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Date:   Tue, 3 May 2022 16:10:52 -0400
From:   Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>
To:     Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>, Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net/sched: act_pedit: really ensure the skb is
 writable

What was the tc pedit command that triggered this?
Can we add it to tdc tests?

cheers,
jamal

On 2022-05-03 10:05, Paolo Abeni wrote:
> Currently pedit tries to ensure that the accessed skb offset
> is writeble via skb_unclone(). The action potentially allows
> touching any skb bytes, so it may end-up modifying shared data.
> 
> The above causes some sporadic MPTCP self-test failures.
> 
> Address the issue keeping track of a rough over-estimate highest skb
> offset accessed by the action and ensure such offset is really
> writable.
> 
> Note that this may cause performance regressions in some scenario,
> but hopefully pedit is not critical path.
> 
> Fixes: db2c24175d14 ("act_pedit: access skb->data safely")
> Acked-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>
> Tested-by: Geliang Tang <geliang.tang@...e.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
> ---
> Note: AFAICS the issue is present since 1da177e4c3f4
> ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2"), but before the "Fixes" commit this change
> is irrelevant, because accessing any data out of the skb head
> will cause an oops.
> ---
>   include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h |  1 +
>   net/sched/act_pedit.c         | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
>   2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
> index 748cf87a4d7e..3e02709a1df6 100644
> --- a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
> +++ b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct tcf_pedit {
>   	struct tc_action	common;
>   	unsigned char		tcfp_nkeys;
>   	unsigned char		tcfp_flags;
> +	u32			tcfp_off_max_hint;
>   	struct tc_pedit_key	*tcfp_keys;
>   	struct tcf_pedit_key_ex	*tcfp_keys_ex;
>   };
> diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> index 31fcd279c177..a8ab6c3f1ea2 100644
> --- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> +++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
> @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
>   	struct nlattr *pattr;
>   	struct tcf_pedit *p;
>   	int ret = 0, err;
> -	int ksize;
> +	int i, ksize;
>   	u32 index;
>   
>   	if (!nla) {
> @@ -228,6 +228,20 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
>   		p->tcfp_nkeys = parm->nkeys;
>   	}
>   	memcpy(p->tcfp_keys, parm->keys, ksize);
> +	p->tcfp_off_max_hint = 0;
> +	for (i = 0; i < p->tcfp_nkeys; ++i) {
> +		u32 cur = p->tcfp_keys[i].off;
> +
> +		/* The AT option can read a single byte, we can bound the actual
> +		 * value with uchar max. Each key touches 4 bytes starting from
> +		 * the computed offset
> +		 */
> +		if (p->tcfp_keys[i].offmask) {
> +			cur += 255 >> p->tcfp_keys[i].shift;
> +			cur = max(p->tcfp_keys[i].at, cur);
> +		}
> +		p->tcfp_off_max_hint = max(p->tcfp_off_max_hint, cur + 4);
> +	}
>   
>   	p->tcfp_flags = parm->flags;
>   	goto_ch = tcf_action_set_ctrlact(*a, parm->action, goto_ch);
> @@ -308,9 +322,14 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
>   			 struct tcf_result *res)
>   {
>   	struct tcf_pedit *p = to_pedit(a);
> +	u32 max_offset;
>   	int i;
>   
> -	if (skb_unclone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC))
> +	max_offset = (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) ?
> +		      skb_transport_offset(skb) :
> +		      skb_network_offset(skb)) +
> +		     p->tcfp_off_max_hint;
> +	if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min(skb->len, max_offset)))
>   		return p->tcf_action;
>   
>   	spin_lock(&p->tcf_lock);

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