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Message-ID: <7e4682da-6ed6-17cf-8e5a-dff7925aef1d@mojatatu.com>
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 16:10:52 -0400
From: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>
To: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>, Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net/sched: act_pedit: really ensure the skb is
writable
What was the tc pedit command that triggered this?
Can we add it to tdc tests?
cheers,
jamal
On 2022-05-03 10:05, Paolo Abeni wrote:
> Currently pedit tries to ensure that the accessed skb offset
> is writeble via skb_unclone(). The action potentially allows
> touching any skb bytes, so it may end-up modifying shared data.
>
> The above causes some sporadic MPTCP self-test failures.
>
> Address the issue keeping track of a rough over-estimate highest skb
> offset accessed by the action and ensure such offset is really
> writable.
>
> Note that this may cause performance regressions in some scenario,
> but hopefully pedit is not critical path.
>
> Fixes: db2c24175d14 ("act_pedit: access skb->data safely")
> Acked-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>
> Tested-by: Geliang Tang <geliang.tang@...e.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
> ---
> Note: AFAICS the issue is present since 1da177e4c3f4
> ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2"), but before the "Fixes" commit this change
> is irrelevant, because accessing any data out of the skb head
> will cause an oops.
> ---
> include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h | 1 +
> net/sched/act_pedit.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
> index 748cf87a4d7e..3e02709a1df6 100644
> --- a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
> +++ b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct tcf_pedit {
> struct tc_action common;
> unsigned char tcfp_nkeys;
> unsigned char tcfp_flags;
> + u32 tcfp_off_max_hint;
> struct tc_pedit_key *tcfp_keys;
> struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tcfp_keys_ex;
> };
> diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> index 31fcd279c177..a8ab6c3f1ea2 100644
> --- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> +++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
> struct nlattr *pattr;
> struct tcf_pedit *p;
> int ret = 0, err;
> - int ksize;
> + int i, ksize;
> u32 index;
>
> if (!nla) {
> @@ -228,6 +228,20 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
> p->tcfp_nkeys = parm->nkeys;
> }
> memcpy(p->tcfp_keys, parm->keys, ksize);
> + p->tcfp_off_max_hint = 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < p->tcfp_nkeys; ++i) {
> + u32 cur = p->tcfp_keys[i].off;
> +
> + /* The AT option can read a single byte, we can bound the actual
> + * value with uchar max. Each key touches 4 bytes starting from
> + * the computed offset
> + */
> + if (p->tcfp_keys[i].offmask) {
> + cur += 255 >> p->tcfp_keys[i].shift;
> + cur = max(p->tcfp_keys[i].at, cur);
> + }
> + p->tcfp_off_max_hint = max(p->tcfp_off_max_hint, cur + 4);
> + }
>
> p->tcfp_flags = parm->flags;
> goto_ch = tcf_action_set_ctrlact(*a, parm->action, goto_ch);
> @@ -308,9 +322,14 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
> struct tcf_result *res)
> {
> struct tcf_pedit *p = to_pedit(a);
> + u32 max_offset;
> int i;
>
> - if (skb_unclone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC))
> + max_offset = (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) ?
> + skb_transport_offset(skb) :
> + skb_network_offset(skb)) +
> + p->tcfp_off_max_hint;
> + if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min(skb->len, max_offset)))
> return p->tcf_action;
>
> spin_lock(&p->tcf_lock);
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