netdev - Re: [PATCH] cred: Do not default to init_cred in prepare_kernel

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Message-ID: <Y1qCg+g9je72TneY@google.com>
Date:   Thu, 27 Oct 2022 22:07:15 +0900
From:   Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
        Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@...el.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        Steve French <sfrench@...ba.org>, Paulo Alcantara <pc@....nz>,
        Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@...hat.com>,
        Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@...rosoft.com>,
        Tom Talpey <tom@...pey.com>,
        Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@...nel.org>,
        Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>,
        Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...merspace.com>,
        Anna Schumaker <anna@...nel.org>,
        Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
        Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org, samba-technical@...ts.samba.org,
        linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] cred: Do not default to init_cred in
 prepare_kernel_cred()

On (22/10/26 16:31), Kees Cook wrote:
> A common exploit pattern for ROP attacks is to abuse prepare_kernel_cred()
> in order to construct escalated privileges[1]. Instead of providing a
> short-hand argument (NULL) to the "daemon" argument to indicate using
> init_cred as the base cred, require that "daemon" is always set to
> an actual task. Replace all existing callers that were passing NULL
> with &init_task.
> 
> Future attacks will need to have sufficiently powerful read/write
> primitives to have found an appropriately privileged task and written it
> to the ROP stack as an argument to succeed, which is similarly difficult
> to the prior effort needed to escalate privileges before struct cred
> existed: locate the current cred and overwrite the uid member.
> 
> This has the added benefit of meaning that prepare_kernel_cred() can no
> longer exceed the privileges of the init task, which may have changed from
> the original init_cred (e.g. dropping capabilities from the bounding set).

Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>