lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CADVnQy=0QF2vit1COPqfphwemHVEwuD5Q8MqUEMVAxVsANOVtA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 2 Sep 2022 09:55:27 -0400
From:   Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>
To:     "Arankal, Nagaraj" <nagaraj.p.arankal@....com>
Cc:     "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: retrans_stamp not cleared while testing NewReno implementation.

"


On Fri, Sep 2, 2022 at 6:29 AM Arankal, Nagaraj
<nagaraj.p.arankal@....com> wrote:
>
> While testing newReno implementation on 4.19.197 based debian kernel, NewReno(SACK disabled) with connections that have a very low traffic, we may timeout the connection too early if a second loss occurs after the first one was successfully acked but no data was transferred later. Below is his description of it:
>
> When SACK is disabled, and a socket suffers multiple separate TCP retransmissions, that socket's ETIMEDOUT value is calculated from the time of the *first* retransmission instead of the *latest* retransmission.
>
> This happens because the tcp_sock's retrans_stamp is set once then never cleared.
>
> Take the following connection:
>
>
> (*1) One data packet sent.
> (*2) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted.
> (*3) The ACK packet is received. The transmitted packet is acknowledged.
>
> At this point the first "retransmission event" has passed and been recovered from. Any future retransmission is a completely new "event".
>
> (*4) After 16 minutes (to correspond with tcp_retries2=15), a new data packet is sent. Note: No data is transmitted between (*3) and (*4) and we disabled keep alives.
>
> The socket's timeout SHOULD be calculated from this point in time, but instead it's calculated from the prior "event" 16 minutes ago.
>
> (*5) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted.
> (*6) At the time of the 2nd retransmission, the socket returns ETIMEDOUT.
>
> From the history I came to know that there was a fix included, which would resolve above issue. Please find below patch.
>
> static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk)
>                                 * is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false
>                                 * fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */
>                                tcp_moderate_cwnd(tp);
> +                             if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
> +                                             tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
>                                return true;
>                }
>
> However, after introducing following fix,
>
> [net,1/2] tcp: only undo on partial ACKs in CA_Loss
>
> I am not able to see retrains_stamp reset to Zero.
> Inside tcp_process_loss , we are returning from below code path.
>
> if ((flag & FLAG_SND_UNA_ADVANCED) &&
>             tcp_try_undo_loss(sk, false))
>                 return;
> because of which tp->retrans_stamp is never cleared as we failed to invoke tcp_try_undo_recovery.
>
> Is this a known bug in kernel code or is it an expected behavior.
>
>
> - Thanks in advance,
> Nagaraj

Thanks for the detailed bug report and analysis! I agree that
"tcp: only undo on partial ACKs in CA_Loss" introduced the
bug that you are analyzing.

I suspect we need a fix along the lines below. I will try to create
a packetdrill test to reproduce this and verify the fix below,
and will run this fix through our existing packetdrill tests.

Thanks!

commit d2f706c1be7e9822a99477edd69bc13ddd00557f
Author: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>
Date:   Fri Sep 2 09:36:23 2022 -0400

    tcp: fix early ETIMEDOUT after spurious non-SACK RTO

    Fix a bug reported and analyzed by Nagaraj Arankal, where the handling
    of a spurious non-SACK RTO could cause a connection to fail to clear
    retrans_stamp, causing a later RTO to very prematurely time out the
    connection with ETIMEDOUT.

    Here is the buggy scenario, expanding upon Nagaraj Arankal's excellent
    report:

    (*1) Send one data packet on a non-SACK connection

    (*2) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted
         and we enter CA_Loss; but this retransmission is spurious.

    (*3) The ACK for the original data is received. The transmitted packet
         is acknowledged.  The TCP timestamp is before the retrans_stamp,
         so tcp_may_undo() returns true, and tcp_try_undo_loss() returns
         true without changing state to Open (because tcp_is_sack() is
         false), and tcp_process_loss() returns without calling
         tcp_try_undo_recovery().  Normally after undoing a CA_Loss
         episode, tcp_fastretrans_alert() would see that the connection
         has returned to CA_Open and fall through and call
         tcp_try_to_open(), which would set retrans_stamp to 0.  However,
         for non-SACK connections we hold the connection in CA_Loss, so do
         not fall through to call tcp_try_to_open() and do not set
         retrans_stamp to 0. So retrans_stamp is (erroneously) still
         non-zero.

         At this point the first "retransmission event" has passed and
         been recovered from. Any future retransmission is a completely
         new "event". However, retrans_stamp is erroneously still
         set. (And we are still in CA_Loss, which is correct.)

    (*4) After 16 minutes (to correspond with tcp_retries2=15), a new data
         packet is sent. Note: No data is transmitted between (*3) and
         (*4) and we disabled keep alives.

         The socket's timeout SHOULD be calculated from this point in
         time, but instead it's calculated from the prior "event" 16
         minutes ago (step (*2)).

    (*5) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted.

    (*6) At the time of the 2nd retransmission, the socket returns
         ETIMEDOUT, prematurely, because retrans_stamp is (erroneously)
         too far in the past (set at the time of (*2)).

    This commit fixes this bug by ensuring that we reuse in
    tcp_try_undo_loss() the same careful logic for non-SACK connections
    that we have in tcp_try_undo_recovery(). To avoid duplicating logic,
    we factor out that logic into a new
    tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen() helper and call that helper from
    both undo functions.

    Fixes: da34ac7626b5 ("tcp: only undo on partial ACKs in CA_Loss")
    Reported-by: Nagaraj Arankal <nagaraj.p.arankal@....com>
    Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>
    Change-Id: Ie58ea40bdbfe0643111a17a41eda0674f62ce76d

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index b85a9f755da41..bc2ea12221f95 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -2513,6 +2513,21 @@ static inline bool tcp_may_undo(const struct
tcp_sock *tp)
         return tp->undo_marker && (!tp->undo_retrans ||
tcp_packet_delayed(tp));
 }

+static bool tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+
+        if (tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq && tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
+                /* Hold old state until something *above* high_seq
+                 * is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false
+                 * fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */
+                if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
+                        tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
+                return true;
+        }
+        return false;
+}
+
 /* People celebrate: "We love our President!" */
 static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk)
 {
@@ -2535,14 +2550,8 @@ static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk)
         } else if (tp->rack.reo_wnd_persist) {
                 tp->rack.reo_wnd_persist--;
         }
-        if (tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq && tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
-                /* Hold old state until something *above* high_seq
-                 * is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false
-                 * fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */
-                if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
-                        tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
+        if (tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(sk))
                 return true;
-        }
         tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
         tp->is_sack_reneg = 0;
         return false;
@@ -2578,6 +2587,8 @@ static bool tcp_try_undo_loss(struct sock *sk,
bool frto_undo)
                         NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
                                         LINUX_MIB_TCPSPURIOUSRTOS);
                 inet_csk(sk)->icsk_retransmits = 0;
+                if (tcp_is_non_sack_preventing_reopen(sk))
+                        return true;
                 if (frto_undo || tcp_is_sack(tp)) {
                         tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
                         tp->is_sack_reneg = 0;

neal

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ