netdev - [PATCH net-next 1/4] can: isotp: isotp_bind(): do not validate unused address information

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Message-Id: <20220519202308.1435903-2-mkl@pengutronix.de>
Date:   Thu, 19 May 2022 22:23:05 +0200
From:   Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
To:     netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org, linux-can@...r.kernel.org,
        kernel@...gutronix.de, Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
        Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH net-next 1/4] can: isotp: isotp_bind(): do not validate unused address information

From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>

With commit 2aa39889c463 ("can: isotp: isotp_bind(): return -EINVAL on
incorrect CAN ID formatting") the bind() syscall returns -EINVAL when
the given CAN ID needed to be sanitized. But in the case of an unconfirmed
broadcast mode the rx CAN ID is not needed and may be uninitialized from
the caller - which is ok.

This patch makes sure the result of an inproper CAN ID format is only
provided when the address information is needed.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220517145653.2556-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
---
 net/can/isotp.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c
index 4a4007f10970..43a27d19cdac 100644
--- a/net/can/isotp.c
+++ b/net/can/isotp.c
@@ -1212,31 +1212,36 @@ static int isotp_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
 	struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
 	int ifindex;
 	struct net_device *dev;
-	canid_t tx_id, rx_id;
+	canid_t tx_id = addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id;
+	canid_t rx_id = addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id;
 	int err = 0;
 	int notify_enetdown = 0;
 
 	if (len < ISOTP_MIN_NAMELEN)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* sanitize tx/rx CAN identifiers */
-	tx_id = addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id;
+	/* sanitize tx CAN identifier */
 	if (tx_id & CAN_EFF_FLAG)
 		tx_id &= (CAN_EFF_FLAG | CAN_EFF_MASK);
 	else
 		tx_id &= CAN_SFF_MASK;
 
-	rx_id = addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id;
-	if (rx_id & CAN_EFF_FLAG)
-		rx_id &= (CAN_EFF_FLAG | CAN_EFF_MASK);
-	else
-		rx_id &= CAN_SFF_MASK;
-
-	/* give feedback on wrong CAN-ID values */
-	if (tx_id != addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id ||
-	    rx_id != addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id)
+	/* give feedback on wrong CAN-ID value */
+	if (tx_id != addr->can_addr.tp.tx_id)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* sanitize rx CAN identifier (if needed) */
+	if (isotp_register_rxid(so)) {
+		if (rx_id & CAN_EFF_FLAG)
+			rx_id &= (CAN_EFF_FLAG | CAN_EFF_MASK);
+		else
+			rx_id &= CAN_SFF_MASK;
+
+		/* give feedback on wrong CAN-ID value */
+		if (rx_id != addr->can_addr.tp.rx_id)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (!addr->can_ifindex)
 		return -ENODEV;
 

base-commit: d7e6f5836038eeac561411ed7a74e2a225a6c138
-- 
2.35.1