lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <Y1op6wgDSPu4MGB8@kroah.com> Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 08:49:15 +0200 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>, Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@...el.com>, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>, Steve French <sfrench@...ba.org>, Paulo Alcantara <pc@....nz>, Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@...hat.com>, Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@...rosoft.com>, Tom Talpey <tom@...pey.com>, Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@...nel.org>, Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>, Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...merspace.com>, Anna Schumaker <anna@...nel.org>, Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Michal Koutný <mkoutny@...e.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org, samba-technical@...ts.samba.org, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] cred: Do not default to init_cred in prepare_kernel_cred() On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 04:31:11PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > A common exploit pattern for ROP attacks is to abuse prepare_kernel_cred() > in order to construct escalated privileges[1]. Instead of providing a > short-hand argument (NULL) to the "daemon" argument to indicate using > init_cred as the base cred, require that "daemon" is always set to > an actual task. Replace all existing callers that were passing NULL > with &init_task. > > Future attacks will need to have sufficiently powerful read/write > primitives to have found an appropriately privileged task and written it > to the ROP stack as an argument to succeed, which is similarly difficult > to the prior effort needed to escalate privileges before struct cred > existed: locate the current cred and overwrite the uid member. > > This has the added benefit of meaning that prepare_kernel_cred() can no > longer exceed the privileges of the init task, which may have changed from > the original init_cred (e.g. dropping capabilities from the bounding set). > > [1] https://google.com/search?q=commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0)) > > Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com> > Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> > Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org> > Cc: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@...el.com> > Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> > Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org> > Cc: Steve French <sfrench@...ba.org> > Cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@....nz> > Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@...hat.com> > Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@...rosoft.com> > Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@...pey.com> > Cc: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@...nel.org> > Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org> > Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...merspace.com> > Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@...nel.org> > Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com> > Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org> > Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net> > Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com> > Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org> > Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com> > Cc: "Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@...e.com> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> > Cc: linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org > Cc: samba-technical@...ts.samba.org > Cc: linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org > Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists