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Message-ID: <20230125144351.30d1d5ab@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 14:43:51 -0800
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>
Cc: Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@...zon.com>, sd@...asysnail.net,
borisp@...dia.com, dueno@...hat.com, fkrenzel@...hat.com,
gal@...dia.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, tariqt@...dia.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3
On Wed, 25 Jan 2023 16:17:26 -0500 Simo Sorce wrote:
> > We're talking about the Tx direction, the packets are queued to the
> > lower layers of the stack unencrypted, and get encrypted by the NIC.
> > Until TCP gets acks for all the data awaiting offloaded crypto - we
> > must hold onto the keys.
>
> Is this because the NIC does not cache the already encrypted outgoing
> packets?
NIC can't cache outgoing packets, there's too many and NIC is supposed
to only do crypto. TCP stack is responsible for handing rtx.
> If that is the case is it _guaranteed_ that the re-encrypted packets
> are exactly identical to the previously sent ones?
In terms of payload, yes. Modulo zero-copy cases we don't need to get
into.
> If it is not guaranteed, are you blocking use of AES GCM and any other
> block cipher that may have very bad failure modes in a situation like
> this (in the case of AES GCM I am thinking of IV reuse) ?
I don't know what you mean.
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