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Message-ID: <20220818185412.6f294cef@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 18:54:12 -0700
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
<netdev@...r.kernel.org>, Raed Salem <raeds@...dia.com>,
ipsec-devel <devel@...ux-ipsec.org>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH xfrm-next v2 0/6] Extend XFRM core to allow full offload
configuration
On Thu, 18 Aug 2022 12:10:31 +0200 Steffen Klassert wrote:
> > > You must provide a clear analysis (as in examination in data) and
> > > discussion (as in examination in writing) if you're intending to
> > > change the "let's keep packet formation in the SW" policy. What you
> > > got below is a good start but not sufficient.
>
> I'm still a bit unease about this approach. I fear that doing parts
> of statefull IPsec procesing in software and parts in hardware will
> lead to all sort of problems. E.g. with this implementation
> the software has no stats, liftetime, lifebyte and packet count
> information but is responsible to do the IKE communication.
>
> We might be able to sort out all problems during the upstraming
> process, but I still have no clear picture how this should work
> in the end with all corener cases this creates.
Makes sense. I'm not sure any of the "deep and stateful offloads"
we have can be considered a success so IMHO we can be selective
in the approaches we accept.
> Also the name full offload is a bit missleading, because the
> software still has to hold all offloaded states and policies.
> In a full offload, the stack would IMO just act as a stub
> layer between IKE and hardware.
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