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Date:   Wed, 22 Jun 2022 09:24:31 -0500
From:   Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com>
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, kpsingh@...nel.org,
        revest@...omium.org, jackmanb@...omium.org, ast@...nel.org,
        daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org, kafai@...com,
        songliubraving@...com, yhs@...com, john.fastabend@...il.com,
        jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     brauner@...nel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...udflare.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Introduce security_create_user_ns()

Hi Casey,

On 6/21/22 7:19 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 6/21/2022 4:39 PM, Frederick Lawler wrote:
>> While creating a LSM BPF MAC policy to block user namespace creation, we
>> used the LSM cred_prepare hook because that is the closest hook to 
>> prevent
>> a call to create_user_ns().
>>
>> The calls look something like this:
>>
>>      cred = prepare_creds()
>>          security_prepare_creds()
>>              call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
>>      if (cred)
>>          create_user_ns(cred)
>>
>> We noticed that error codes were not propagated from this hook and
>> introduced a patch [1] to propagate those errors.
>>
>> The discussion notes that security_prepare_creds()
>> is not appropriate for MAC policies, and instead the hook is
>> meant for LSM authors to prepare credentials for mutation. [2]
>>
>> Ultimately, we concluded that a better course of action is to introduce
>> a new security hook for LSM authors. [3]
>>
>> This patch set first introduces a new security_create_user_ns() function
>> and create_user_ns LSM hook, then marks the hook as sleepable in BPF.
> 
> Why restrict this hook to user namespaces? It seems that an LSM that
> chooses to preform controls on user namespaces may want to do so for
> network namespaces as well.
IIRC, CLONE_NEWUSER is the only namespace flag that does not require 
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. There is a security use case to prevent this namespace 
from being created within an unprivileged environment. I'm not opposed 
to a more generic hook, but I don't currently have a use case to block 
any others. We can also say the same is true for the other namespaces: 
add this generic security function to these too.

I'm curious what others think about this too.


> Also, the hook seems backwards. You should
> decide if the creation of the namespace is allowed before you create it.
> Passing the new namespace to a function that checks to see creating a
> namespace is allowed doesn't make a lot off sense.
> 

I think having more context to a security hook is a good thing. I 
believe you brought up in the previous discussions that you'd like to 
use this hook for xattr purposes. Doesn't that require a namespace?

>>
>> Links:
>> 1. 
>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220608150942.776446-1-fred@cloudflare.com/
>> 2. 
>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/87y1xzyhub.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org/ 
>>
>> 3. 
>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/9fe9cd9f-1ded-a179-8ded-5fde8960a586@cloudflare.com/ 
>>
>>
>> Frederick Lawler (2):
>>    security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
>>    bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_create_user_ns() sleepable
>>
>>   include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
>>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 5 +++++
>>   include/linux/security.h      | 8 ++++++++
>>   kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c          | 1 +
>>   kernel/user_namespace.c       | 5 +++++
>>   security/security.c           | 6 ++++++
>>   6 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
>>
>> -- 
>> 2.30.2
>>

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