netdev - Re: [PATCH v2] 9p/trans_fd: perform read/write with TIF

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Message-ID: <0362d03f-9332-0b37-02e0-2b1b169f4c6f@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date:   Fri, 7 Oct 2022 20:52:44 +0900
From:   Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
To:     Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@...ewreck.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc:     Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@...debyte.com>,
        Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@...il.com>,
        Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@...kov.net>,
        syzbot <syzbot+8b41a1365f1106fd0f33@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
        v9fs-developer@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] 9p/trans_fd: perform read/write with TIF_SIGPENDING
 set

On 2022/10/07 10:40, Dominique Martinet wrote:
> Tetsuo Handa wrote on Sun, Sep 04, 2022 at 09:27:22AM +0900:
>> On 2022/09/04 8:39, Dominique Martinet wrote:
>>> Is there any reason you spent time working on v2, or is that just
>>> theorical for not messing with userland fd ?
>>
>> Just theoretical for not messing with userland fd, for programs generated
>> by fuzzers might use fds passed to the mount() syscall. I imagined that
>> syzbot again reports this problem when it started playing with fcntl().
>>
>> For robustness, not messing with userland fd is the better. ;-)
> 
> By the way digging this back made me think about this a bit again.
> My opinion hasn't really changed that if you want to shoot yourself in
> the foot I don't think we're crossing any priviledge boundary here, but
> we could probably prevent it by saying the mount call with close that fd
> and somehow steal it? (drop the fget, close_fd after get_file perhaps?)
> 
> That should address your concern about robustess and syzbot will no
> longer be able to play with fcntl on "our" end of the pipe. I think it's
> fair to say that once you pass it to the kernel all bets are off, so
> closing it for the userspace application could make sense, and the mount
> already survives when short processes do the mount call and immediately
> exit so it's not like we need that fd to be open...
> 
> 
> What do you think?

I found that pipe is using alloc_file_clone() which allocates "struct file"
instead of just incrementing "struct file"->f_count.

Then, can we add EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alloc_file_clone) to fs/file_table.c and
use it like

  struct file *f;

  ts->rd = fget(rfd);
  if (!ts->rd)
    goto out_free_ts;
  if (!(ts->rd->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
    goto out_put_rd;
  f = alloc_file_clone(ts->rd, ts->rd->f_flags | O_NONBLOCK, ts->rd->f_op);
  if (IS_ERR(f))
    goto out_put_rd;
  fput(ts->rd);
  ts->rd = f;

  ts->wr = fget(wfd);
  if (!ts->wr)
    goto out_put_rd;
  if (!(ts->wr->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
    goto out_put_wr;
  f = alloc_file_clone(ts->wr, ts->wr->f_flags | O_NONBLOCK, ts->wr->f_op);
  if (IS_ERR(f))
    goto out_put_wr;
  fput(ts->wr);
  ts->wr = f;

 from p9_fd_open() for cloning "struct file" with O_NONBLOCK flag added?
Just an idea. I don't know whether alloc_file_clone() arguments are correct...