Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQz28AeAgQKOyb=uhXGraTtO=gPbH2oLKvWzQSMGhrxZg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 4 Nov 2021 15:28:59 -0400
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Cc:     Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>,
        network dev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        SElinux list <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Security Module list 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-sctp @ vger . kernel . org" <linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@...il.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@...nternet.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 net 4/4] security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook
 in selinux

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:40 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 4:17 AM Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 9:46 PM Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 6:01 PM Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 1:36 PM Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 1:33 PM Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com> wrote:
> > > > > > On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 12:40 PM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > On Tue, Nov 2, 2021 at 1:03 PM Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Different from selinux_inet_conn_established(), it also gives the
> > > > > > > > secid to asoc->peer_secid in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(),
> > > > > > > > as one UDP-type socket may have more than one asocs.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Note that peer_secid in asoc will save the peer secid for this
> > > > > > > > asoc connection, and peer_sid in sksec will just keep the peer
> > > > > > > > secid for the latest connection. So the right use should be do
> > > > > > > > peeloff for UDP-type socket if there will be multiple asocs in
> > > > > > > > one socket, so that the peeloff socket has the right label for
> > > > > > > > its asoc.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > v1->v2:
> > > > > > > >   - call selinux_inet_conn_established() to reduce some code
> > > > > > > >     duplication in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as Ondrej
> > > > > > > >     suggested.
> > > > > > > >   - when doing peeloff, it calls sock_create() where it actually
> > > > > > > >     gets secid for socket from socket_sockcreate_sid(). So reuse
> > > > > > > >     SECSID_WILD to ensure the peeloff socket keeps using that
> > > > > > > >     secid after calling selinux_sctp_sk_clone() for client side.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Interesting... I find strange that SCTP creates the peeloff socket
> > > > > > > using sock_create() rather than allocating it directly via
> > > > > > > sock_alloc() like the other callers of sctp_copy_sock() (which calls
> > > > > > > security_sctp_sk_clone()) do. Wouldn't it make more sense to avoid the
> > > > > > > sock_create() call and just rely on the security_sctp_sk_clone()
> > > > > > > semantic to set up the labels? Would anything break if
> > > > > > > sctp_do_peeloff() switched to plain sock_alloc()?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I'd rather we avoid this SECSID_WILD hack to support the weird
> > > > > > > created-but-also-cloned socket hybrid and just make the peeloff socket
> > > > > > > behave the same as an accept()-ed socket (i.e. no
> > > > > > > security_socket_[post_]create() hook calls, just
> > > > > > > security_sctp_sk_clone()).
> > > >
> > > > I believe the important part is that sctp_do_peeloff() eventually
> > > > calls security_sctp_sk_clone() via way of sctp_copy_sock().  Assuming
> > > > we have security_sctp_sk_clone() working properly I would expect that
> > > > the new socket would be setup properly when sctp_do_peeloff() returns
> > > > on success.
> > > >
> > > > ... and yes, that SECSID_WILD approach is *not* something we want to do.
> > >
> > > SECSID_WILD is used to avoid client's new socket's sid overwritten by
> > > old socket's.
> >
> > In the case of security_sctp_sk_clone() the new client socket (the
> > cloned socket) should inherit the label/sid from the original socket
> > (the "parent" in the inherit-from-parent label inheritance behavior
> > discussed earlier).  The selinux_sctp_assoc_established() function
> > should not change the socket's label/sid at all, only the peer label.
> >
> > > If I understand correctly, new socket's should keep using its original
> > > sid, namely,
> > > the one set from security_socket_[post_]create() on client side. I
> > > AGREE with that.
> > > Now I want to *confirm* this with you, as it's different from the last version's
> > > 'inherit from parent socket' that Richard and Ondrej reviewed.
> >
> > Unfortunately I think we are struggling to communicate because you are
> > not familiar with SELinux concepts and I'm not as well versed in SCTP
> > as you are.  As things currently stand, I am getting a disconnect
> > between your explanations and the code you have submitted; they simply
> > aren't consistent from my perspective.
> >
> > In an effort to help provide something that is hopefully a bit more
> > clear, here are the selinux_sctp_sk_clone() and
> > selinux_sctp_assoc_established() functions which I believe we need.
> > If you feel these are incorrect, please explain and/or provide edits:
> >
> >   static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> >                                     struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
> >   {
> >     struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
> >     struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
> >
> >     /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
> >      * the non-sctp clone version.
> >      */
> >     if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
> >       return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
> >
> >     newsksec->secid = sksec->secid;
> >     newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
> >     newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
> >     selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
> >   }
> >
> >   static void selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
> >                                              struct sk_buff *skb)
> >   {
> >     struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
> >
> >     selinux_inet_conn_established(asoc->base.sk, skb);
> >     asoc->peer_secid = sksec->peer_sid;
> >   }
>
> This code would be functionally equivalent to the v1 patchset for the
> client side, but on server side you want to set newsksec->secid to
> asoc->secid, as this contains the "connection secid" computed by
> selinux_conn_sid() in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(). This is supposed
> to mirror what selinux_inet_conn_request() -> selinux_inet_csk_clone()
> does for non-SCTP sockets. So I think we should rather go back to the
> v1 patchset variant, where the parent socket's sid is stashed in
> asoc->secid to be picked up by selinux_sctp_sk_clone().
>
> As for the sctp_do_peeloff-calls-sock_create problem - I was oblivious
> about the difference between the sock vs. socket structs, so this
> would be a bit more difficult to fix than replacing one function call.
> But if we end up just overwriting the label assigned in
> selinux_socket_post_create() as it is now, then the only difference is
> an unexpected SCTP_SOCKET__CREATE permission check and a pointless
> computation of socket_sockcreate_sid(), so it can be addressed
> separately. I'll try to suggest a patch and then we can discuss
> whether it makes sense or not.

Okay, I'll wait on that patchset before commenting further.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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