lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <06faf04c-dc4a-69fd-0be9-04f57f779ffe@amd.com>
Date:   Fri, 3 Dec 2021 13:11:17 -0600
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To:     Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@...il.com>, kys@...rosoft.com,
        haiyangz@...rosoft.com, sthemmin@...rosoft.com, wei.liu@...nel.org,
        decui@...rosoft.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        bp@...en8.de, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org,
        hpa@...or.com, jgross@...e.com, sstabellini@...nel.org,
        boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com, joro@...tes.org, will@...nel.org,
        davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
        martin.petersen@...cle.com, arnd@...db.de, hch@...radead.org,
        m.szyprowski@...sung.com, robin.murphy@....com,
        Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com, xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org,
        michael.h.kelley@...rosoft.com
Cc:     iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        vkuznets@...hat.com, brijesh.singh@....com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com,
        hch@....de, parri.andrea@...il.com, dave.hansen@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 1/5] Swiotlb: Add Swiotlb bounce buffer remap function
 for HV IVM

On 12/3/21 5:20 AM, Tianyu Lan wrote:
> On 12/2/2021 10:42 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 12/1/21 10:02 AM, Tianyu Lan wrote:
>>> From: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>
>>>
>>> In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, bounce buffer needs to be accessed via
>>> extra address space which is above shared_gpa_boundary (E.G 39 bit
>>> address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUID ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access
>>> physical address will be original physical address + shared_gpa_boundary.
>>> The shared_gpa_boundary in the AMD SEV SNP spec is called virtual top of
>>> memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below vTOM are automatically treated as
>>> private while memory above vTOM is treated as shared.
>>>
>>> Expose swiotlb_unencrypted_base for platforms to set unencrypted
>>> memory base offset and platform calls swiotlb_update_mem_attributes()
>>> to remap swiotlb mem to unencrypted address space. memremap() can
>>> not be called in the early stage and so put remapping code into
>>> swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(). Store remap address and use it to copy
>>> data from/to swiotlb bounce buffer.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>
>>
>> This patch results in the following stack trace during a bare-metal boot
>> on my EPYC system with SME active (e.g. mem_encrypt=on):
>>
>> [    0.123932] BUG: Bad page state in process swapper  pfn:108001
>> [    0.123942] page:(____ptrval____) refcount:0 mapcount:-128 
>> mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x108001
>> [    0.123946] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
>> [    0.123952] raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff88904f2d5e80 ffff88904f2d5e80 
>> 0000000000000000
>> [    0.123954] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff7f 
>> 0000000000000000
>> [    0.123955] page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
>> [    0.123957] Modules linked in:
>> [    0.123961] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 
>> 5.16.0-rc3-sos-custom #2
>> [    0.123964] Hardware name: AMD Corporation
>> [    0.123967] Call Trace:
>> [    0.123971]  <TASK>
>> [    0.123975]  dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e
>> [    0.123985]  bad_page.cold+0x65/0x96
>> [    0.123990]  __free_pages_ok+0x3a8/0x410
>> [    0.123996]  memblock_free_all+0x171/0x1dc
>> [    0.124005]  mem_init+0x1f/0x14b
>> [    0.124011]  start_kernel+0x3b5/0x6a1
>> [    0.124016]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb
>> [    0.124022]  </TASK>
>>
>> I see ~40 of these traces, each for different pfns.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
> 
> Hi Tom:
>        Thanks for your test. Could you help to test the following patch 
> and check whether it can fix the issue.

The patch is mangled. Is the only difference where set_memory_decrypted() 
is called?

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> index 569272871375..f6c3638255d5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> +++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
> @@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ extern enum swiotlb_force swiotlb_force;
>    * @end:       The end address of the swiotlb memory pool. Used to do a 
> quick
>    *             range check to see if the memory was in fact allocated by 
> this
>    *             API.
> + * @vaddr:     The vaddr of the swiotlb memory pool. The swiotlb memory pool
> + *             may be remapped in the memory encrypted case and store 
> virtual
> + *             address for bounce buffer operation.
>    * @nslabs:    The number of IO TLB blocks (in groups of 64) between 
> @start and
>    *             @end. For default swiotlb, this is command line 
> adjustable via
>    *             setup_io_tlb_npages.
> @@ -92,6 +95,7 @@ extern enum swiotlb_force swiotlb_force;
>   struct io_tlb_mem {
>          phys_addr_t start;
>          phys_addr_t end;
> +       void *vaddr;
>          unsigned long nslabs;
>          unsigned long used;
>          unsigned int index;
> @@ -186,4 +190,6 @@ static inline bool is_swiotlb_for_alloc(struct device 
> *dev)
>   }
>   #endif /* CONFIG_DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL */
> 
> +extern phys_addr_t swiotlb_unencrypted_base;
> +
>   #endif /* __LINUX_SWIOTLB_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> index 8e840fbbed7c..34e6ade4f73c 100644
> --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
> @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
>   #include <asm/io.h>
>   #include <asm/dma.h>
> 
> +#include <linux/io.h>
>   #include <linux/init.h>
>   #include <linux/memblock.h>
>   #include <linux/iommu-helper.h>
> @@ -72,6 +73,8 @@ enum swiotlb_force swiotlb_force;
> 
>   struct io_tlb_mem io_tlb_default_mem;
> 
> +phys_addr_t swiotlb_unencrypted_base;
> +
>   /*
>    * Max segment that we can provide which (if pages are contingous) will
>    * not be bounced (unless SWIOTLB_FORCE is set).
> @@ -155,6 +158,27 @@ static inline unsigned long nr_slots(u64 val)
>          return DIV_ROUND_UP(val, IO_TLB_SIZE);
>   }
> 
> +/*
> + * Remap swioltb memory in the unencrypted physical address space
> + * when swiotlb_unencrypted_base is set. (e.g. for Hyper-V AMD SEV-SNP
> + * Isolation VMs).
> + */
> +void *swiotlb_mem_remap(struct io_tlb_mem *mem, unsigned long bytes)
> +{
> +       void *vaddr = NULL;
> +
> +       if (swiotlb_unencrypted_base) {
> +               phys_addr_t paddr = mem->start + swiotlb_unencrypted_base;
> +
> +               vaddr = memremap(paddr, bytes, MEMREMAP_WB);
> +               if (!vaddr)
> +                       pr_err("Failed to map the unencrypted memory %llx 
> size %lx.\n",
> +                              paddr, bytes);
> +       }
> +
> +       return vaddr;
> +}
> +
>   /*
>    * Early SWIOTLB allocation may be too early to allow an architecture to
>    * perform the desired operations.  This function allows the 
> architecture to
> @@ -172,7 +196,12 @@ void __init swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(void)
>          vaddr = phys_to_virt(mem->start);
>          bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(mem->nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
>          set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, bytes >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> -       memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> +
> +       mem->vaddr = swiotlb_mem_remap(mem, bytes);
> +       if (!mem->vaddr)
> +               mem->vaddr = vaddr;
> +
> +       memset(mem->vaddr, 0, bytes);
>   }
> 
>   static void swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem(struct io_tlb_mem *mem, phys_addr_t 
> start,
> @@ -196,7 +225,17 @@ static void swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem(struct io_tlb_mem 
> *mem, phys_addr_t start,
>                  mem->slots[i].orig_addr = INVALID_PHYS_ADDR;
>                  mem->slots[i].alloc_size = 0;
>          }
> +
> +       /*
> +        * If swiotlb_unencrypted_base is set, the bounce buffer memory will
> +        * be remapped and cleared in swiotlb_update_mem_attributes.
> +        */
> +       if (swiotlb_unencrypted_base)
> +               return;
> +
>          memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> +       mem->vaddr = vaddr;
> +       return;
>   }
> 
>   int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int 
> verbose)
> @@ -371,7 +410,7 @@ static void swiotlb_bounce(struct device *dev, 
> phys_addr_t tlb_addr, size_t size
>          phys_addr_t orig_addr = mem->slots[index].orig_addr;
>          size_t alloc_size = mem->slots[index].alloc_size;
>          unsigned long pfn = PFN_DOWN(orig_addr);
> -       unsigned char *vaddr = phys_to_virt(tlb_addr);
> +       unsigned char *vaddr = mem->vaddr + tlb_addr - mem->start;
>          unsigned int tlb_offset, orig_addr_offset;
> 
>          if (orig_addr == INVALID_PHYS_ADDR)
> 
> 
> Thanks.
> 

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ