netdev - [PATCH net-next 4/9] can: isotp: isotp_bind(): return -EINVAL on incorrect CAN ID formatting

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Date:   Mon, 16 May 2022 22:26:20 +0200
From:   Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
To:     netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org, linux-can@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel@...gutronix.de, Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
        Derek Will <derekrobertwill@...il.com>,
        Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH net-next 4/9] can: isotp: isotp_bind(): return -EINVAL on incorrect CAN ID formatting

From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>

Commit 3ea566422cbd ("can: isotp: sanitize CAN ID checks in
isotp_bind()") checks the given CAN ID address information by
sanitizing the input values.

This check (silently) removes obsolete bits by masking the given CAN
IDs.

Derek Will suggested to give a feedback to the application programmer
when the 'sanitizing' was actually needed which means the programmer
provided CAN ID content in a wrong format (e.g. SFF CAN IDs with a CAN
ID > 0x7FF).

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220515181633.76671-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Suggested-by: Derek Will <derekrobertwill@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
---
 net/can/isotp.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c
index 2caeeae8ec16..4a4007f10970 100644
--- a/net/can/isotp.c
+++ b/net/can/isotp.c
@@ -1232,6 +1232,11 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
 	else
 		rx_id &= CAN_SFF_MASK;
 
+	/* give feedback on wrong CAN-ID values */
+	if (tx_id != addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id ||
+	    rx_id != addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (!addr->can_ifindex)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-- 
2.35.1