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Message-ID: <5715ea83-c4aa-c884-ab95-3d5e630cad05@linux.dev>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2023 14:04:08 -0800
From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
To: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@...il.com>
Cc: daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org, martin.lau@...nel.org,
ast@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, memxor@...il.com,
kernel-team@...com, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 bpf-next 3/5] bpf: Add skb dynptrs
On 1/27/23 11:17 AM, Joanne Koong wrote:
> @@ -8243,6 +8316,28 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
> mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
> regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
> regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size;
> + if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data &&
> + dynptr_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB) {
> + bool seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write;
> +
> + regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;
> + if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE))
> + regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY;
> + else
> + /*
> + * Calling may_access_direct_pkt_data() will set
> + * env->seen_direct_write to true if the skb is
> + * writable. As an optimization, we can ignore
> + * setting env->seen_direct_write.
> + *
> + * env->seen_direct_write is used by skb
> + * programs to determine whether the skb's page
> + * buffers should be cloned. Since data slice
> + * writes would only be to the head, we can skip
> + * this.
> + */
> + env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write;
> + }
[ ... ]
> @@ -9263,17 +9361,26 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
> return ret;
> break;
> case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
> + {
> + enum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
> +
> if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK &&
> reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
> verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or dynptr_ptr\n", i);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> - ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx,
> - ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY);
> + if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb])
> + dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT | DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;
> + else
> + dynptr_arg_type |= MEM_RDONLY;
> +
> + ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type,
> + meta->func_id);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
> break;
> + }
> case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD:
> if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
> reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
> @@ -15857,6 +15964,14 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
> desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) {
> insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1);
> *cnt = 1;
> + } else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) {
> + bool is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE);
Does it need to restore the env->seen_direct_write here also?
It seems this 'seen_direct_write' saving/restoring is needed now because
'may_access_direct_pkt_data(BPF_WRITE)' is not only called when it is actually
writing the packet. Some refactoring can help to avoid issue like this.
While at 'seen_direct_write', Alexei has also pointed out that the verifier
needs to track whether the (packet) 'slice' returned by bpf_dynptr_data() has
been written. It should be tracked in 'seen_direct_write'. Take a look at how
reg_is_pkt_pointer() and may_access_direct_pkt_data() are done in
check_mem_access(). iirc, this reg_is_pkt_pointer() part got loss somewhere in
v5 (or v4?) when bpf_dynptr_data() was changed to return register typed
PTR_TO_MEM instead of PTR_TO_PACKET.
[ ... ]
> +int bpf_dynptr_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u64 flags,
> + struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, int is_rdonly)
hmm... this exposed kfunc takes "int is_rdonly".
What if the bpf prog calls it like bpf_dynptr_from_skb(..., false) in some hook
that is not writable to packet?
> +{
> + if (flags) {
> + bpf_dynptr_set_null(ptr);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + bpf_dynptr_init(ptr, skb, BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB, 0, skb->len);
> +
> + if (is_rdonly)
> + bpf_dynptr_set_rdonly(ptr);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> BPF_CALL_1(bpf_sk_fullsock, struct sock *, sk)
> {
> return sk_fullsock(sk) ? (unsigned long)sk : (unsigned long)NULL;
> @@ -11607,3 +11634,28 @@ bpf_sk_base_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
>
> return func;
> }
> +
> +BTF_SET8_START(bpf_kfunc_check_set_skb)
> +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_dynptr_from_skb)
> +BTF_SET8_END(bpf_kfunc_check_set_skb)
> +
> +static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_skb = {
> + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> + .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_skb,
> +};
> +
> +static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> + ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> + return ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_SEG6LOCAL, &bpf_kfunc_set_skb);
> +}
> +late_initcall(bpf_kfunc_init);
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