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Message-Id: <56095a3aeb4ce619736cbb25c93e32a99d063488.1658815925.git.cdleonard@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 09:15:14 +0300
From: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@...il.com>
To: David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Philip Paeps <philip@...uble.is>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.co.jp>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>,
Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@...sta.com>,
Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>,
Ivan Delalande <colona@...sta.com>,
Caowangbao <caowangbao@...wei.com>,
Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@...gle.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 12/26] tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies
This is required because tcp ipv4 sometimes sends replies without
allocating a full skb that can be signed by tcp authopt.
Handle this with additional code in tcp authopt.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@...il.com>
---
include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 7 ++
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 151 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
index 1fa1b968c80c..9bc0f58a78cb 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
@@ -114,10 +114,17 @@ static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key(
int tcp_authopt_hash(
char *hash_location,
struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply(
+ char *hash_location,
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
+ __be32 saddr,
+ __be32 daddr,
+ struct tcphdr *th);
int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req);
static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq(
struct sock *newsk,
const struct sock *oldsk,
struct request_sock *req)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
index 2a216356d280..2af6265041b4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
@@ -944,10 +944,72 @@ static int tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(struct sock *sk,
out:
tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool);
return err;
}
+struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data {
+ __be32 saddr;
+ __be32 daddr;
+ __be16 sport;
+ __be16 dport;
+ __be32 sisn;
+ __be32 disn;
+ __be16 digestbits;
+} __packed;
+
+static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
+ __be32 saddr,
+ __be32 daddr,
+ __be16 sport,
+ __be16 dport,
+ __be32 sisn,
+ __be32 disn,
+ u8 *traffic_key)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool;
+ struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data data;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(data) != 22);
+
+ pool = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(key);
+ if (IS_ERR(pool))
+ return PTR_ERR(pool);
+
+ err = tcp_authopt_setkey(pool, key);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ // RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1
+ // Separate to keep alignment semi-sane
+ err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, "\x01TCP-AO", 7);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ data.saddr = saddr;
+ data.daddr = daddr;
+ data.sport = sport;
+ data.dport = dport;
+ data.sisn = sisn;
+ data.disn = disn;
+ data.digestbits = htons(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) * 8);
+
+ err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&data, sizeof(data));
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, traffic_key, 0);
+ err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+out:
+ tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool);
+ return err;
+}
+
static int crypto_ahash_buf_zero(struct ahash_request *req, int len)
{
u8 zeros[TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN] = {0};
int buflen, err;
@@ -1214,10 +1276,92 @@ int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location,
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_hash);
/**
+ * tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply - Hash tcp+ipv4 header without SKB
+ *
+ * @hash_location: output buffer
+ * @info: sending socket's tcp_authopt_info
+ * @key: signing key, from tcp_authopt_select_key.
+ * @saddr: source address
+ * @daddr: destination address
+ * @th: Pointer to TCP header and options
+ */
+int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply(char *hash_location,
+ struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
+ __be32 saddr,
+ __be32 daddr,
+ struct tcphdr *th)
+{
+ struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool;
+ u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF];
+ u8 traffic_key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN];
+ __be32 sne = 0;
+ int err;
+
+ /* Call special code path for computing traffic key without skb
+ * This can be called from tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack so caching would be
+ * difficult here.
+ */
+ err = tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(key, saddr, daddr,
+ th->source, th->dest,
+ htonl(info->src_isn), htonl(info->dst_isn),
+ traffic_key);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err_traffic_key;
+
+ /* Init mac shash */
+ pool = tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(key);
+ if (IS_ERR(pool))
+ return PTR_ERR(pool);
+ err = crypto_ahash_setkey(pool->tfm, traffic_key, key->alg->traffic_key_len);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+ err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sne, 4);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(pool, saddr, daddr, th->doff * 4);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ // TCP header with checksum set to zero. Caller ensures this.
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(th->check != 0))
+ goto out_err;
+ err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)th, sizeof(*th));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ // TCP options
+ err = tcp_authopt_hash_opts(pool, th, (struct tcphdr_authopt *)(hash_location - 4),
+ !(key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, macbuf, 0);
+ err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_err;
+ memcpy(hash_location, macbuf, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN);
+
+ tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, pool);
+ return 0;
+
+out_err:
+ tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, pool);
+out_err_traffic_key:
+ memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
* tcp_authopt_lookup_recv - lookup key for receive
*
* @sk: Receive socket
* @skb: Packet, used to compare addr and iface
* @net: Per-namespace information containing keys
--
2.25.1
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