[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <fa306757-2040-415b-99a7-ba40c100638a@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 19:05:38 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com, gnoack3000@...il.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, yusongping@...wei.com,
artem.kuzin@...wei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites
dedicated to network
On 16/01/2023 09:58, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets
> bind() and connect() actions.
>
> socket:
> * bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
> * connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
> * bind_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
> for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
> * connect_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
> for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
> * ruleset_overlap: Tests with overlapping rules for one port.
> * ruleset_expanding: Tests with expanding rulesets in which rules are
> gradually added one by one, restricting sockets' connections.
> * inval: Tests with invalid user space supplied data:
> - out of range ruleset attribute;
> - unhandled allowed access;
> - zero port value;
> - zero access value;
> - legitimate access values;
> * bind_connect_inval_addrlen: Tests with invalid address length
> for ipv4/ipv6 sockets.
> * inval_port_format: Tests with wrong port format for ipv4/ipv6 sockets.
>
> layout1:
> * with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within
> filesystem directory access test.
>
> Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.1% of 946 lines according
> to gcc/gcov-11.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Adds is_sandboxed const for FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
> * Refactors AF_UNSPEC tests.
> * Adds address length checking tests.
> * Convert ports in all tests to __be16.
> * Adds invalid port values tests.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Squashes all selftest commits.
> * Adds fs test with network bind() socket action.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 4 +
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 65 ++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 1157 +++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 1226 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
> index 0f0a65287bac..71f7e9a8a64c 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
> @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
> +CONFIG_INET=y
> +CONFIG_IPV6=y
> +CONFIG_NET=y
> +CONFIG_NET_NS=y
> CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y
> CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
> CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> index b762b5419a89..5de4559c7fbb 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
> */
>
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <linux/landlock.h>
> +#include <netinet/in.h>
> #include <sched.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <string.h>
> @@ -17,6 +19,7 @@
> #include <sys/mount.h>
> #include <sys/prctl.h>
> #include <sys/sendfile.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> @@ -4413,4 +4416,66 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
> }
> }
>
> +#define IP_ADDRESS "127.0.0.1"
> +
> +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, with_net)
> +{
> + int sockfd;
> + int sock_port = 15000;
> + struct sockaddr_in addr4;
> +
> + addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
> + addr4.sin_port = htons(sock_port);
> + addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
> + memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
> +
> + const struct rule rules[] = {
> + {
> + .path = dir_s1d2,
> + .access = ACCESS_RO,
> + },
> + {},
> + };
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> +
> + .port = htons(sock_port),
> + };
> +
> + /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
> + const int ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
> + &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
> +
> + /* Adds a network rule. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0,
> + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service, 0));
> +
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
> +
> + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
> +
> + /* Tests on a directory with the network rule loaded. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
> +
> + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Binds a socket to port 15000. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4)));
> +
> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
> +}
> +
> TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b9543089a4d3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1157 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Landlock tests - Network
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
> + */
> +
> +#define _GNU_SOURCE
> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
> +#include <errno.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <linux/landlock.h>
> +#include <linux/in.h>
> +#include <sched.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <sys/prctl.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> +#include <sys/types.h>
> +
> +#include "common.h"
> +
> +#define MAX_SOCKET_NUM 10
> +
> +#define SOCK_PORT_START 3470
> +#define SOCK_PORT_ADD 10
> +
> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPv4 "127.0.0.1"
Please use a capital "V".
> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPv6 "::1"
ditto
> +#define SOCK_PORT 15000
> +
> +/* Number pending connections queue to be hold. */
> +#define BACKLOG 10
> +
> +const struct sockaddr addr_unspec = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC };
> +
> +/* Invalid attribute, out of landlock network access range. */
> +#define LANDLOCK_INVAL_ATTR 7
> +
> +FIXTURE(socket)
> +{
> + uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> + struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> + struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> +};
> +
> +/* struct _fixture_variant_socket */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket)
> +{
> + const bool is_ipv4;
> + const bool is_sandboxed;
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_ipv4 = true,
> + .is_sandboxed = false,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4_sandboxed) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_ipv4 = true,
> + .is_sandboxed = true,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_ipv4 = false,
> + .is_sandboxed = false,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6_sandboxed) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_ipv4 = false,
> + .is_sandboxed = true,
> +};
> +
> +static int
> +create_socket_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_socket *const variant,
If all "struct _fixture_variant_socket" can be replaced with
"FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket)" while keeping clang-format and checkpatch.pl
happy, please do it. It seems that some clang-format issues have been
fixed. Same for _test_data and FIXTURE_DATA. Please remove the outdated
comments about these structs (see socket_standalone, and socket variant
definitions).
> + const int type)
> +{
> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
> + return socket(AF_INET, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> + else
> + return socket(AF_INET6, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> +}
> +
> +static int bind_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_socket *const variant,
> + const int sockfd,
> + const struct _test_data_socket *const self,
> + const size_t index, const bool zero_size)
> +
Extra new line.
> +{
> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
> + return bind(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
> + (zero_size ? 0 : sizeof(self->addr4[index])));
Is the zero_size really useful? Do calling bind and connect with this
argument reaches the Landlock code (check_addrlen) or is it caught by
the network code beforehand?
> + else
> + return bind(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
> + (zero_size ? 0 : sizeof(self->addr6[index])));
> +}
> +
> +static int connect_variant(const struct _fixture_variant_socket *const variant,
> + const int sockfd,
> + const struct _test_data_socket *const self,
> + const size_t index, const bool zero_size)
> +{
> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
> + return connect(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
> + (zero_size ? 0 : sizeof(self->addr4[index])));
> + else
> + return connect(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
> + (zero_size ? 0 : sizeof(self->addr6[index])));
> +}
[...]
> +
> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, bind)
> +{
> + int sockfd;
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + .port = htons(self->port[0]),
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + .port = htons(self->port[1]),
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
> + .allowed_access = 0,
> + .port = htons(self->port[2]),
> + };
> + int ruleset_fd, ret;
> +
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> +
> + /*
> + * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
> + * socket.
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_1, 0));
> + /*
> + * Allows connect and deny bind operations to the port[1]
> + * socket.
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_2, 0));
> + /*
> + * Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in
> + * network actions for port[2] socket.
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_3, 0));
> + ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
> +
> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> + }
> +
> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Binds a socket to port[0]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0, false);
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> + } else {
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
The condition is useless here. Same on multiple other locations.
> +
> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
> +
> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Binds a socket to port[1]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1, false);
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
> + } else {
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> + }
> +
> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Binds a socket to port[2]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 2, false);
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
> + } else {
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> + }
> +}
Powered by blists - more mailing lists