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Message-ID: <d4c07fa45de290f32611420e2f116d8a6e32d22a.camel@sipsolutions.net>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2022 22:04:38 +0100
From: Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>
To: coverity-bot <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@...el.com>,
Haim Dreyfuss <haim.dreyfuss@...el.com>,
Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@...el.com>,
Petr Stourac <pstourac@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Mordechay Goodstein <mordechay.goodstein@...el.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Nathan Errera <nathan.errera@...el.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Shaul Triebitz <shaul.triebitz@...el.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@...el.com>,
Abhishek Naik <abhishek.naik@...el.com>,
Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@...hat.com>,
Ayala Beker <ayala.beker@...el.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
Sriram R <quic_srirrama@...cinc.com>,
Kalle Valo <kvalo@...nel.org>,
Mike Golant <michael.golant@...el.com>,
Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@...el.com>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
linux-next@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Coverity: iwl_mvm_sec_key_add(): Memory - corruptions
On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 08:54 -0800, coverity-bot wrote:
>
> *** CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
> drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mld-key.c:123 in iwl_mvm_sec_key_add()
> 117
> 118 if (WARN_ON(keyconf->keylen > sizeof(cmd.u.add.key)))
> 119 return -EINVAL;
> 120
> 121 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
> 122 keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104)
> vvv CID 1527370: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN)
> vvv Overrunning buffer pointed to by "cmd.u.add.key + 3" of 32 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 34 using argument "keyconf->keylen" (which evaluates to 32). [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.]
> 123 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key + IWL_SEC_WEP_KEY_OFFSET, keyconf->key,
> 124 keyconf->keylen);
> 125 else
> 126 memcpy(cmd.u.add.key, keyconf->key, keyconf->keylen);
> 127
> 128 if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) {
>
> If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
> such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
> sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
> include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
>
Well, I don't think you can teach coverity this easily, but the
WARN_ON() check there is not really meant to protect this - WEP keys
must have a length of either 5 or 13 bytes (40 or 104 bits!).
So there's no issue here, but I'm not surprised that coverity wouldn't
be able to figure that out through the stack.
johannes
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