Message-ID: <20220516152038.39594-9-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Date:   Mon, 16 May 2022 23:20:31 +0800
From:   Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
To:     <mic@...ikod.net>
CC:     <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>,
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <yusongping@...wei.com>,
        <anton.sirazetdinov@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 08/15] landlock: TCP network hooks implementation

Support of socket_bind() and socket_connect() hooks.
Its possible to restrict binding and connecting of TCP
types of sockets to particular ports. Its just basic idea
how Landlock could support network confinement.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
---

Changes since v3:
* Split commit.
* Add SECURITY_NETWORK in config.
* Add IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) if a kernel has no INET configuration.
* Add hook_socket_bind and hook_socket_connect hooks.

Changes since v4:
* Factors out CONFIG_INET into make file.
* Refactoring check_socket_access().
* Adds helper get_port().
* Adds CONFIG_IPV6 in  get_port(), hook_socket_bind/connect
functions to support AF_INET6 family.
* Adds AF_UNSPEC family support in hook_socket_bind/connect
functions.
* Refactoring add_rule_net_service() and landlock_add_rule
syscall to support network rule inserting.
* Refactoring init_layer_masks() to support network rules.

---
 security/landlock/Kconfig    |   1 +
 security/landlock/Makefile   |   2 +
 security/landlock/net.c      | 159 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/net.h      |  25 ++++++
 security/landlock/ruleset.c  |  15 +++-
 security/landlock/setup.c    |   2 +
 security/landlock/syscalls.c |  63 ++++++++++++--
 7 files changed, 261 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
 create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h

diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Kconfig
+++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
 	bool "Landlock support"
 	depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
+	select SECURITY_NETWORK
 	select SECURITY_PATH
 	help
 	  Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Makefile
+++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o

 landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \
 	cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
+
+landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9302e5891991
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "net.h"
+
+int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+			     u16 port, u32 access_rights)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
+	access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
+			 ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(uintptr_t));
+	mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
+	err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, NULL, port,
+				access_rights, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE);
+	mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int check_socket_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+			       u16 port, access_mask_t access_request)
+{
+	bool allowed = false;
+	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
+	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
+	access_mask_t handled_access;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
+		return 0;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, port,
+					LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE);
+
+	handled_access = init_layer_masks(domain, access_request,
+			&layer_masks, sizeof(layer_masks),
+			LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE);
+	allowed = unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
+			&layer_masks, ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
+
+	return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
+{
+	/* Gets port value in host byte order. */
+	switch (address->sa_family) {
+	case AF_UNSPEC:
+	case AF_INET:
+	{
+		const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
+					(struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+		return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
+	}
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case AF_INET6:
+	{
+		const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
+					(struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+		return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
+	}
+#endif
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+			    int addrlen)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+						landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check if it's a TCP socket */
+	if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Get port value in host byte order */
+	switch (address->sa_family) {
+	case AF_UNSPEC:
+	case AF_INET:
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case AF_INET6:
+#endif
+		return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address),
+					LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+				int addrlen)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+						landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+	if (!dom)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check if it's a TCP socket */
+	if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Get port value in host byte order */
+	switch (address->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case AF_INET6:
+#endif
+		return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address),
+					   LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
+	case AF_UNSPEC:
+	{
+		u16 i;
+		/*
+		 * If just in a layer a mask supports connect access,
+		 * the socket_connect() hook with AF_UNSPEC family flag
+		 * must be banned. This prevents from disconnecting already
+		 * connected sockets.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < dom->num_layers; i++) {
+			if (landlock_get_net_access_mask(dom, i) &
+				LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
+				return -EACCES;
+		}
+	}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
+};
+
+__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
+			LANDLOCK_NAME);
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..da5ce8fa04cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void);
+
+int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+				u16 port, u32 access_hierarchy);
+#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
+{}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index ea9ecb3f471a..317cf98890f6 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ access_mask_t get_handled_accesses(
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
-		break;
+		return 0;
 	}
 	return access_dom;
 }
@@ -763,6 +763,19 @@ access_mask_t init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 				}
 			}
 			break;
+		case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE:
+			for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
+					LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET) {
+				if (landlock_get_net_access_mask(domain,
+								 layer_level) &
+						BIT_ULL(access_bit)) {
+					(*layer_masks)[access_bit] |=
+						BIT_ULL(layer_level);
+					handled_accesses |=
+							   BIT_ULL(access_bit);
+				}
+			}
+			break;
 		default:
 			return 0;
 		}
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f8e8e980454c..8059dc0b47d3 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include "fs.h"
 #include "ptrace.h"
 #include "setup.h"
+#include "net.h"

 bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;

@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void)
 	landlock_add_cred_hooks();
 	landlock_add_ptrace_hooks();
 	landlock_add_fs_hooks();
+	landlock_add_net_hooks();
 	landlock_initialized = true;
 	pr_info("Up and running.\n");
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 812541f4e155..9454c6361011 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include "cred.h"
 #include "fs.h"
 #include "limits.h"
+#include "net.h"
 #include "ruleset.h"
 #include "setup.h"

@@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
 {
 	struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
 	struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
-	size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size;
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr;
+	size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size;

 	/*
 	 * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no
@@ -90,6 +92,11 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
 	path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12);
+
+	net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access);
+	net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 10);
 }

 /* Ruleset handling */
@@ -299,9 +306,9 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 	 * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
 	 * are ignored in path walks.
 	 */
-	if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access) {
+	if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access)
 		return -ENOMSG;
-	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
 	 * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
@@ -323,13 +330,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 	return err;
 }

+static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
+				const void *const rule_attr)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+	struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr;
+	int res;
+	u32 mask;
+
+	/* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */
+	res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr,
+			sizeof(net_service_attr));
+	if (res)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
+	 * are ignored by network actions
+	 */
+	if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access)
+		return -ENOMSG;
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
+	 * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
+	 */
+	mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+	if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Denies inserting a rule with port 0 */
+	if (net_service_attr.port == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Imports the new rule. */
+	return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port,
+				       net_service_attr.allowed_access);
+#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+	return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+}
+
 /**
  * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset
  *
  * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended
  *		with the new rule.
- * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only
- *             LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now).
+ * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr:
+ *             LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE.
  * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct
  *             landlock_path_beneath_attr for now).
  * @flags: Must be 0.
@@ -340,6 +388,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
  * Possible returned errors are:
  *
  * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
+ * - EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not
+ *   supported by the running kernel;
  * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e.
  *   &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's
  *   accesses);
@@ -375,6 +425,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule,
 	case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH:
 		err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr);
 		break;
+	case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE:
+		err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr);
+		break;
 	default:
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		break;
--
2.25.1

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