netdev - [PATCH] usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow

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Message-Id: <20230103091710.81530-1-szymon.heidrich@gmail.com>
Date:   Tue,  3 Jan 2023 10:17:09 +0100
From:   Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@...il.com>
To:     davem@...emloft.ne, edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org,
        pabeni@...hat.com
Cc:     szymon.heidrich@...il.com, linux-usb@...r.kernel.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow

Variables off and len typed as uint32 in rndis_query function
are controlled by incoming RNDIS response message thus their
value may be manipulated. Setting off to a unexpectetly large
value will cause the sum with len and 8 to overflow and pass
the implemented validation step. Consequently the response
pointer will be referring to a location past the expected
buffer boundaries allowing information leakage e.g. via
RNDIS_OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS OID.

Fixes: ddda08624013 ("USB: rndis_host, various cleanups")
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@...il.com>
---
 drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
index f79333fe1..7b3739b29 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c
@@ -255,7 +255,8 @@ static int rndis_query(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf,
 
 	off = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->offset);
 	len = le32_to_cpu(u.get_c->len);
-	if (unlikely((8 + off + len) > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE))
+	if (unlikely((off > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8) ||
+		     (len > CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE - 8 - off)))
 		goto response_error;
 
 	if (*reply_len != -1 && len != *reply_len)
-- 
2.39.0