lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAKH8qBuLMZrFmmi77Qbt7DCd1w9FJwdeK5CnZTJqHYiWxwDx6w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 9 Nov 2022 17:02:05 -0800
From:   Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>
To:     Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
Cc:     Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>,
        ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org,
        song@...nel.org, yhs@...com, john.fastabend@...il.com,
        kpsingh@...nel.org, haoluo@...gle.com, jolsa@...nel.org,
        David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>,
        Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>,
        Anatoly Burakov <anatoly.burakov@...el.com>,
        Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@...el.com>,
        Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@...il.com>,
        Maryam Tahhan <mtahhan@...hat.com>, xdp-hints@...-project.net,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [xdp-hints] Re: [RFC bpf-next v2 06/14] xdp: Carry over xdp
 metadata into skb context

On Wed, Nov 9, 2022 at 4:13 PM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
>
> On 11/9/22 1:33 PM, Stanislav Fomichev wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 9, 2022 at 10:22 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 11/9/22 3:10 AM, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen wrote:
> >>> Snipping a bit of context to reply to this bit:
> >>>
> >>>>>>> Can the xdp prog still change the metadata through xdp->data_meta? tbh, I am not
> >>>>>>> sure it is solid enough by asking the xdp prog not to use the same random number
> >>>>>>> in its own metadata + not to change the metadata through xdp->data_meta after
> >>>>>>> calling bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb().
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> What do you think the usecase here might be? Or are you suggesting we
> >>>>>> reject further access to data_meta after
> >>>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb somehow?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> If we want to let the programs override some of this
> >>>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() metadata, it feels like we can add
> >>>>>> more kfuncs instead of exposing the layout?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb(ctx);
> >>>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_skb_hash(ctx, 1234);
> >>>
> >>> There are several use cases for needing to access the metadata after
> >>> calling bpf_xdp_metdata_export_to_skb():
> >>>
> >>> - Accessing the metadata after redirect (in a cpumap or devmap program,
> >>>     or on a veth device)
> >>> - Transferring the packet+metadata to AF_XDP
> >> fwiw, the xdp prog could also be more selective and only stores one of the hints
> >> instead of the whole 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata'.
> >>
> >>> - Returning XDP_PASS, but accessing some of the metadata first (whether
> >>>     to read or change it)
> >>>
> >>> The last one could be solved by calling additional kfuncs, but that
> >>> would be less efficient than just directly editing the struct which
> >>> will be cache-hot after the helper returns.
> >>
> >> Yeah, it is more efficient to directly write if possible.  I think this set
> >> allows the direct reading and writing already through data_meta (as a _u8 *).
> >>
> >>>
> >>> And yeah, this will allow the XDP program to inject arbitrary metadata
> >>> into the netstack; but it can already inject arbitrary *packet* data
> >>> into the stack, so not sure if this is much of an additional risk? If it
> >>> does lead to trivial crashes, we should probably harden the stack
> >>> against that?
> >>>
> >>> As for the random number, Jesper and I discussed replacing this with the
> >>> same BTF-ID scheme that he was using in his patch series. I.e., instead
> >>> of just putting in a random number, we insert the BTF ID of the metadata
> >>> struct at the end of it. This will allow us to support multiple
> >>> different formats in the future (not just changing the layout, but
> >>> having multiple simultaneous formats in the same kernel image), in case
> >>> we run out of space.
> >>
> >> This seems a bit hypothetical.  How much headroom does it usually have for the
> >> xdp prog?  Potentially the hints can use all the remaining space left after the
> >> header encap and the current bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() usage?
> >>
> >>>
> >>> We should probably also have a flag set on the xdp_frame so the stack
> >>> knows that the metadata area contains relevant-to-skb data, to guard
> >>> against an XDP program accidentally hitting the "magic number" (BTF_ID)
> >>> in unrelated stuff it puts into the metadata area.
> >>
> >> Yeah, I think having a flag is useful.  The flag will be set at xdp_buff and
> >> then transfer to the xdp_frame?
> >>
> >>>
> >>>> After re-reading patch 6, have another question. The 'void
> >>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb();' function signature. Should it at
> >>>> least return ok/err? or even return a 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *'
> >>>> pointer and the xdp prog can directly read (or even write) it?
> >>>
> >>> Hmm, I'm not sure returning a failure makes sense? Failure to read one
> >>> or more fields just means that those fields will not be populated? We
> >>> should probably have a flags field inside the metadata struct itself to
> >>> indicate which fields are set or not, but I'm not sure returning an
> >>> error value adds anything? Returning a pointer to the metadata field
> >>> might be convenient for users (it would just be an alias to the
> >>> data_meta pointer, but the verifier could know its size, so the program
> >>> doesn't have to bounds check it).
> >>
> >> If some hints are not available, those hints should be initialized to
> >> 0/CHECKSUM_NONE/...etc.  The xdp prog needs a direct way to tell hard failure
> >> when it cannot write the meta area because of not enough space.  Comparing
> >> xdp->data_meta with xdp->data as a side effect is not intuitive.
> >>
> >> It is more than saving the bound check.  With type info of 'struct
> >> xdp_to_skb_metadata *', the verifier can do more checks like reading in the
> >> middle of an integer member.  The verifier could also limit write access only to
> >> a few struct's members if it is needed.
> >>
> >> The returning 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *' should not be an alias to the
> >> xdp->data_meta.  They should actually point to different locations in the
> >> headroom.  bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() sets a flag in xdp_buff.
> >> xdp->data_meta won't be changed and keeps pointing to the last
> >> bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() location.  The kernel will know if there is
> >> xdp_to_skb_metadata before the xdp->data_meta when that bit is set in the
> >> xdp_{buff,frame}.  Would it work?
> >>
> >>>
> >>>> A related question, why 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata' needs
> >>>> __randomize_layout?
> >>>
> >>> The __randomize_layout thing is there to force BPF programs to use CO-RE
> >>> to access the field. This is to avoid the struct layout accidentally
> >>> ossifying because people in practice rely on a particular layout, even
> >>> though we tell them to use CO-RE. There are lots of examples of this
> >>> happening in other domains (IP header options, TCP options, etc), and
> >>> __randomize_layout seemed like a neat trick to enforce CO-RE usage :)
> >>
> >> I am not sure if it is necessary or helpful to only enforce __randomize_layout
> >> in 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata'.  There are other CO-RE use cases (tracing and
> >> non tracing) that already have direct access (reading and/or writing) to other
> >> kernel structures.
> >>
> >> It is more important for the verifier to see the xdp prog accessing it as a
> >> 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *' instead of xdp->data_meta which is a __u8 * so
> >> that the verifier can enforce the rules of access.
> >>
> >>>
> >>>>>>> Does xdp_to_skb_metadata have a use case for XDP_PASS (like patch 7) or the
> >>>>>>> xdp_to_skb_metadata can be limited to XDP_REDIRECT only?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> XDP_PASS cases where we convert xdp_buff into skb in the drivers right
> >>>>>> now usually have C code to manually pull out the metadata (out of hw
> >>>>>> desc) and put it into skb.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> So, currently, if we're calling bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() for
> >>>>>> XDP_PASS, we're doing a double amount of work:
> >>>>>> skb_metadata_import_from_xdp first, then custom driver code second.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> In theory, maybe we should completely skip drivers custom parsing when
> >>>>>> there is a prog with BPF_F_XDP_HAS_METADATA?
> >>>>>> Then both xdp->skb paths (XDP_PASS+XDP_REDIRECT) will be bpf-driven
> >>>>>> and won't require any mental work (plus, the drivers won't have to
> >>>>>> care either in the future).
> >>>>>>    > WDYT?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Yeah, not sure if it can solely depend on BPF_F_XDP_HAS_METADATA but it makes
> >>>>> sense to only use the hints (if ever written) from xdp prog especially if it
> >>>>> will eventually support xdp prog changing some of the hints in the future.  For
> >>>>> now, I think either way is fine since they are the same and the xdp prog is sort
> >>>>> of doing extra unnecessary work anyway by calling
> >>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() with XDP_PASS and knowing nothing can be
> >>>>> changed now.
> >>>
> >>> I agree it would be best if the drivers also use the XDP metadata (if
> >>> present) on XDP_PASS. Longer term my hope is we can make the XDP
> >>> metadata support the only thing drivers need to implement (i.e., have
> >>> the stack call into that code even when no XDP program is loaded), but
> >>> for now just for consistency (and allowing the XDP program to update the
> >>> metadata), we should probably at least consume it on XDP_PASS.
> >>>
> >>> -Toke
> >>>
> >
> > Not to derail the discussion (left the last message intact on top,
> > feel free to continue), but to summarize. The proposed changes seem to
> > be:
> >
> > 1. bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() should return pointer to "struct
> > xdp_to_skb_metadata"
> >    - This should let bpf programs change the metadata passed to the skb
> >
> > 2. "struct xdp_to_skb_metadata" should have its btf_id as the first
> > __u32 member (and remove the magic)
> >    - This is for the redirect case where the end users, including
> > AF_XDP, can parse this metadata from btf_id
>
> I think Toke's idea is to put the btf_id at the end of xdp_to_skb_metadata.  I
> can see why the end is needed for the userspace AF_XDP because, afaict, AF_XDP
> rx_desc currently cannot tell if there is metadata written by the xdp prog or
> not.  However, if the 'has_skb_metadata' bit can also be passed to the AF_XDP
> rx_desc->options, the btf_id may as well be not needed now.  However, the btf_id
> and other future new members can be added to the xdp_to_skb_metadata later if
> there is a need.
>
> For the kernel and xdp prog, a bit in the xdp->flags should be enough to get to
> the xdp_to_skb_metadata.  The xdp prog will use CO-RE to access the members in
> xdp_to_skb_metadata.

Ack, good points on putting it at the end.
Regarding bit in desc->options vs btf_id: since it seems that btf_id
is useful anyway, let's start with that? We can add a bit later on if
it turns out using metadata is problematic otherwise.

> >    - This, however, is not all the metadata that the device can
> > support, but a much narrower set that the kernel is expected to use
> > for skb construction
> >
> > 3. __randomize_layout isn't really helping, CO-RE will trigger
> > regardless; maybe only the case where it matters is probably AF_XDP,
> > so still useful?
> >
> > 4. The presence of the metadata generated by
> > bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb should be indicated by a flag in
> > xdp_{buff,frame}->flags
> >    - Assuming exposing it via xdp_md->has_skb_metadata is ok?
>
> probably __bpf_md_ptr(struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *, skb_metadata) and the type
> will be PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL.

Oh, that seems even better than returning it from
bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb.
bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb can return true/false and the rest goes
via default verifier ctx resolution mechanism..
(returning ptr from a kfunc seems to be a bit complicated right now)

> >    - Since the programs probably need to do the following:
> >
> >    if (xdp_md->has_skb_metadata) {
> >      access/change skb metadata by doing struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *p
> > = data_meta;
>
> and directly access/change xdp->skb_metadata instead of using xdp->data_meta.

Ack.

> >    } else {
> >      use kfuncs
> >    }
> >
> > 5. Support the case where we keep program's metadata and kernel's
> > xdp_to_skb_metadata
> >    - skb_metadata_import_from_xdp() will "consume" it by mem-moving the
> > rest of the metadata over it and adjusting the headroom
>
> I was thinking the kernel's xdp_to_skb_metadata is always before the program's
> metadata.  xdp prog should usually work in this order also: read/write headers,
> write its own metadata, call bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb(), and return
> XDP_PASS/XDP_REDIRECT.  When it is XDP_PASS, the kernel just needs to pop the
> xdp_to_skb_metadata and pass the remaining program's metadata to the bpf-tc.
>
> For the kernel and xdp prog, I don't think it matters where the
> xdp_to_skb_metadata is.  However, the xdp->data_meta (program's metadata) has to
> be before xdp->data because of the current data_meta and data comparison usage
> in the xdp prog.
>
> The order of the kernel's xdp_to_skb_metadata and the program's metadata
> probably only matters to the userspace AF_XDP.  However, I don't see how AF_XDP
> supports the program's metadata now.  afaict, it can only work now if there is
> some sort of contract between them or the AF_XDP currently does not use the
> program's metadata.  Either way, we can do the mem-moving only for AF_XDP and it
> should be a no op if there is no program's metadata?  This behavior could also
> be configurable through setsockopt?

Agreed on all of the above. For now it seems like the safest thing to
do is to put xdp_to_skb_metadata last to allow af_xdp to properly
locate btf_id.
Let's see if Toke disagrees :-)


> Thanks for the summary!
>
> >
> >
> > I think the above solves all the cases Toke points to?
> >
> > a) Accessing the metadata after redirect (in a cpumap or devmap
> > program, or on a veth device)
> >    - only a small xdp_to_skb_metadata subset will work out of the box
> > iff the redirecttor calls bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb; for the rest
> > the progs will have to agree on the layout, right?
> >
> > b) Transferring the packet+metadata to AF_XDP
> >    - here, again, the AF_XDP consumer will have to either expect
> > xdp_to_skb_metadata with a smaller set of skb-related metadata, or
> > will have to make sure the producer builds a custom layout using
> > kfuncs; there is also no flag to indicate whether xdp_to_skb_metadata
> > is there or not; the consumer will have to test btf_id at the right
> > offset
> >
> > c) Returning XDP_PASS, but accessing some of the metadata first
> > (whether to read or change it)
> >    - can read via kfuncs, can change via
> > bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb(); m->xyz=abc;
> >
> > Anything I'm missing?
>

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ