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Message-ID: <Y+0Wjrc9shLkH+Gg@hog>
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2023 18:29:50 +0100
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
To: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@...ek.ru>,
Frantisek Krenzelok <fkrenzel@...hat.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>,
Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@...zon.com>,
Boris Pismenny <borisp@...dia.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Gal Pressman <gal@...dia.com>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@...tmann.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3
2023-02-14, 21:08:11 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Feb 2023 12:17:37 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> > Changes in v2
> > use reverse xmas tree ordering in tls_set_sw_offload and
> > do_tls_setsockopt_conf
> > turn the alt_crypto_info into an else if
> > selftests: add rekey_fail test
> >
> > Vadim suggested simplifying tls_set_sw_offload by copying the new
> > crypto_info in the context in do_tls_setsockopt_conf, and then
> > detecting the rekey in tls_set_sw_offload based on whether the iv was
> > already set, but I don't think we can have a common error path
> > (otherwise we'd free the aead etc on rekey failure). I decided instead
> > to reorganize tls_set_sw_offload so that the context is unmodified
> > until we know the rekey cannot fail. Some fields will be touched
> > during the rekey, but they will be set to the same value they had
> > before the rekey (prot->rec_seq_size, etc).
> >
> > Apoorv suggested to name the struct tls_crypto_info_keys "tls13"
> > rather than "tls12". Since we're using the same crypto_info data for
> > TLS1.3 as for 1.2, even if the tests only run for TLS1.3, I'd rather
> > keep the "tls12" name, in case we end up adding a
> > "tls13_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128" type in the future.
> >
> > Kuniyuki and Apoorv also suggested preventing rekeys on RX when we
> > haven't received a matching KeyUpdate message, but I'd rather let
> > userspace handle this and have a symmetric API between TX and RX on
> > the kernel side. It's a bit of a foot-gun, but we can't really stop a
> > broken userspace from rolling back the rec_seq on an existing
> > crypto_info either, and that seems like a worse possible breakage.
>
> And how will we handle re-keying in offload?
Sorry for the stupid question... do you mean that I need to solve that
problem before this series can progress, or that the cover letter
should summarize the state of the discussion?
> > include/net/tls.h | 4 +
> > net/tls/tls.h | 3 +-
> > net/tls/tls_device.c | 2 +-
> > net/tls/tls_main.c | 37 +++-
> > net/tls/tls_sw.c | 189 +++++++++++++----
> > tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 336 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>
> Documentation please.
Ok, I'll add a paragraph to Documentation/networking/tls.rst in the
next version.
--
Sabrina
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