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Message-Id: <5be6dfdbfa3b618e169c5d03e2b1109310ac5938.1634730082.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2021 07:42:45 -0400
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
To: network dev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, davem@...emloft.net,
kuba@...nel.org, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>,
michael.tuexen@...chi.franken.de
Subject: [PATCH net 5/7] sctp: add vtag check in sctp_sf_violation
sctp_sf_violation() is called when processing HEARTBEAT_ACK chunk
in cookie_wait state, and some other places are also using it.
The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as
later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent
asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious
chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
---
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 96a069d725e9..36328ab88bdd 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -4669,6 +4669,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net,
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+ if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
--
2.27.0
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