Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTuxxRfJg=Ax5z87Jz6tq1oVRcppB444dHM2gP-FZrkTQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 16 Aug 2022 17:51:12 -0400
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com>
Cc:     kpsingh@...nel.org, revest@...omium.org, jackmanb@...omium.org,
        ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org,
        kafai@...com, songliubraving@...com, yhs@...com,
        john.fastabend@...il.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
        stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
        shuah@...nel.org, brauner@...nel.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
        ebiederm@...ssion.com, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...udflare.com,
        cgzones@...glemail.com, karl@...badwolfsecurity.com,
        tixxdz@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()

On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 12:20 PM Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com> wrote:
>
> While user namespaces do not make the kernel more vulnerable, they are however
> used to initiate exploits. Some users do not want to block namespace creation
> for the entirety of the system, which some distributions provide. Instead, we
> needed a way to have some applications be blocked, and others allowed. This is
> not possible with those tools. Managing hierarchies also did not fit our case
> because we're determining which tasks are allowed based on their attributes.
>
> While exploring a solution, we first leveraged the LSM cred_prepare hook
> because that is the closest hook to prevent a call to create_user_ns().
>
> The calls look something like this:
>
>     cred = prepare_creds()
>         security_prepare_creds()
>             call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
>     if (cred)
>         create_user_ns(cred)
>
> We noticed that error codes were not propagated from this hook and
> introduced a patch [1] to propagate those errors.
>
> The discussion notes that security_prepare_creds() is not appropriate for
> MAC policies, and instead the hook is meant for LSM authors to prepare
> credentials for mutation. [2]
>
> Additionally, cred_prepare hook is not without problems. Handling the clone3
> case is a bit more tricky due to the user space pointer passed to it. This
> makes checking the syscall subject to a possible TOCTTOU attack.
>
> Ultimately, we concluded that a better course of action is to introduce
> a new security hook for LSM authors. [3]
>
> This patch set first introduces a new security_create_user_ns() function
> and userns_create LSM hook, then marks the hook as sleepable in BPF. The
> following patches after include a BPF test and a patch for an SELinux
> implementation.
>
> We want to encourage use of user namespaces, and also cater the needs
> of users/administrators to observe and/or control access. There is no
> expectation of an impact on user space applications because access control
> is opt-in, and users wishing to observe within a LSM context
>
>
> Links:
> 1. https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220608150942.776446-1-fred@cloudflare.com/
> 2. https://lore.kernel.org/all/87y1xzyhub.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org/
> 3. https://lore.kernel.org/all/9fe9cd9f-1ded-a179-8ded-5fde8960a586@cloudflare.com/
>
> Past discussions:
> V4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801180146.1157914-1-fred@cloudflare.com/
> V3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220721172808.585539-1-fred@cloudflare.com/
> V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220707223228.1940249-1-fred@cloudflare.com/
> V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220621233939.993579-1-fred@cloudflare.com/
>
> Changes since v4:
> - Update commit description
> - Update cover letter
> Changes since v3:
> - Explicitly set CAP_SYS_ADMIN to test namespace is created given
>   permission
> - Simplify BPF test to use sleepable hook only
> - Prefer unshare() over clone() for tests
> Changes since v2:
> - Rename create_user_ns hook to userns_create
> - Use user_namespace as an object opposed to a generic namespace object
> - s/domB_t/domA_t in commit message
> Changes since v1:
> - Add selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm create_user_ns hook patch
> - Add selinux: Implement create_user_ns hook patch
> - Change function signature of security_create_user_ns() to only take
>   struct cred
> - Move security_create_user_ns() call after id mapping check in
>   create_user_ns()
> - Update documentation to reflect changes
>
> Frederick Lawler (4):
>   security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
>   bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable
>   selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook
>   selinux: Implement userns_create hook
>
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h                 |   1 +
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h                     |   4 +
>  include/linux/security.h                      |   6 ++
>  kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c                          |   1 +
>  kernel/user_namespace.c                       |   5 +
>  security/security.c                           |   5 +
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                      |   9 ++
>  security/selinux/include/classmap.h           |   2 +
>  .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++
>  .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c |  33 ++++++
>  10 files changed, 168 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c
>  create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c

I just merged this into the lsm/next tree, thanks for seeing this
through Frederick, and thank you to everyone who took the time to
review the patches and add their tags.

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm.git next

-- 
paul-moore.com

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