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Message-ID: <ac48766a-b861-4fc0-3171-7b23f175c672@nvidia.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 16:20:27 +0200
From: Max Gurtovoy <mgurtovoy@...dia.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>, Bryan Tan <bryantan@...are.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Israel Rukshin <israelr@...dia.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...com>,
Keith Busch <kbusch@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nvme@...ts.infradead.org, linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@...dia.com>,
Sagi Grimberg <sagi@...mberg.me>,
Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier@...adcom.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Vishnu Dasa <vdasa@...are.com>,
Yishai Hadas <yishaih@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH rdma-next 00/13] Add RDMA inline crypto support
On 18/01/2023 9:36, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 16, 2023 at 03:05:47PM +0200, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
>> >From Israel,
>>
>> The purpose of this patchset is to add support for inline
>> encryption/decryption of the data at storage protocols like nvmf over
>> RDMA (at a similar way like integrity is used via unique mkey).
>>
>> This patchset adds support for plaintext keys. The patches were tested
>> on BF-3 HW with fscrypt tool to test this feature, which showed reduce
>> in CPU utilization when comparing at 64k or more IO size. The CPU utilization
>> was improved by more than 50% comparing to the SW only solution at this case.
> One thing that needs to be solved before we can look into this is the
> interaction with protection information (or integrity data in Linux
> terms). Currently inline encryption and protection information are
> mutally incompatible.
Well, for sure this should be solved. Not sure that it should be done
before this series.
This patch set doesn't break/change existing behavior of PI and
Encryption offloads so the above can be done incrementally.
It's already big enough series and 2 subsystems are involved.
Today, if one would like to run both features using a capable device
then the PI will be offloaded (no SW fallback) and the Encryption will
be using SW fallback.
There should be a serious instrumentation in the block layer to make
both operations offloaded.
We'll start looking into it. Any suggestions and designs are welcomed.
We also prepared patches to extend the blk lavel encryption (in addition
to fscrypt exist today).
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