(addr, numpages, !enc);
> +
> +	if (mem_encrypt_active())
> +		return __set_memory_enc_pgtable(addr, numpages, enc);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
>  {
>  	return __set_memory_enc_dec(addr, numpages, true);
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h b/include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h
> index 56348a541c50..8ed6733d5146 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h
> @@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page {
>  #define HVCALL_RETARGET_INTERRUPT		0x007e
>  #define HVCALL_FLUSH_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_SPACE 0x00af
>  #define HVCALL_FLUSH_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_LIST 0x00b0
> +#define HVCALL_MODIFY_SPARSE_GPA_PAGE_HOST_VISIBILITY 0x00db
> 
>  /* Extended hypercalls */
>  #define HV_EXT_CALL_QUERY_CAPABILITIES		0x8001
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h b/include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h
> index 7537ae1db828..aa55447b9700 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h
> @@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ bool hv_query_ext_cap(u64 cap_query);
>  static inline bool hv_is_hyperv_initialized(void) { return false; }
>  static inline bool hv_is_hibernation_supported(void) { return false; }
>  static inline void hyperv_cleanup(void) {}
> +static inline hv_is_isolation_supported(void);
>  #endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
> 
>  #endif
> --
> 2.25.1

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ