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Message-ID: <Y3uN07qSlGqo0dNO@zn.tnic>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 15:40:19 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [Patch v3 05/14] x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of
bss_decrypted consistently
On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 10:41:28AM -0800, Michael Kelley wrote:
> Current code in sme_postprocess_startup() decrypts the bss_decrypted
> section when sme_me_mask is non-zero. But code in
> mem_encrypt_free_decrytped_mem() re-encrypts the unused portion based
^^
letters flipped.
> @@ -513,10 +513,14 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
> npages = (vaddr_end - vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> /*
> - * The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption
> - * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it.
> + * If the unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption
> + * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. Base the
> + * re-encryption on the same condition used for the decryption in
> + * sme_postprocess_startup(). Higher level abstractions, such as
> + * CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT, aren't necessarily equivalent in a Hyper-V VM
> + * using vTOM, where sme_me_mask is always zero.
Good, an example why one needs to pay attention here.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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