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Message-ID: <20220518080253.GQ680067@gauss3.secunet.de>
Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 10:02:53 +0200
From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
CC: "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, Raed Salem <raeds@...dia.com>,
ipsec-devel <devel@...ux-ipsec.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH ipsec-next 5/6] xfrm: add RX datapath protection for
IPsec full offload mode
On Mon, May 16, 2022 at 08:29:03AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 05:02:54PM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> > On Tue, May 10, 2022 at 01:36:56PM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > > From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@...dia.com>
> > >
> > > Traffic received by device with enabled IPsec full offload should be
> > > forwarded to the stack only after decryption, packet headers and
> > > trailers removed.
> > >
> > > Such packets are expected to be seen as normal (non-XFRM) ones, while
> > > not-supported packets should be dropped by the HW.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@...dia.com>
> > > ---
> > > include/net/xfrm.h | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> > > 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
> > > index 21be19ece4f7..9f9250fe1c4d 100644
> > > --- a/include/net/xfrm.h
> > > +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
> > > @@ -1094,6 +1094,29 @@ xfrm_state_addr_cmp(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x, un
> > > return !0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
> > > +static inline struct xfrm_state *xfrm_input_state(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > > +{
> > > + struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
> > > +
> > > + return sp->xvec[sp->len - 1];
> > > +}
> > > +#endif
> > > +
> > > +static inline struct xfrm_offload *xfrm_offload(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > > +{
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
> > > + struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
> > > +
> > > + if (!sp || !sp->olen || sp->len != sp->olen)
> > > + return NULL;
> > > +
> > > + return &sp->ovec[sp->olen - 1];
> > > +#else
> > > + return NULL;
> > > +#endif
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
> > > int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
> > > unsigned short family);
> > > @@ -1113,6 +1136,15 @@ static inline int __xfrm_policy_check2(struct sock *sk, int dir,
> > > {
> > > struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
> > > int ndir = dir | (reverse ? XFRM_POLICY_MASK + 1 : 0);
> > > + struct xfrm_offload *xo = xfrm_offload(skb);
> > > + struct xfrm_state *x;
> > > +
> > > + if (xo) {
> > > + x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
> > > + if (x->xso.type == XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_FULL)
> > > + return (xo->flags & CRYPTO_DONE) &&
> > > + (xo->status & CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
> > > + }
> >
> > We can not exit without doing the policy check here. The inner
> > packet could still match a block policy in software. Maybe
> > we can reset the secpath and do the policy check.
>
> We checked that both policy and state were offloaded. In such case,
> driver returned that everything ok and the packet is handled.
>
> SW policy will be in lower priority, so we won't catch it.
Ok.
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