netdev - Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in ___bpf_prog

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Date:   Wed, 11 Jan 2023 22:59:30 -0800
From:   Yonghong Song <yhs@...a.com>
To:     Hao Sun <sunhao.th@...il.com>
Cc:     bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
        Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
        Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
        Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@...nel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in ___bpf_prog_run



On 1/9/23 5:21 AM, Hao Sun wrote:
> 
> 
> Yonghong Song <yhs@...a.com> 于2022年12月18日周日 00:57写道：
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/16/22 10:54 PM, Hao Sun wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> On 17 Dec 2022, at 1:07 PM, Yonghong Song <yhs@...a.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/14/22 11:49 PM, Hao Sun wrote:
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>> The following KASAN report can be triggered by loading and test
>>>>> running this simple BPF prog with a random data/ctx:
>>>>> 0: r0 = bpf_get_current_task_btf      ;
>>>>> R0_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct(off=0,imm=0)
>>>>> 1: r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 +8192)       ;
>>>>> R0_w=scalar(umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
>>>>> 2: exit
>>>>> I've simplified the C reproducer but didn't find the root cause.
>>>>> JIT was disabled, and the interpreter triggered UAF when executing
>>>>> the load insn. A slab-out-of-bound read can also be triggered:
>>>>> https://pastebin.com/raw/g9zXr8jU
>>>>> This can be reproduced on:
>>>>> HEAD commit: b148c8b9b926 selftests/bpf: Add few corner cases to test
>>>>> padding handling of btf_dump
>>>>> git tree: bpf-next
>>>>> console log: https://pastebin.com/raw/1EUi9tJe
>>>>> kernel config: https://pastebin.com/raw/rgY3AJDZ
>>>>> C reproducer: https://pastebin.com/raw/cfVGuCBm
>>>>
>>>> I I tried with your above kernel config and C reproducer and cannot reproduce the kasan issue you reported.
>>>>
>>>> [root@...h-fb-vm1 bpf-next]# ./a.out
>>>> func#0 @0
>>>> 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
>>>> 0: (85) call bpf_get_current_task_btf#158     ; R0_w=trusted_ptr_task_struct(off=0,imm=0)
>>>> 1: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r0 +8192)       ; R0_w=scalar(umax=4294967295,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
>>>> 2: (95) exit
>>>> processed 3 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 0 peak_states 0 mark_read 0
>>>>
>>>> prog fd: 3
>>>> [root@...h-fb-vm1 bpf-next]#
>>>>
>>>> Your config indeed has kasan on.
>>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> I can still reproduce this on a latest bpf-next build: 0e43662e61f25
>>> (“tools/resolve_btfids: Use pkg-config to locate libelf”).
>>> The simplified C reproducer sometime need to be run twice to trigger
>>> the UAF. Also note that interpreter is required. Here is the original
>>> C reproducer that loads and runs the BPF prog continuously for your
>>> convenience:
>>> https://pastebin.com/raw/WSJuNnVU
>>>
>>
>> I still cannot reproduce with more than 10 runs. The config has jit off
>> so it already uses interpreter. It has kasan on as well.
>> # CONFIG_BPF_JIT is not set
>>
>> Since you can reproduce it, I guess it would be great if you can
>> continue to debug this.
>>
> 
> The load insn ‘r0 = *(u32*) (current + 8192)’ is OOB, because sizeof(task_struct)
> is 7240 as shown in KASAN report. The issue is that struct task_struct is special,
> its runtime size is actually smaller than it static type size. In X86:
> 
> task_struct->thread_struct->fpu->fpstate->union fpregs_state is
> /*
> * ...
> * The size of the structure is determined by the largest
> * member - which is the xsave area. The padding is there
> * to ensure that statically-allocated task_structs (just
> * the init_task today) have enough space.
> */
> union fpregs_state {
> 	struct fregs_state fsave;
> 	struct fxregs_state fxsave;
> 	struct swregs_state soft;
> 	struct xregs_state xsave;
> 	u8 __padding[PAGE_SIZE];
> };
> 
> In btf_struct_access(), the resolved size for task_struct is 10496, much bigger
> than its runtime size, so the prog in reproducer passed the verifier and leads
> to the oob. This can happen to all similar types, whose runtime size is smaller
> than its static size.
> 
> Not sure how many similar cases are there, maybe special check to task_struct
> is enough. Any hint on how this should be addressed?

This should a corner case, I am not aware of other allocations like this.

For a normal program, if the access chain looks
like
 
task_struct->thread_struct->fpu->fpstate->fpregs_state->{fsave,fxsave, 
soft, xsave},
we should not hit this issue. So I think we don't need to address this
issue in kernel. The test itself should filter this out.