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Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 22:47:39 +0200 From: "Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" <parri.andrea@...il.com> To: KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>, Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@...rosoft.com>, Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@...rosoft.com>, Wei Liu <wei.liu@...nel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>, Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>, Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com> Cc: linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" <parri.andrea@...il.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH 3/6] hv_sock: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer. Ensure that invalid values cannot cause data being copied out of the bounds of the source buffer in hvs_stream_dequeue(). Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@...il.com> --- include/linux/hyperv.h | 5 +++++ net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c | 11 +++++++++-- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/hyperv.h b/include/linux/hyperv.h index fe2e0179ed51e..55478a6810b60 100644 --- a/include/linux/hyperv.h +++ b/include/linux/hyperv.h @@ -1663,6 +1663,11 @@ static inline u32 hv_pkt_datalen(const struct vmpacket_descriptor *desc) return (desc->len8 << 3) - (desc->offset8 << 3); } +/* Get packet length associated with descriptor */ +static inline u32 hv_pkt_len(const struct vmpacket_descriptor *desc) +{ + return desc->len8 << 3; +} struct vmpacket_descriptor * hv_pkt_iter_first_raw(struct vmbus_channel *channel); diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c index 8c37d07017fc4..092cadc2c866d 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c @@ -577,12 +577,19 @@ static bool hvs_dgram_allow(u32 cid, u32 port) static int hvs_update_recv_data(struct hvsock *hvs) { struct hvs_recv_buf *recv_buf; - u32 payload_len; + u32 pkt_len, payload_len; + + pkt_len = hv_pkt_len(hvs->recv_desc); + + /* Ensure the packet is big enough to read its header */ + if (pkt_len < HVS_HEADER_LEN) + return -EIO; recv_buf = (struct hvs_recv_buf *)(hvs->recv_desc + 1); payload_len = recv_buf->hdr.data_size; - if (payload_len > HVS_MTU_SIZE) + /* Ensure the packet is big enough to read its payload */ + if (payload_len > pkt_len - HVS_HEADER_LEN || payload_len > HVS_MTU_SIZE) return -EIO; if (payload_len == 0) -- 2.25.1
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