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Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 13:14:17 +0200
From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@...nel.org>
Cc: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
bpf@...r.kernel.org,
Freysteinn Alfredsson <freysteinn.alfredsson@....se>,
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 09/17] bpf: Introduce pkt_uid member for PTR_TO_PACKET
From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@...il.com>
Add a new member in PTR_TO_PACKET specific register state, namely
pkt_uid. This is used to classify packet pointers into different sets,
and the invariant is that any pkt pointers not belonging to the same
set, i.e. not sharing same pkt_uid, won't be allowed for comparison with
each other. During range propagation in __find_good_pkt_pointers, we now
need to take care to skip packet pointers with a different pkt_uid.
This change is necessary so that we can dequeue multiple XDP frames in a
single program, obtain packet pointers using their xdp_md fake struct,
and prevent confusion wrt comparison of packet pointers pointing into
different frames. Attaching a pkt_uid to the PTR_TO_PACKET type prevents
these, and also allows user to see which frame a packet pointer belongs
to in the verbose verifier log (by matching pkt_uid and ref_obj_id of
the referenced xdp_md obtained from bpf_packet_dequeue).
regsafe is updated to match non-zero pkt_uid using the idmap to ensure
it rejects distinct pkt_uid pkt pointers.
We also replace memset of reg->raw to set range to 0. In commit
0962590e5533 ("bpf: fix partial copy of map_ptr when dst is scalar"),
the copying was changed to use raw so that all possible members of type
specific register state are copied, since at that point the type of
register is not known. But inside the reg_is_pkt_pointer block, there is
no need to memset the whole 'raw' struct, since we also have a pkt_uid
member that we now want to preserve after copying from one register to
another, for pkt pointers. A test for this case has been included to
prevent regressions.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 8 ++++-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 2e3bad8640dc..93b69dbf3d19 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ struct bpf_reg_state {
s32 off;
union {
/* valid when type == PTR_TO_PACKET */
- int range;
+ struct {
+ int range;
+ /* To distinguish packet pointers backed by different
+ * packets, to prevent pkt pointer comparisons.
+ */
+ u32 pkt_uid;
+ };
/* valid when type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE |
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 68f98d76bc78..f319e9392587 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -431,6 +431,12 @@ static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META;
}
+static bool type_is_pkt_pointer_any(enum bpf_reg_type type)
+{
+ return type_is_pkt_pointer(type) ||
+ type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
+}
+
static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET ||
@@ -861,6 +867,8 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose_a("off=%d", reg->off);
if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t))
verbose_a("r=%d", reg->range);
+ if (type_is_pkt_pointer_any(t) && reg->pkt_uid)
+ verbose_a("pkt_uid=%d", reg->pkt_uid);
else if (base_type(t) == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ||
base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
base_type(t) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE)
@@ -1394,8 +1402,7 @@ static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
- return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) ||
- reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
+ return type_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg->type);
}
/* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */
@@ -6575,14 +6582,17 @@ static void release_reg_references(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
- if (regs[i].ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
+ if (regs[i].ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id ||
+ (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i]) && regs[i].pkt_uid == ref_obj_id))
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
+ }
bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
if (!reg)
continue;
- if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id)
+ if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id ||
+ (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg) && reg->pkt_uid == ref_obj_id))
__mark_reg_unknown(env, reg);
}
}
@@ -8200,7 +8210,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
- memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
+ dst_reg->range = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
@@ -8260,7 +8270,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
if (smin_val < 0)
- memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw));
+ dst_reg->range = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
@@ -9287,7 +9297,8 @@ static void __find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_func_state *state,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
reg = &state->regs[i];
- if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
+ if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id &&
+ reg->pkt_uid == dst_reg->pkt_uid)
/* keep the maximum range already checked */
reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
}
@@ -9295,7 +9306,8 @@ static void __find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_func_state *state,
bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
if (!reg)
continue;
- if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
+ if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id &&
+ reg->pkt_uid == dst_reg->pkt_uid)
reg->range = max(reg->range, new_range);
}
}
@@ -9910,6 +9922,14 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, u32 regno,
__mark_ptr_or_null_regs(vstate->frame[i], id, is_null);
}
+static bool is_bad_pkt_comparison(const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg)
+{
+ if (!reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) || !reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg))
+ return false;
+ return dst_reg->pkt_uid != src_reg->pkt_uid;
+}
+
static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
@@ -9923,6 +9943,9 @@ static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32)
return false;
+ if (is_bad_pkt_comparison(dst_reg, src_reg))
+ return false;
+
switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
case BPF_JGT:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
@@ -10220,11 +10243,17 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
opcode == BPF_JEQ);
} else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg],
- this_branch, other_branch) &&
- is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
- insn->dst_reg);
- return -EACCES;
+ this_branch, other_branch)) {
+ if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
+ insn->dst_reg);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ if (is_bad_pkt_comparison(dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg])) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d, R%d pkt pointer comparison prohibited\n",
+ insn->dst_reg, insn->src_reg);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
}
if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
@@ -11514,6 +11543,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
/* id relations must be preserved */
if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
return false;
+ if (rold->pkt_uid && !check_ids(rold->pkt_uid, rcur->pkt_uid, idmap))
+ return false;
/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
--
2.37.0
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