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Date:   Thu, 10 Nov 2022 15:26:53 +0100
From:   Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
To:     Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
Cc:     ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org,
        song@...nel.org, yhs@...com, john.fastabend@...il.com,
        kpsingh@...nel.org, haoluo@...gle.com, jolsa@...nel.org,
        David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>,
        Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>,
        Anatoly Burakov <anatoly.burakov@...el.com>,
        Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@...el.com>,
        Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@...il.com>,
        Maryam Tahhan <mtahhan@...hat.com>, xdp-hints@...-project.net,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [xdp-hints] Re: [RFC bpf-next v2 06/14] xdp: Carry over xdp
 metadata into skb context

Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com> writes:

> On Wed, Nov 9, 2022 at 4:13 PM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
>>
>> On 11/9/22 1:33 PM, Stanislav Fomichev wrote:
>> > On Wed, Nov 9, 2022 at 10:22 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 11/9/22 3:10 AM, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen wrote:
>> >>> Snipping a bit of context to reply to this bit:
>> >>>
>> >>>>>>> Can the xdp prog still change the metadata through xdp->data_meta? tbh, I am not
>> >>>>>>> sure it is solid enough by asking the xdp prog not to use the same random number
>> >>>>>>> in its own metadata + not to change the metadata through xdp->data_meta after
>> >>>>>>> calling bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb().
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> What do you think the usecase here might be? Or are you suggesting we
>> >>>>>> reject further access to data_meta after
>> >>>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb somehow?
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> If we want to let the programs override some of this
>> >>>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() metadata, it feels like we can add
>> >>>>>> more kfuncs instead of exposing the layout?
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb(ctx);
>> >>>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_skb_hash(ctx, 1234);
>> >>>
>> >>> There are several use cases for needing to access the metadata after
>> >>> calling bpf_xdp_metdata_export_to_skb():
>> >>>
>> >>> - Accessing the metadata after redirect (in a cpumap or devmap program,
>> >>>     or on a veth device)
>> >>> - Transferring the packet+metadata to AF_XDP
>> >> fwiw, the xdp prog could also be more selective and only stores one of the hints
>> >> instead of the whole 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata'.
>> >>
>> >>> - Returning XDP_PASS, but accessing some of the metadata first (whether
>> >>>     to read or change it)
>> >>>
>> >>> The last one could be solved by calling additional kfuncs, but that
>> >>> would be less efficient than just directly editing the struct which
>> >>> will be cache-hot after the helper returns.
>> >>
>> >> Yeah, it is more efficient to directly write if possible.  I think this set
>> >> allows the direct reading and writing already through data_meta (as a _u8 *).
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>> And yeah, this will allow the XDP program to inject arbitrary metadata
>> >>> into the netstack; but it can already inject arbitrary *packet* data
>> >>> into the stack, so not sure if this is much of an additional risk? If it
>> >>> does lead to trivial crashes, we should probably harden the stack
>> >>> against that?
>> >>>
>> >>> As for the random number, Jesper and I discussed replacing this with the
>> >>> same BTF-ID scheme that he was using in his patch series. I.e., instead
>> >>> of just putting in a random number, we insert the BTF ID of the metadata
>> >>> struct at the end of it. This will allow us to support multiple
>> >>> different formats in the future (not just changing the layout, but
>> >>> having multiple simultaneous formats in the same kernel image), in case
>> >>> we run out of space.
>> >>
>> >> This seems a bit hypothetical.  How much headroom does it usually have for the
>> >> xdp prog?  Potentially the hints can use all the remaining space left after the
>> >> header encap and the current bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() usage?
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>> We should probably also have a flag set on the xdp_frame so the stack
>> >>> knows that the metadata area contains relevant-to-skb data, to guard
>> >>> against an XDP program accidentally hitting the "magic number" (BTF_ID)
>> >>> in unrelated stuff it puts into the metadata area.
>> >>
>> >> Yeah, I think having a flag is useful.  The flag will be set at xdp_buff and
>> >> then transfer to the xdp_frame?
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>>> After re-reading patch 6, have another question. The 'void
>> >>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb();' function signature. Should it at
>> >>>> least return ok/err? or even return a 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *'
>> >>>> pointer and the xdp prog can directly read (or even write) it?
>> >>>
>> >>> Hmm, I'm not sure returning a failure makes sense? Failure to read one
>> >>> or more fields just means that those fields will not be populated? We
>> >>> should probably have a flags field inside the metadata struct itself to
>> >>> indicate which fields are set or not, but I'm not sure returning an
>> >>> error value adds anything? Returning a pointer to the metadata field
>> >>> might be convenient for users (it would just be an alias to the
>> >>> data_meta pointer, but the verifier could know its size, so the program
>> >>> doesn't have to bounds check it).
>> >>
>> >> If some hints are not available, those hints should be initialized to
>> >> 0/CHECKSUM_NONE/...etc.  The xdp prog needs a direct way to tell hard failure
>> >> when it cannot write the meta area because of not enough space.  Comparing
>> >> xdp->data_meta with xdp->data as a side effect is not intuitive.
>> >>
>> >> It is more than saving the bound check.  With type info of 'struct
>> >> xdp_to_skb_metadata *', the verifier can do more checks like reading in the
>> >> middle of an integer member.  The verifier could also limit write access only to
>> >> a few struct's members if it is needed.
>> >>
>> >> The returning 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *' should not be an alias to the
>> >> xdp->data_meta.  They should actually point to different locations in the
>> >> headroom.  bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() sets a flag in xdp_buff.
>> >> xdp->data_meta won't be changed and keeps pointing to the last
>> >> bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() location.  The kernel will know if there is
>> >> xdp_to_skb_metadata before the xdp->data_meta when that bit is set in the
>> >> xdp_{buff,frame}.  Would it work?
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>>> A related question, why 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata' needs
>> >>>> __randomize_layout?
>> >>>
>> >>> The __randomize_layout thing is there to force BPF programs to use CO-RE
>> >>> to access the field. This is to avoid the struct layout accidentally
>> >>> ossifying because people in practice rely on a particular layout, even
>> >>> though we tell them to use CO-RE. There are lots of examples of this
>> >>> happening in other domains (IP header options, TCP options, etc), and
>> >>> __randomize_layout seemed like a neat trick to enforce CO-RE usage :)
>> >>
>> >> I am not sure if it is necessary or helpful to only enforce __randomize_layout
>> >> in 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata'.  There are other CO-RE use cases (tracing and
>> >> non tracing) that already have direct access (reading and/or writing) to other
>> >> kernel structures.
>> >>
>> >> It is more important for the verifier to see the xdp prog accessing it as a
>> >> 'struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *' instead of xdp->data_meta which is a __u8 * so
>> >> that the verifier can enforce the rules of access.
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>>>>>> Does xdp_to_skb_metadata have a use case for XDP_PASS (like patch 7) or the
>> >>>>>>> xdp_to_skb_metadata can be limited to XDP_REDIRECT only?
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> XDP_PASS cases where we convert xdp_buff into skb in the drivers right
>> >>>>>> now usually have C code to manually pull out the metadata (out of hw
>> >>>>>> desc) and put it into skb.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> So, currently, if we're calling bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() for
>> >>>>>> XDP_PASS, we're doing a double amount of work:
>> >>>>>> skb_metadata_import_from_xdp first, then custom driver code second.
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> In theory, maybe we should completely skip drivers custom parsing when
>> >>>>>> there is a prog with BPF_F_XDP_HAS_METADATA?
>> >>>>>> Then both xdp->skb paths (XDP_PASS+XDP_REDIRECT) will be bpf-driven
>> >>>>>> and won't require any mental work (plus, the drivers won't have to
>> >>>>>> care either in the future).
>> >>>>>>    > WDYT?
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Yeah, not sure if it can solely depend on BPF_F_XDP_HAS_METADATA but it makes
>> >>>>> sense to only use the hints (if ever written) from xdp prog especially if it
>> >>>>> will eventually support xdp prog changing some of the hints in the future.  For
>> >>>>> now, I think either way is fine since they are the same and the xdp prog is sort
>> >>>>> of doing extra unnecessary work anyway by calling
>> >>>>> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() with XDP_PASS and knowing nothing can be
>> >>>>> changed now.
>> >>>
>> >>> I agree it would be best if the drivers also use the XDP metadata (if
>> >>> present) on XDP_PASS. Longer term my hope is we can make the XDP
>> >>> metadata support the only thing drivers need to implement (i.e., have
>> >>> the stack call into that code even when no XDP program is loaded), but
>> >>> for now just for consistency (and allowing the XDP program to update the
>> >>> metadata), we should probably at least consume it on XDP_PASS.
>> >>>
>> >>> -Toke
>> >>>
>> >
>> > Not to derail the discussion (left the last message intact on top,
>> > feel free to continue), but to summarize. The proposed changes seem to
>> > be:
>> >
>> > 1. bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb() should return pointer to "struct
>> > xdp_to_skb_metadata"
>> >    - This should let bpf programs change the metadata passed to the skb
>> >
>> > 2. "struct xdp_to_skb_metadata" should have its btf_id as the first
>> > __u32 member (and remove the magic)
>> >    - This is for the redirect case where the end users, including
>> > AF_XDP, can parse this metadata from btf_id
>>
>> I think Toke's idea is to put the btf_id at the end of xdp_to_skb_metadata.  I
>> can see why the end is needed for the userspace AF_XDP because, afaict, AF_XDP
>> rx_desc currently cannot tell if there is metadata written by the xdp prog or
>> not.  However, if the 'has_skb_metadata' bit can also be passed to the AF_XDP
>> rx_desc->options, the btf_id may as well be not needed now.  However, the btf_id
>> and other future new members can be added to the xdp_to_skb_metadata later if
>> there is a need.
>>
>> For the kernel and xdp prog, a bit in the xdp->flags should be enough to get to
>> the xdp_to_skb_metadata.  The xdp prog will use CO-RE to access the members in
>> xdp_to_skb_metadata.
>
> Ack, good points on putting it at the end.
> Regarding bit in desc->options vs btf_id: since it seems that btf_id
> is useful anyway, let's start with that? We can add a bit later on if
> it turns out using metadata is problematic otherwise.

I think the bit is mostly useful so that the stack can know that the
metadata has been set before consuming it (to guard against regular
xdp_metadata usage accidentally hitting the "right" BTF ID). I don't
think it needs to be exposed to the XDP programs themselves.

>> >    - This, however, is not all the metadata that the device can
>> > support, but a much narrower set that the kernel is expected to use
>> > for skb construction
>> >
>> > 3. __randomize_layout isn't really helping, CO-RE will trigger
>> > regardless; maybe only the case where it matters is probably AF_XDP,
>> > so still useful?

Yeah, see my response to Martin, I think the randomisation is useful for
AF_XDP transfer.

>> > 4. The presence of the metadata generated by
>> > bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb should be indicated by a flag in
>> > xdp_{buff,frame}->flags
>> >    - Assuming exposing it via xdp_md->has_skb_metadata is ok?
>>
>> probably __bpf_md_ptr(struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *, skb_metadata) and the type
>> will be PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL.
>
> Oh, that seems even better than returning it from
> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb.
> bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb can return true/false and the rest goes
> via default verifier ctx resolution mechanism..
> (returning ptr from a kfunc seems to be a bit complicated right now)

See my response to John in the other thread about mixing stable UAPI (in
xdp_md) and unstable BTF structures in the xdp_md struct: I think this
is confusing and would prefer a kfunc.

>> >    - Since the programs probably need to do the following:
>> >
>> >    if (xdp_md->has_skb_metadata) {
>> >      access/change skb metadata by doing struct xdp_to_skb_metadata *p
>> > = data_meta;
>>
>> and directly access/change xdp->skb_metadata instead of using xdp->data_meta.
>
> Ack.
>
>> >    } else {
>> >      use kfuncs
>> >    }
>> >
>> > 5. Support the case where we keep program's metadata and kernel's
>> > xdp_to_skb_metadata
>> >    - skb_metadata_import_from_xdp() will "consume" it by mem-moving the
>> > rest of the metadata over it and adjusting the headroom
>>
>> I was thinking the kernel's xdp_to_skb_metadata is always before the program's
>> metadata.  xdp prog should usually work in this order also: read/write headers,
>> write its own metadata, call bpf_xdp_metadata_export_to_skb(), and return
>> XDP_PASS/XDP_REDIRECT.  When it is XDP_PASS, the kernel just needs to pop the
>> xdp_to_skb_metadata and pass the remaining program's metadata to the bpf-tc.
>>
>> For the kernel and xdp prog, I don't think it matters where the
>> xdp_to_skb_metadata is.  However, the xdp->data_meta (program's metadata) has to
>> be before xdp->data because of the current data_meta and data comparison usage
>> in the xdp prog.
>>
>> The order of the kernel's xdp_to_skb_metadata and the program's metadata
>> probably only matters to the userspace AF_XDP.  However, I don't see how AF_XDP
>> supports the program's metadata now.  afaict, it can only work now if there is
>> some sort of contract between them or the AF_XDP currently does not use the
>> program's metadata.  Either way, we can do the mem-moving only for AF_XDP and it
>> should be a no op if there is no program's metadata?  This behavior could also
>> be configurable through setsockopt?
>
> Agreed on all of the above. For now it seems like the safest thing to
> do is to put xdp_to_skb_metadata last to allow af_xdp to properly
> locate btf_id.
> Let's see if Toke disagrees :-)

As I replied to Martin, I'm not sure it's worth the complexity to
logically split the SKB metadata from the program's own metadata (as
opposed to just reusing the existing data_meta pointer)?

However, if we do, the layout that makes most sense to me is putting the
skb metadata before the program metadata, like:

--------------
| skb_metadata
--------------
| data_meta
--------------
| data
--------------

Not sure if that's what you meant? :)

-Toke

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