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Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 18:10:53 -0800
From: Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@...zon.com>
To: <sd@...asysnail.net>
CC: <fkrenzel@...hat.com>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3
> 2023-01-17, 18:03:51 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> > Please CC all the maintainers.
>
> Sorry.
>
> > On Tue, 17 Jan 2023 14:45:26 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> > > This adds support for receiving KeyUpdate messages (RFC 8446, 4.6.3
> > > [1]). A sender transmits a KeyUpdate message and then changes its TX
> > > key. The receiver should react by updating its RX key before
> > > processing the next message.
> > >
> > > This patchset implements key updates by:
> > > 1. pausing decryption when a KeyUpdate message is received, to avoid
> > > attempting to use the old key to decrypt a record encrypted with
> > > the new key
> > > 2. returning -EKEYEXPIRED to syscalls that cannot receive the
> > > KeyUpdate message, until the rekey has been performed by userspace
> >
> > Why? We return to user space after hitting a cmsg, don't we?
> > If the user space wants to keep reading with the old key - 🤷️
>
> But they won't be able to read anything. Either we don't pause
> decryption, and the socket is just broken when we look at the next
> record, or we pause, and there's nothing to read until the rekey is
> done. I think that -EKEYEXPIRED is better than breaking the socket
> just because a read snuck in between getting the cmsg and setting the
> new key.
Pausing also better aligns with the RFC also since all subsequent messages
should be encrypted with the new key.
>From the RFC https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#section-4.6.3
After sending a KeyUpdate message, the sender SHALL send all
its traffic using the next generation of keys, computed as described
in Section 7.2. Upon receiving a KeyUpdate, the receiver MUST update
its receiving keys.
>
> > > 3. passing the KeyUpdate message to userspace as a control message
> > > 4. allowing updates of the crypto_info via the TLS_TX/TLS_RX
> > > setsockopts
> > >
> > > This API has been tested with gnutls to make sure that it allows
> > > userspace libraries to implement key updates [2]. Thanks to Frantisek
> > > Krenzelok <fkrenzel@...hat.com> for providing the implementation in
> > > gnutls and testing the kernel patches.
> >
> > Please explain why - the kernel TLS is not faster than user space,
> > the point of it is primarily to enable offload. And you don't add
> > offload support here.
>
> Well, TLS1.3 support was added 4 years ago, and yet the offload still
> doesn't support 1.3 at all.
>
> IIRC support for KeyUpdates is mandatory in TLS1.3, so currently the
> kernel can't claim to support 1.3, independent of offloading.
>
> Some folks did tests with and without kTLS using nbdcopy and found a
> small but noticeable performance improvement (around 8-10%).
>
> > > Note: in a future series, I'll clean up tls_set_sw_offload and
> > > eliminate the per-cipher copy-paste using tls_cipher_size_desc.
> >
> > Yeah, I think it's on Vadim's TODO list as well.
>
> I've already done most of the work as I was working on this, I'll
> submit it later.
>
> --
> Sabrina
--
Apoorv
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