[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <62bbf87f16223_2181420853@john.notmuch>
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 00:00:15 -0700
From: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
To: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Julien Salleyron <julien.salleyron@...il.com>
Cc: bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Marc Vertes <mvertes@...e.fr>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: tls: fix tls with sk_redirect using a BPF verdict.
Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Tue, 28 Jun 2022 17:25:05 +0200 Julien Salleyron wrote:
> > This patch allows to use KTLS on a socket where we apply sk_redirect using a BPF
> > verdict program.
> >
You'll also need a signed-off-by.
> > Without this patch, we see that the data received after the redirection are
> > decrypted but with an incorrect offset and length. It seems to us that the
> > offset and length are correct in the stream-parser data, but finally not applied
> > in the skb. We have simply applied those values to the skb.
> >
> > In the case of regular sockets, we saw a big performance improvement from
> > applying redirect. This is not the case now with KTLS, may be related to the
> > following point.
>
> It's because kTLS does a very expensive reallocation and copy for the
> non-zerocopy case (which currently means all of TLS 1.3). I have
> code almost ready to fix that (just needs to be reshuffled into
> upstreamable patches). Brings us up from 5.9 Gbps to 8.4 Gbps per CPU
> on my test box with 16k records. Probably much more than that with
> smaller records.
Also on my list open-ssl support is lacking ktls support for both
direction in tls1.3 iirc. We have a couple test workloads pinned on
1.2 for example which really isn't great.
>
> > It is still necessary to perform a read operation (never triggered) from user
> > space despite the redirection. It makes no sense, since this read operation is
> > not necessary on regular sockets without KTLS.
> >
> > We do not see how to fix this problem without a change of architecture, for
> > example by performing TLS decrypt directly inside the BPF verdict program.
> >
> > An example program can be found at
> > https://github.com/juliens/ktls-bpf_redirect-example/
> >
> > Co-authored-by: Marc Vertes <mvertes@...e.fr>
> > ---
> > net/tls/tls_sw.c | 6 ++++++
> > tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c | 8 +++-----
> > 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> > index 0513f82b8537..a409f8a251db 100644
> > --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> > +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> > @@ -1839,8 +1839,14 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
> > if (bpf_strp_enabled) {
> > /* BPF may try to queue the skb */
> > __skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
> > +
> > err = sk_psock_tls_strp_read(psock, skb);
> > +
> > if (err != __SK_PASS) {
> > + if (err == __SK_REDIRECT) {
> > + skb->data += rxm->offset;
> > + skb->len = rxm->full_len;
> > + }
>
> IDK what this is trying to do but I certainly depends on the fact
> we run skb_cow_data() and is not "generally correct" :S
Ah also we are not handling partially consumed correctly either.
Seems we might pop off the skb even when we need to continue;
Maybe look at how skb_copy_datagram_msg() goes below because it
fixes the skb copy up with the rxm->offset. But, also we need to
do this repair before sk_psock_tls_strp_read I think so that
the BPF program reads the correct data in all cases? I guess
your sample program (and selftests for that matter) just did
the redirect without reading the data?
Thanks!
Powered by blists - more mailing lists