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Message-Id: <cdca8eaca8a0ec5fe4aa58412a6096bb08c3c9bc.1635854268.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 08:02:50 -0400
From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
To: network dev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org,
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCHv2 net 4/4] security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux
Different from selinux_inet_conn_established(), it also gives the
secid to asoc->peer_secid in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(),
as one UDP-type socket may have more than one asocs.
Note that peer_secid in asoc will save the peer secid for this
asoc connection, and peer_sid in sksec will just keep the peer
secid for the latest connection. So the right use should be do
peeloff for UDP-type socket if there will be multiple asocs in
one socket, so that the peeloff socket has the right label for
its asoc.
v1->v2:
- call selinux_inet_conn_established() to reduce some code
duplication in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as Ondrej
suggested.
- when doing peeloff, it calls sock_create() where it actually
gets secid for socket from socket_sockcreate_sid(). So reuse
SECSID_WILD to ensure the peeloff socket keeps using that
secid after calling selinux_sctp_sk_clone() for client side.
Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a9977a2ae8ac..341cd5dccbf5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5519,7 +5519,8 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk
if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
- newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
+ if (asoc->secid != SECSID_WILD)
+ newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
@@ -5575,6 +5576,16 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
+static void selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
+
+ selinux_inet_conn_established(asoc->base.sk, skb);
+ asoc->peer_secid = sksec->peer_sid;
+ asoc->secid = SECSID_WILD;
+}
+
static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
{
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
@@ -7290,6 +7301,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
--
2.27.0
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