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Message-ID: <Y2gPelnt3xfgDGYd@unreal>
Date: Sun, 6 Nov 2022 21:48:10 +0200
From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
To: Simon Horman <simon.horman@...igine.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@...unet.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Chentian Liu <chengtian.liu@...igine.com>,
Huanhuan Wang <huanhuan.wang@...igine.com>,
Yinjun Zhang <yinjun.zhang@...igine.com>,
Louis Peens <louis.peens@...igine.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
oss-drivers@...igine.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 3/3] nfp: implement xfrm callbacks and expose
ipsec offload feature to upper layer
On Tue, Nov 01, 2022 at 12:02:48PM +0100, Simon Horman wrote:
> From: Huanhuan Wang <huanhuan.wang@...igine.com>
>
> Xfrm callbacks are implemented to offload SA info into firmware
> by mailbox. It supports 16K SA info in total.
>
> Expose ipsec offload feature to upper layer, this feature will
> signal the availability of the offload.
>
> Based on initial work of Norm Bagley <norman.bagley@...ronome.com>.
>
> Signed-off-by: Huanhuan Wang <huanhuan.wang@...igine.com>
> Reviewed-by: Louis Peens <louis.peens@...igine.com>
> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@...igine.com>
> ---
> .../net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/crypto/ipsec.c | 532 +++++++++++++++++-
> .../ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfp_net_common.c | 6 +
> .../net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfp_net_ctrl.h | 4 +-
> 3 files changed, 538 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
<...>
> static int nfp_net_xfrm_add_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
> {
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + struct net_device *netdev = x->xso.dev;
> + struct nfp_ipsec_cfg_mssg msg = {0};
I think that I already wrote it {0} -> {};
> + int i, key_len, trunc_len, err = 0;
> + struct nfp_ipsec_cfg_add_sa *cfg;
> + struct nfp_net *nn;
> + unsigned int saidx;
> + __be32 *p;
<...>
> + if (trunc_len == 96)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_MD5_96;
> + else if (trunc_len == 128)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_MD5_128;
> + else
> + trunc_len = 0;
IMHO, this is better to write as switch-case in separate function.
> + break;
> + case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
> + if (trunc_len == 96)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_SHA1_96;
> + else if (trunc_len == 80)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_SHA1_80;
> + else
> + trunc_len = 0;
> + break;
Ditto.
> + case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256HMAC:
> + if (trunc_len == 96)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_SHA256_96;
> + else if (trunc_len == 128)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_SHA256_128;
> + else
> + trunc_len = 0;
> + break;
> + case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384HMAC:
> + if (trunc_len == 96)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_SHA384_96;
> + else if (trunc_len == 192)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_SHA384_192;
> + else
> + trunc_len = 0;
> + break;
> + case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512HMAC:
> + if (trunc_len == 96)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_SHA512_96;
> + else if (trunc_len == 256)
> + cfg->ctrl_word.hash = NFP_IPSEC_HASH_SHA512_256;
> + else
> + trunc_len = 0;
> + break;
> + default:
> + nn_err(nn, "Unsupported authentication algorithm\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (!trunc_len) {
> + nn_err(nn, "Unsupported authentication algorithm trunc length\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (x->aalg) {
> + p = (__be32 *)x->aalg->alg_key;
> + key_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(x->aalg->alg_key_len, BITS_PER_BYTE);
> + if (key_len > sizeof(cfg->auth_key)) {
> + nn_err(nn, "Insufficient space for offloaded auth key\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + for (i = 0; i < key_len / sizeof(cfg->auth_key[0]) ; i++)
> + cfg->auth_key[i] = ntohl(*p++);
I wonder if you can't declare p as u32 and use memcpy here instead of
u32->__be32->u32 conversions.
Thanks
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