netdev - Re: [syzbot] general protection fault in skb

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Date:   Thu, 2 Feb 2023 10:02:42 +0100
From:   David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To:     David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, jhubbard@...dia.com
Cc:     syzbot <syzbot+a440341a59e3b7142895@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
        davem@...emloft.net, edumazet@...gle.com, hch@....de,
        johannes@...solutions.net, kuba@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, pabeni@...hat.com,
        syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] general protection fault in skb_dequeue (3)

On 02.02.23 09:52, David Howells wrote:
> Hi John, David,
> 
> Could you have a look at this?
> 
>> syzbot found the following issue on:
>>
>> HEAD commit:    80bd9028feca Add linux-next specific files for 20230131
>> git tree:       linux-next
>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1468e369480000
>> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=904dc2f450eaad4a
>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a440341a59e3b7142895
>> compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
>> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12c5d2be480000
>> C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=11259a79480000
>> ...
>> The issue was bisected to:
>>
>> commit 920756a3306a35f1c08f25207d375885bef98975
>> Author: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
>> Date:   Sat Jan 21 12:51:18 2023 +0000
>>
>>      block: Convert bio_iov_iter_get_pages to use iov_iter_extract_pages
>>
>> bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=170384f9480000
>> final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=148384f9480000
>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=108384f9480000
>> ...
>> general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
>> KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
>> CPU: 0 PID: 2838 Comm: kworker/u4:6 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-next-20230131-syzkaller-09515-g80bd9028feca #0
>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/12/2023
>> Workqueue: phy4 ieee80211_iface_work
>> RIP: 0010:__skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:2321 [inline]
>> RIP: 0010:__skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:2337 [inline]
>> RIP: 0010:skb_dequeue+0xf5/0x180 net/core/skbuff.c:3511
> 
> I don't think this is specifically related to anything networking.  I've run
> it a few times and weird stuff happens in various places.  I'm wondering if
> it's related to FOLL_PIN in some way.
> 
> The syzbot test in question does the following:
> 
>     #{"repeat":true,"procs":1,"slowdown":1,"sandbox":"none","sandbox_arg":0,"netdev":true,"cgroups":true,"close_fds":true,"usb":true,"wifi":true,"sysctl":true,"tmpdir":true}
>     socket(0x0, 0x2, 0x0)
>     epoll_create(0x7)
>     r0 = creat(&(0x7f0000000040)='./bus\x00', 0x9)
>     ftruncate(r0, 0x800)
>     lseek(r0, 0x200, 0x2)
>     r1 = open(&(0x7f0000000000)='./bus\x00', 0x24000, 0x0)  <-- O_DIRECT
>     sendfile(r0, r1, 0x0, 0x1dd00)
> 
> Basically a DIO splice from a file to itself.
> 
> I've hand-written my own much simpler tester (see attached).  You need to run
> at least two copies in parallel, I think, to trigger the bug.  It's possible
> truncate is interfering somehow.
> 
> David
> ---
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <sys/sendfile.h>
> #include <sys/wait.h>
> 
> #define file_size 0x800
> #define send_size 0x1dd00
> #define repeat_count 1000
> 
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
> 	int in, out, i, wt;
> 
> 	if (argc != 2 || !argv[1][0]) {
> 		fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <file>\n", argv[0]);
> 		exit(2);
> 	}
> 
> 	for (i = 0; i < repeat_count; i++) {
> 		switch (fork()) {
> 		case -1:
> 			perror("fork");
> 			exit(1);
> 		case 0:
> 			out = creat(argv[1], 0666);
> 			if (out < 0) {
> 				perror(argv[1]);
> 				exit(1);
> 			}
> 
> 			if (ftruncate(out, file_size) < 0) {
> 				perror("ftruncate");
> 				exit(1);
> 			}
> 
> 			if (lseek(out, file_size, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
> 				perror("lseek");
> 				exit(1);
> 			}
> 
> 			in = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT | O_NOFOLLOW);
> 			if (in < 0) {
> 				perror("open");
> 				exit(1);
> 			}
> 
> 			if (sendfile(out, in, NULL, send_size) < 0) {
> 				perror("sendfile");
> 				exit(1);
> 			}
> 			exit(0);

[as raised on IRC]

At first, I wondered if that's related to shared anonymous pages getting 
pinned R/O that would trigger COW-unsharing ... but I don't even see 
where we are supposed to use FOLL_PIN vs. FOLL_GET here? IOW, we're not 
even supposed to access user space memory (neither FOLL_GET nor 
FOLL_PIN) but still end up with a change in behavior.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb