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Message-ID: <39c2c143-e37c-f77a-0802-a187257d5053@novek.ru>
Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 23:10:18 +0000
From: Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@...ek.ru>
To: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
Cc: Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Frantisek Krenzelok <fkrenzel@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 3/5] tls: implement rekey for TLS1.3
On 17.01.2023 13:45, Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> This adds the possibility to change the key and IV when using
> TLS1.3. Changing the cipher or TLS version is not supported.
>
> Once we have updated the RX key, we can unblock the receive side.
>
> This change only affects tls_sw, since 1.3 offload isn't supported.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
> Tested-by: Frantisek Krenzelok <fkrenzel@...hat.com>
> ---
> net/tls/tls.h | 3 +-
> net/tls/tls_device.c | 2 +-
> net/tls/tls_main.c | 32 ++++++++++--
> net/tls/tls_sw.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> 4 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls.h b/net/tls/tls.h
> index 34d0fe814600..6f9c85eaa9c5 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls.h
> +++ b/net/tls/tls.h
> @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ int tls_sk_attach(struct sock *sk, int optname, char __user *optval,
> unsigned int optlen);
> void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err);
>
> -int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx);
> +int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx,
> + struct tls_crypto_info *new_crypto_info);
> void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);
> void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
> void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c
> index c149f36b42ee..1ad50c253dfe 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
> @@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@ int tls_set_device_offload_rx(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
> context->resync_nh_reset = 1;
>
> ctx->priv_ctx_rx = context;
> - rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0);
> + rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0, NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto release_ctx;
>
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
> index fb1da1780f50..9be82aecd13e 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
> @@ -669,9 +669,12 @@ static int tls_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
> static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
> unsigned int optlen, int tx)
> {
> + union tls_crypto_context tmp = {};
> + struct tls_crypto_info *old_crypto_info = NULL;
> struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
> struct tls_crypto_info *alt_crypto_info;
> struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
> + bool update = false;
> size_t optsize;
> int rc = 0;
> int conf;
> @@ -687,9 +690,17 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
> alt_crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
> }
>
> - /* Currently we don't support set crypto info more than one time */
> - if (TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(crypto_info))
> - return -EBUSY;
> + if (TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(crypto_info)) {
> + /* Currently we only support setting crypto info more
> + * than one time for TLS 1.3
> + */
> + if (crypto_info->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + update = true;
> + old_crypto_info = crypto_info;
> + crypto_info = &tmp.info;
> + }
>
> rc = copy_from_sockptr(crypto_info, optval, sizeof(*crypto_info));
> if (rc) {
> @@ -704,6 +715,15 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
> goto err_crypto_info;
> }
>
> + if (update) {
> + /* Ensure that TLS version and ciphers are not modified */
> + if (crypto_info->version != old_crypto_info->version ||
> + crypto_info->cipher_type != old_crypto_info->cipher_type) {
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + goto err_crypto_info;
> + }
> + }
> +
looks like these checks can be moved up to TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY scope and there
will be no need for extra variables.
> /* Ensure that TLS version and ciphers are same in both directions */
> if (TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(alt_crypto_info)) {
> if (alt_crypto_info->version != crypto_info->version ||
> @@ -772,7 +792,8 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
> TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXDEVICE);
> TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXDEVICE);
> } else {
> - rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 1);
> + rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 1,
> + update ? crypto_info : NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto err_crypto_info;
> TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXSW);
> @@ -786,7 +807,8 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
> TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXDEVICE);
> TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXDEVICE);
> } else {
> - rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0);
> + rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0,
> + update ? crypto_info : NULL);
> if (rc)
> goto err_crypto_info;
> TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXSW);
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> index 22efea224a04..310135aaa6e6 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
> @@ -2505,11 +2505,19 @@ void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
> tls_ctx->prot_info.version != TLS_1_3_VERSION;
> }
>
> -int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> +static void tls_finish_key_update(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
> +{
> + struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
> +
> + ctx->key_update_pending = false;
> +}
> +
> +int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx,
> + struct tls_crypto_info *new_crypto_info)
> {
> struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
> struct tls_prot_info *prot = &ctx->prot_info;
> - struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
> + struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info, *src_crypto_info;
> struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
> struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
> struct cipher_context *cctx;
> @@ -2517,9 +2525,28 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size, salt_size;
> struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
> char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt, *cipher_name;
> - size_t keysize;
> + size_t keysize, crypto_info_size;
> int rc = 0;
>
> + if (new_crypto_info) {
> + /* non-NULL new_crypto_info means rekey */
> + src_crypto_info = new_crypto_info;
> + if (tx) {
> + sw_ctx_tx = ctx->priv_ctx_tx;
> + crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
> + cctx = &ctx->tx;
> + aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send;
> + sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
> + } else {
> + sw_ctx_rx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
> + crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
> + cctx = &ctx->rx;
> + aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
> + sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
> + }
> + goto skip_init;
> + }
> +
> if (tx) {
> if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) {
> sw_ctx_tx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_tx), GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -2566,12 +2593,15 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
> sw_ctx_rx->key_update_pending = false;
> }
> + src_crypto_info = crypto_info;
>
> +skip_init:
> switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
> case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *gcm_128_info;
>
> - gcm_128_info = (void *)crypto_info;
> + crypto_info_size = sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128);
> + gcm_128_info = (void *)src_crypto_info;
> nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
> tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
> iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
> @@ -2588,7 +2618,8 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256: {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
>
> - gcm_256_info = (void *)crypto_info;
> + crypto_info_size = sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256);
> + gcm_256_info = (void *)src_crypto_info;
> nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
> tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
> iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
> @@ -2605,7 +2636,8 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *ccm_128_info;
>
> - ccm_128_info = (void *)crypto_info;
> + crypto_info_size = sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128);
> + ccm_128_info = (void *)src_crypto_info;
> nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
> tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
> iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
> @@ -2622,7 +2654,8 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> case TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305: {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_chacha20_poly1305 *chacha20_poly1305_info;
>
> - chacha20_poly1305_info = (void *)crypto_info;
> + crypto_info_size = sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_chacha20_poly1305);
> + chacha20_poly1305_info = (void *)src_crypto_info;
> nonce_size = 0;
> tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_TAG_SIZE;
> iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IV_SIZE;
> @@ -2639,7 +2672,8 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM: {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_sm4_gcm *sm4_gcm_info;
>
> - sm4_gcm_info = (void *)crypto_info;
> + crypto_info_size = sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_sm4_gcm);
> + sm4_gcm_info = (void *)src_crypto_info;
> nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_IV_SIZE;
> tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_TAG_SIZE;
> iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_GCM_IV_SIZE;
> @@ -2656,7 +2690,8 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> case TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM: {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_sm4_ccm *sm4_ccm_info;
>
> - sm4_ccm_info = (void *)crypto_info;
> + crypto_info_size = sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_sm4_ccm);
> + sm4_ccm_info = (void *)src_crypto_info;
> nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_IV_SIZE;
> tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_TAG_SIZE;
> iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_SM4_CCM_IV_SIZE;
> @@ -2673,7 +2708,8 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> case TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128: {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_aria_gcm_128 *aria_gcm_128_info;
>
> - aria_gcm_128_info = (void *)crypto_info;
> + crypto_info_size = sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_aria_gcm_128);
> + aria_gcm_128_info = (void *)src_crypto_info;
> nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
> tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
> iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
> @@ -2690,7 +2726,8 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> case TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256: {
> struct tls12_crypto_info_aria_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
>
> - gcm_256_info = (void *)crypto_info;
> + crypto_info_size = sizeof(struct tls12_crypto_info_aria_gcm_256);
> + gcm_256_info = (void *)src_crypto_info;
> nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
> tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
> iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_ARIA_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
> @@ -2734,19 +2771,26 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size;
> prot->iv_size = iv_size;
> prot->salt_size = salt_size;
> - cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!cctx->iv) {
> - rc = -ENOMEM;
> - goto free_priv;
> + if (!new_crypto_info) {
> + cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!cctx->iv) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_priv;
> + }
> }
> /* Note: 128 & 256 bit salt are the same size */
> prot->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
> memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, salt_size);
> memcpy(cctx->iv + salt_size, iv, iv_size);
> - cctx->rec_seq = kmemdup(rec_seq, rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!cctx->rec_seq) {
> - rc = -ENOMEM;
> - goto free_iv;
> +
> + if (!new_crypto_info) {
> + cctx->rec_seq = kmemdup(rec_seq, rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!cctx->rec_seq) {
> + rc = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_iv;
> + }
> + } else {
> + memcpy(cctx->rec_seq, rec_seq, rec_seq_size);
> }
>
> if (!*aead) {
> @@ -2761,13 +2805,20 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
>
> rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, keysize);
> -
> - if (rc)
> - goto free_aead;
> + if (rc) {
> + if (new_crypto_info)
> + goto out;
> + else
> + goto free_aead;
> + }
>
> rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
> - if (rc)
> - goto free_aead;
> + if (rc) {
> + if (new_crypto_info)
> + goto out;
> + else
> + goto free_aead;
> + }
>
> if (sw_ctx_rx) {
> tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv);
> @@ -2782,6 +2833,13 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> goto free_aead;
> }
>
> + if (new_crypto_info) {
> + memcpy(crypto_info, new_crypto_info, crypto_info_size);
> + memzero_explicit(new_crypto_info, crypto_info_size);
> + if (!tx)
> + tls_finish_key_update(ctx);
> + }
> +
> goto out;
>
> free_aead:
> @@ -2794,12 +2852,14 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
> kfree(cctx->iv);
> cctx->iv = NULL;
> free_priv:
> - if (tx) {
> - kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
> - ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
> - } else {
> - kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
> - ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;
> + if (!new_crypto_info) {
> + if (tx) {
> + kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
> + ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
> + } else {
> + kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
> + ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;
> + }
> }
> out:
> return rc;
I think we can avoid extra parameter and extra level of if{} constructions by
checking if iv and rec_seq is already allocated and adjust init part the same
way. I don't think we have to have separate error path because in case of any
error during rekey procedure the connection becomes useless and application
should indicate error to the other end. The code copies new crypto info to the
current storage, so it assumes that all fields a properly filled and that means
that this copy can be done earlier and use the same code path as first init code.
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