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Message-ID: <3def567a-5f99-970d-f9e4-3b9426809b16@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Oct 2021 20:53:15 -0400
From: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@...hat.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@...tech.com.au>,
Max VA <maxv@...tinelone.com>,
Ying Xue <ying.xue@...driver.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tipc: fix size validations for the MSG_CRYPTO type
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@...hat.com>
On 10/25/21 11:31, Greg KH wrote:
> From: Max VA <maxv@...tinelone.com>
>
> The function tipc_crypto_key_rcv is used to parse MSG_CRYPTO messages
> to receive keys from other nodes in the cluster in order to decrypt any
> further messages from them.
> This patch verifies that any supplied sizes in the message body are
> valid for the received message.
>
> Fixes: 1ef6f7c9390f ("tipc: add automatic session key exchange")
> Signed-off-by: Max VA <maxv@...tinelone.com>
> Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@...driver.com>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
> ---
> net/tipc/crypto.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> Max's email system doesn't seem to be able to send non-attachment
> patches out, so I'm forwarding this on for him. It's already acked by
> one of the tipc maintainers.
>
> diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c
> index c9391d38de85..dc60c32bb70d 100644
> --- a/net/tipc/crypto.c
> +++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
> @@ -2285,43 +2285,53 @@ static bool tipc_crypto_key_rcv(struct tipc_crypto *rx, struct tipc_msg *hdr)
> u16 key_gen = msg_key_gen(hdr);
> u16 size = msg_data_sz(hdr);
> u8 *data = msg_data(hdr);
> + unsigned int keylen;
> +
> + /* Verify whether the size can exist in the packet */
> + if (unlikely(size < sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) + TIPC_AEAD_KEYLEN_MIN)) {
> + pr_debug("%s: message data size is too small\n", rx->name);
> + goto exit;
> + }
> +
> + keylen = ntohl(*((__be32 *)(data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME)));
> +
> + /* Verify the supplied size values */
> + if (unlikely(size != keylen + sizeof(struct tipc_aead_key) ||
> + keylen > TIPC_AEAD_KEY_SIZE_MAX)) {
> + pr_debug("%s: invalid MSG_CRYPTO key size\n", rx->name);
> + goto exit;
> + }
>
> spin_lock(&rx->lock);
> if (unlikely(rx->skey || (key_gen == rx->key_gen && rx->key.keys))) {
> pr_err("%s: key existed <%p>, gen %d vs %d\n", rx->name,
> rx->skey, key_gen, rx->key_gen);
> - goto exit;
> + goto exit_unlock;
> }
>
> /* Allocate memory for the key */
> skey = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
> if (unlikely(!skey)) {
> pr_err("%s: unable to allocate memory for skey\n", rx->name);
> - goto exit;
> + goto exit_unlock;
> }
>
> /* Copy key from msg data */
> - skey->keylen = ntohl(*((__be32 *)(data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME)));
> + skey->keylen = keylen;
> memcpy(skey->alg_name, data, TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME);
> memcpy(skey->key, data + TIPC_AEAD_ALG_NAME + sizeof(__be32),
> skey->keylen);
>
> - /* Sanity check */
> - if (unlikely(size != tipc_aead_key_size(skey))) {
> - kfree(skey);
> - skey = NULL;
> - goto exit;
> - }
> -
> rx->key_gen = key_gen;
> rx->skey_mode = msg_key_mode(hdr);
> rx->skey = skey;
> rx->nokey = 0;
> mb(); /* for nokey flag */
>
> -exit:
> +exit_unlock:
> spin_unlock(&rx->lock);
>
> +exit:
> /* Schedule the key attaching on this crypto */
> if (likely(skey && queue_delayed_work(tx->wq, &rx->work, 0)))
> return true;
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