netdev - Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 4/5] bpf: tcp: Stop bpf_setsockopt(TCP

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Message-ID: <4e6e14e4-7301-9981-c52f-7715f26f63f3@linux.dev>
Date:   Wed, 28 Sep 2022 23:17:38 -0700
From:   Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
To:     Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Cc:     bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@...com>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 4/5] bpf: tcp: Stop
 bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) in init ops to recur itself

On 9/28/22 10:37 PM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 28, 2022 at 10:31 PM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
>>
>> On 9/28/22 7:04 PM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2022 at 3:48 PM Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...nel.org>
>>>>
>>>> When a bad bpf prog '.init' calls
>>>> bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION, "itself"), it will trigger this loop:
>>>>
>>>> .init => bpf_setsockopt(tcp_cc) => .init => bpf_setsockopt(tcp_cc) ...
>>>> ... => .init => bpf_setsockopt(tcp_cc).
>>>>
>>>> It was prevented by the prog->active counter before but the prog->active
>>>> detection cannot be used in struct_ops as explained in the earlier
>>>> patch of the set.
>>>>
>>>> In this patch, the second bpf_setsockopt(tcp_cc) is not allowed
>>>> in order to break the loop.  This is done by using a bit of
>>>> an existing 1 byte hole in tcp_sock to check if there is
>>>> on-going bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) in this tcp_sock.
>>>>
>>>> Note that this essentially limits only the first '.init' can
>>>> call bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) to pick a fallback cc (eg. peer
>>>> does not support ECN) and the second '.init' cannot fallback to
>>>> another cc.  This applies even the second
>>>> bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) will not cause a loop.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...nel.org>
>>>> ---
>>>>    include/linux/tcp.h |  6 ++++++
>>>>    net/core/filter.c   | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>>    2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h
>>>> index a9fbe22732c3..3bdf687e2fb3 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/tcp.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
>>>> @@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ struct tcp_sock {
>>>>           u8      bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags;  /* Control calling BPF programs
>>>>                                            * values defined in uapi/linux/tcp.h
>>>>                                            */
>>>> +       u8      bpf_chg_cc_inprogress:1; /* In the middle of
>>>> +                                         * bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION),
>>>> +                                         * it is to avoid the bpf_tcp_cc->init()
>>>> +                                         * to recur itself by calling
>>>> +                                         * bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION, "itself").
>>>> +                                         */
>>>>    #define BPF_SOCK_OPS_TEST_FLAG(TP, ARG) (TP->bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags & ARG)
>>>>    #else
>>>>    #define BPF_SOCK_OPS_TEST_FLAG(TP, ARG) 0
>>>> diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
>>>> index 96f2f7a65e65..ac4c45c02da5 100644
>>>> --- a/net/core/filter.c
>>>> +++ b/net/core/filter.c
>>>> @@ -5105,6 +5105,9 @@ static int bpf_sol_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int optname,
>>>>    static int sol_tcp_sockopt_congestion(struct sock *sk, char *optval,
>>>>                                         int *optlen, bool getopt)
>>>>    {
>>>> +       struct tcp_sock *tp;
>>>> +       int ret;
>>>> +
>>>>           if (*optlen < 2)
>>>>                   return -EINVAL;
>>>>
>>>> @@ -5125,8 +5128,31 @@ static int sol_tcp_sockopt_congestion(struct sock *sk, char *optval,
>>>>           if (*optlen >= sizeof("cdg") - 1 && !strncmp("cdg", optval, *optlen))
>>>>                   return -ENOTSUPP;
>>>>
>>>> -       return do_tcp_setsockopt(sk, SOL_TCP, TCP_CONGESTION,
>>>> +       /* It stops this looping
>>>> +        *
>>>> +        * .init => bpf_setsockopt(tcp_cc) => .init =>
>>>> +        * bpf_setsockopt(tcp_cc)" => .init => ....
>>>> +        *
>>>> +        * The second bpf_setsockopt(tcp_cc) is not allowed
>>>> +        * in order to break the loop when both .init
>>>> +        * are the same bpf prog.
>>>> +        *
>>>> +        * This applies even the second bpf_setsockopt(tcp_cc)
>>>> +        * does not cause a loop.  This limits only the first
>>>> +        * '.init' can call bpf_setsockopt(TCP_CONGESTION) to
>>>> +        * pick a fallback cc (eg. peer does not support ECN)
>>>> +        * and the second '.init' cannot fallback to
>>>> +        * another.
>>>> +        */
>>>> +       tp = tcp_sk(sk);
>>>> +       if (tp->bpf_chg_cc_inprogress)
>>>> +               return -EBUSY;
>>>> +
>>>
>>> Is the socket locked (and owned by current thread) at this point ?
>>> If not, changing bpf_chg_cc_inprogress would be racy.
>>
>> Yes, the socket is locked and owned.  There is a sock_owned_by_me check earlier
>> in _bpf_setsockopt().
> 
> Good to know. Note a listener can be cloned without socket lock being held.
> 
> In order to avoid surprises, I would clear bpf_chg_cc_inprogress in
> tcp_create_openreq_child()

Ah, make sense.  I will re-spin.