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Message-ID: <87tu8oze94.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 12:04:23 -0500
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
To: Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com>
Cc: linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-aio@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-cachefs@...hat.com, linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org,
samba-technical@...ts.samba.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
serge@...lyn.com, amir73il@...il.com, kernel-team@...udflare.com,
Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] cred: Propagate security_prepare_creds() error code
Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com> writes:
> While experimenting with the security_prepare_creds() LSM hook, we
> noticed that our EPERM error code was not propagated up the callstack.
> Instead ENOMEM is always returned. As a result, some tools may send a
> confusing error message to the user:
>
> $ unshare -rU
> unshare: unshare failed: Cannot allocate memory
>
> A user would think that the system didn't have enough memory, when
> instead the action was denied.
>
> This problem occurs because prepare_creds() and prepare_kernel_cred()
> return NULL when security_prepare_creds() returns an error code. Later,
> functions calling prepare_creds() and prepare_kernel_cred() return
> ENOMEM because they assume that a NULL meant there was no memory
> allocated.
>
> Fix this by propagating an error code from security_prepare_creds() up
> the callstack.
Why would it make sense for security_prepare_creds to return an error
code other than ENOMEM?
That seems a bit of a violation of what that function is supposed to do.
I have probably missed a very interesting discussion where that was
mentioned but I don't see link to the discussion or anything explaining
why we want to do that in this change.
Eric
> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com>
> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
> Acked-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@...hat.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> (SELinux)
>
> ---
> Changes since v2:
> - Rebase onto 5.19-rc1 from 5.18-rc1
>
> Changes since v1:
> - Revert style churn in ovl_create_or_link() noted by Amir
> - Revert style churn in prepare_nsset() noted by Serge
> - Update documentation for prepare_creds()
> - Set ofs->creator_cred in ovl_fill_super() and req->creds in aio_fsync()
> to NULL on error noted by Amir
> ---
> Documentation/security/credentials.rst | 6 +++---
> fs/aio.c | 9 +++++++--
> fs/cachefiles/security.c | 8 ++++----
> fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 4 ++--
> fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 4 ++--
> fs/coredump.c | 2 +-
> fs/exec.c | 14 ++++++++-----
> fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c | 4 ++--
> fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c | 7 +++++--
> fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c | 4 ++--
> fs/nfsd/auth.c | 4 ++--
> fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c | 10 ++++-----
> fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c | 4 ++--
> fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 4 ++--
> fs/open.c | 8 ++++----
> fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 6 ++++--
> fs/overlayfs/super.c | 6 ++++--
> kernel/capability.c | 4 ++--
> kernel/cred.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-----------
> kernel/groups.c | 4 ++--
> kernel/nsproxy.c | 9 ++++++++-
> kernel/sys.c | 28 +++++++++++++-------------
> kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c | 4 ++--
> kernel/umh.c | 5 +++--
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 6 ++++--
> net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 4 ++--
> security/apparmor/task.c | 12 +++++------
> security/commoncap.c | 20 +++++++++---------
> security/keys/keyctl.c | 8 ++++----
> security/keys/process_keys.c | 16 +++++++--------
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 4 ++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++----
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 4 ++--
> 34 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
> index 357328d566c8..8852b2ab6a18 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
> @@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ new set of credentials by calling::
>
> this locks current->cred_replace_mutex and then allocates and constructs a
> duplicate of the current process's credentials, returning with the mutex still
> -held if successful. It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory).
> +held if successful. It returns < 0 if not successful.
>
> The mutex prevents ``ptrace()`` from altering the ptrace state of a process
> while security checks on credentials construction and changing is taking place
> @@ -497,8 +497,8 @@ A typical credentials alteration function would look something like this::
> int ret;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> new->suid = suid;
> ret = security_alter_suid(new);
> diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
> index 3c249b938632..5abbe88c3ca7 100644
> --- a/fs/aio.c
> +++ b/fs/aio.c
> @@ -1620,6 +1620,8 @@ static void aio_fsync_work(struct work_struct *work)
> static int aio_fsync(struct fsync_iocb *req, const struct iocb *iocb,
> bool datasync)
> {
> + int err;
> +
> if (unlikely(iocb->aio_buf || iocb->aio_offset || iocb->aio_nbytes ||
> iocb->aio_rw_flags))
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1628,8 +1630,11 @@ static int aio_fsync(struct fsync_iocb *req, const struct iocb *iocb,
> return -EINVAL;
>
> req->creds = prepare_creds();
> - if (!req->creds)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(req->creds)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(req->creds);
> + req->creds = NULL;
> + return err;
> + }
>
> req->datasync = datasync;
> INIT_WORK(&req->work, aio_fsync_work);
> diff --git a/fs/cachefiles/security.c b/fs/cachefiles/security.c
> index fe777164f1d8..8dc256b18312 100644
> --- a/fs/cachefiles/security.c
> +++ b/fs/cachefiles/security.c
> @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ int cachefiles_get_security_ID(struct cachefiles_cache *cache)
> _enter("{%s}", cache->secctx);
>
> new = prepare_kernel_cred(current);
> - if (!new) {
> - ret = -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(new);
> goto error;
> }
>
> @@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ int cachefiles_determine_cache_security(struct cachefiles_cache *cache,
> /* duplicate the cache creds for COW (the override is currently in
> * force, so we can use prepare_creds() to do this) */
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> cachefiles_end_secure(cache, *_saved_cred);
>
> diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
> index 342717bf1dc2..0a5b8157387a 100644
> --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
> +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
> @@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ init_cifs_spnego(void)
> */
>
> cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
> - if (!cred)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(cred))
> + return PTR_ERR(cred);
>
> keyring = keyring_alloc(".cifs_spnego",
> GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
> diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
> index bf861fef2f0c..1debcfa927d1 100644
> --- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
> +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
> @@ -466,8 +466,8 @@ init_cifs_idmap(void)
> * with add_key().
> */
> cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
> - if (!cred)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(cred))
> + return PTR_ERR(cred);
>
> keyring = keyring_alloc(".cifs_idmap",
> GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
> diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
> index ebc43f960b64..ea4ccae6368a 100644
> --- a/fs/coredump.c
> +++ b/fs/coredump.c
> @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
> goto fail;
>
> cred = prepare_creds();
> - if (!cred)
> + if (IS_ERR(cred))
> goto fail;
> /*
> * We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the process
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 0989fb8472a1..02624783e40e 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1468,15 +1468,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec);
> */
> static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> + int err = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
> if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
> - return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
> + return err;
>
> bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
> - if (likely(bprm->cred))
> - return 0;
> + if (IS_ERR(bprm->cred)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(bprm->cred);
> + bprm->cred = NULL;
> + mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> + return err;
> + }
>
> - mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + return 0;
> }
>
> static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c
> index 7f8ab14fb8ec..5c703ab65ecf 100644
> --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c
> +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c
> @@ -622,8 +622,8 @@ int ksmbd_override_fsids(struct ksmbd_work *work)
> gid = share->force_gid;
>
> cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
> - if (!cred)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(cred))
> + return PTR_ERR(cred);
>
> cred->fsuid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), uid);
> cred->fsgid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), gid);
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c
> index 604be402ae13..74d950a6dd55 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c
> @@ -493,9 +493,12 @@ ff_layout_alloc_lseg(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lh,
> kcred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
> memalloc_nofs_restore(nofs_flags);
> }
> - rc = -ENOMEM;
> - if (!kcred)
> +
> + if (IS_ERR(kcred)) {
> + rc = PTR_ERR(kcred);
> goto out_err_free;
> + }
> +
> kcred->fsuid = uid;
> kcred->fsgid = gid;
> cred = RCU_INITIALIZER(kcred);
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
> index f331866dd418..6ddceff5fbe0 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
> @@ -204,8 +204,8 @@ int nfs_idmap_init(void)
> key_type_id_resolver.name);
>
> cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
> - if (!cred)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(cred))
> + return PTR_ERR(cred);
>
> keyring = keyring_alloc(".id_resolver",
> GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
> index fdf2aad73470..9206ec3ed0f1 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
> @@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
> /* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
> revert_creds(get_cred(current_real_cred()));
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> new->fsuid = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_uid;
> new->fsgid = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_gid;
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c
> index 11f8715d92d6..630c2af0ec74 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c
> @@ -872,8 +872,8 @@ static const struct cred *get_backchannel_cred(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct r
> struct cred *kcred;
>
> kcred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
> - if (!kcred)
> - return NULL;
> + if (IS_ERR(kcred))
> + return ERR_CAST(kcred);
>
> kcred->uid = ses->se_cb_sec.uid;
> kcred->gid = ses->se_cb_sec.gid;
> @@ -932,10 +932,10 @@ static int setup_callback_client(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct nfs4_cb_conn *c
> return PTR_ERR(client);
> }
> cred = get_backchannel_cred(clp, client, ses);
> - if (!cred) {
> - trace_nfsd_cb_setup_err(clp, -ENOMEM);
> + if (IS_ERR(cred)) {
> + trace_nfsd_cb_setup_err(clp, PTR_ERR(cred));
> rpc_shutdown_client(client);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + return PTR_ERR(cred);
> }
> clp->cl_cb_client = client;
> clp->cl_cb_cred = cred;
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
> index c634483d85d2..8e1b196928c1 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
> @@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ nfs4_save_creds(const struct cred **original_creds)
> struct cred *new;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> new->fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
> new->fsgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
> index c29baa03dfaf..af41db078843 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c
> @@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ static __be32 nfsd_set_fh_dentry(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp)
> * fix that case easily.
> */
> struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new) {
> - error = nfserrno(-ENOMEM);
> + if (IS_ERR(new)) {
> + error = nfserrno(PTR_ERR(new));
> goto out;
> }
> new->cap_effective =
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index 1d57fbde2feb..9c667fe67a69 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ static const struct cred *access_override_creds(void)
> struct cred *override_cred;
>
> override_cred = prepare_creds();
> - if (!override_cred)
> - return NULL;
> + if (IS_ERR(override_cred))
> + return ERR_CAST(override_cred);
>
> override_cred->fsuid = override_cred->uid;
> override_cred->fsgid = override_cred->gid;
> @@ -438,8 +438,8 @@ static long do_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode, int fla
>
> if (!(flags & AT_EACCESS)) {
> old_cred = access_override_creds();
> - if (!old_cred)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(old_cred))
> + return PTR_ERR(old_cred);
> }
>
> retry:
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> index 6b03457f72bb..aafd0a905d34 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> @@ -592,9 +592,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> goto out_revert_creds;
> }
>
> - err = -ENOMEM;
> override_cred = prepare_creds();
> - if (override_cred) {
> + if (!IS_ERR(override_cred)) {
> override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> if (!attr->hardlink) {
> @@ -613,7 +612,10 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> err = ovl_create_upper(dentry, inode, attr);
> else
> err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
> + } else {
> + err = PTR_ERR(override_cred);
> }
> +
> out_revert_creds:
> revert_creds(old_cred);
> return err;
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> index e0a2e0468ee7..d4353a32681a 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> @@ -1983,10 +1983,12 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
> if (!ofs)
> goto out;
>
> - err = -ENOMEM;
> ofs->creator_cred = cred = prepare_creds();
> - if (!cred)
> + if (IS_ERR(cred)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(cred);
> + ofs->creator_cred = NULL;
> goto out_err;
> + }
>
> /* Is there a reason anyone would want not to share whiteouts? */
> ofs->share_whiteout = true;
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 765194f5d678..7a722754f571 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -263,8 +263,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
> inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
> &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index e10c15f51c1f..dba33c9fa869 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -245,12 +245,13 @@ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
> *
> * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
> *
> - * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
> + * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, < 0 on error.
> *
> * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
> */
> struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
> {
> + int err = -ENOMEM;
> struct task_struct *task = current;
> const struct cred *old;
> struct cred *new;
> @@ -259,7 +260,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
>
> new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!new)
> - return NULL;
> + return ERR_PTR(err);
>
> kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
>
> @@ -288,7 +289,8 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
> if (!new->ucounts)
> goto error;
>
> - if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
> + err = security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (err < 0)
> goto error;
>
> validate_creds(new);
> @@ -296,7 +298,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
>
> error:
> abort_creds(new);
> - return NULL;
> + return ERR_PTR(err);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
>
> @@ -309,8 +311,8 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
> struct cred *new;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return new;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return ERR_CAST(new);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
> /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
> @@ -363,8 +365,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
> }
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
> ret = create_user_ns(new);
> @@ -707,16 +709,17 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
> *
> * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
> *
> - * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
> + * Returns the new credentials or < 0 on error
> */
> struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
> {
> + int err = -ENOMEM;
> const struct cred *old;
> struct cred *new;
>
> new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!new)
> - return NULL;
> + return ERR_PTR(err);
>
> kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
>
> @@ -750,7 +753,8 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
> if (!new->ucounts)
> goto error;
>
> - if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
> + err = security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> + if (err < 0)
> goto error;
>
> put_cred(old);
> @@ -760,7 +764,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
> error:
> put_cred(new);
> put_cred(old);
> - return NULL;
> + return ERR_PTR(err);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c
> index 787b381c7c00..140915fbb31f 100644
> --- a/kernel/groups.c
> +++ b/kernel/groups.c
> @@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info)
> struct cred *new;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> set_groups(new, group_info);
> return commit_creds(new);
> diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> index eec72ca962e2..6cf75aa83b6c 100644
> --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
> +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> @@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ static void put_nsset(struct nsset *nsset)
>
> static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset)
> {
> + int err = -ENOMEM;
> struct task_struct *me = current;
>
> nsset->nsproxy = create_new_namespaces(0, me, current_user_ns(), me->fs);
> @@ -324,6 +325,12 @@ static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset)
> if (!nsset->cred)
> goto out;
>
> + if (IS_ERR(nsset->cred)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(nsset->cred);
> + nsset->cred = NULL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> /* Only create a temporary copy of fs_struct if we really need to. */
> if (flags == CLONE_NEWNS) {
> nsset->fs = me->fs;
> @@ -338,7 +345,7 @@ static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset)
>
> out:
> put_nsset(nsset);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + return err;
> }
>
> static inline int validate_ns(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns)
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index b911fa6d81ab..bfba37c1cad8 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -378,8 +378,8 @@ long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> @@ -440,8 +440,8 @@ long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> @@ -535,8 +535,8 @@ long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> @@ -612,8 +612,8 @@ long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> @@ -678,8 +678,8 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> old = current_cred();
>
> @@ -773,8 +773,8 @@ long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> old = current_cred();
>
> retval = -EPERM;
> @@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
> return old_fsuid;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> return old_fsuid;
>
> if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
> @@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
> return old_fsgid;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> return old_fsgid;
>
> if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) ||
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
> index 706e1686b5eb..35bca2fd9e8d 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_user.c
> @@ -559,8 +559,8 @@ static int user_event_set_call_visible(struct user_event *user, bool visible)
>
> cred = prepare_creds();
>
> - if (!cred)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(cred))
> + return PTR_ERR(cred);
>
> /*
> * While by default tracefs is locked down, systems can be configured
> diff --git a/kernel/umh.c b/kernel/umh.c
> index b989736e8707..9337b0a17dd2 100644
> --- a/kernel/umh.c
> +++ b/kernel/umh.c
> @@ -87,10 +87,11 @@ static int call_usermodehelper_exec_async(void *data)
> */
> set_user_nice(current, 0);
>
> - retval = -ENOMEM;
> new = prepare_kernel_cred(current);
> - if (!new)
> + if (IS_ERR(new)) {
> + retval = PTR_ERR(new);
> goto out;
> + }
>
> spin_lock(&umh_sysctl_lock);
> new->cap_bset = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_bset, new->cap_bset);
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 5481ba44a8d6..56c94b0867b4 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -171,18 +171,20 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
> int unshare_userns(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct cred **new_cred)
> {
> struct cred *cred;
> - int err = -ENOMEM;
> + int err;
>
> if (!(unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER))
> return 0;
>
> cred = prepare_creds();
> - if (cred) {
> + if (!IS_ERR(cred)) {
> err = create_user_ns(cred);
> if (err)
> put_cred(cred);
> else
> *new_cred = cred;
> + } else {
> + err = PTR_ERR(cred);
> }
>
> return err;
> diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
> index 3aced951d5ab..dbfb2b17491e 100644
> --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
> +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
> @@ -338,8 +338,8 @@ static int __init init_dns_resolver(void)
> * with add_key().
> */
> cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
> - if (!cred)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(cred))
> + return PTR_ERR(cred);
>
> keyring = keyring_alloc(".dns_resolver",
> GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
> index d17130ee6795..77d0bb7f0aa6 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/task.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
> @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label)
> return -EBUSY;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> if (ctx->nnp && label_is_stale(ctx->nnp)) {
> struct aa_label *tmp = ctx->nnp;
> @@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token)
> struct cred *new;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> AA_BUG(!label);
>
> if (!ctx->previous) {
> @@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
> return 0;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> aa_put_label(cred_label(new));
> set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous));
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 5fc8986c3c77..906d1bf4a226 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1247,8 +1247,8 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
> return commit_creds(new);
> }
> @@ -1323,8 +1323,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> return -EPERM;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> new->securebits = arg2;
> return commit_creds(new);
>
> @@ -1341,8 +1341,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> return -EPERM;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> if (arg2)
> new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
> else
> @@ -1355,8 +1355,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> return -EINVAL;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
> return commit_creds(new);
> }
> @@ -1378,8 +1378,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
> return -EPERM;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)
> cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3);
> else
> diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> index 96a92a645216..cb3be208bc7d 100644
> --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
> +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> @@ -1146,8 +1146,8 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
> struct cred *new;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> key_put(new->request_key_auth);
> new->request_key_auth = key_get(key);
> @@ -1396,8 +1396,8 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
> return old_setting;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> switch (reqkey_defl) {
> case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
> diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
> index b5d5333ab330..8e7655d48319 100644
> --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
> +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
> @@ -247,8 +247,8 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
> int ret;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
> if (ret < 0) {
> @@ -294,8 +294,8 @@ static int install_process_keyring(void)
> int ret;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
> if (ret < 0) {
> @@ -359,8 +359,8 @@ static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
> int ret;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
> if (ret < 0) {
> @@ -842,8 +842,8 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
> long ret, serial;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
> old = current_cred();
>
> /* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> index 735a0865ea11..ba34df79b30e 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> @@ -424,8 +424,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
>
> /* Prepares new credentials. */
> new_cred = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new_cred) {
> - err = -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new_cred)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(new_cred);
> goto out_put_ruleset;
> }
> new_llcred = landlock_cred(new_cred);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index beceb89f68d9..01f43e433750 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3472,8 +3472,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
>
> if (new_creds == NULL) {
> new_creds = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new_creds)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new_creds))
> + return PTR_ERR(new_creds);
> }
>
> tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
> @@ -6457,8 +6457,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
> }
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
> performed during the actual operation (execve,
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 6207762dbdb1..ca4e2b906cce 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -3555,8 +3555,8 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
> }
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (new == NULL)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return PTR_ERR(new);
>
> tsp = smack_cred(new);
> tsp->smk_task = skp;
> @@ -4633,8 +4633,8 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
>
> if (new_creds == NULL) {
> new_creds = prepare_creds();
> - if (new_creds == NULL)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new_creds))
> + return PTR_ERR(new_creds);
> }
>
> tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index 4b58526450d4..4f2a446a6683 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -2777,8 +2777,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> struct task_smack *tsp;
>
> new = prepare_creds();
> - if (!new) {
> - rc = -ENOMEM;
> + if (IS_ERR(new)) {
> + rc = PTR_ERR(new);
> goto out;
> }
> tsp = smack_cred(new);
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