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Message-ID: <20230224141740.63d5e503@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 14:17:40 -0800
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
Cc: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@...il.com>, Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
borisp@...dia.com, john.fastabend@...il.com, davem@...emloft.net,
edumazet@...gle.com, pabeni@...hat.com, davejwatson@...com,
aviadye@...lanox.com, ilyal@...lanox.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: tls: fix possible race condition between
do_tls_getsockopt_conf() and do_tls_setsockopt_conf()
On Fri, 24 Feb 2023 22:48:57 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> 2023-02-24, 13:06:25 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> > On Fri, 24 Feb 2023 21:22:43 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> [...]
> > >
> > > I suggested a change of locking in do_tls_getsockopt_conf this
> > > morning [1]. The issue reported last seemed valid, but this patch is not
> > > at all what I had in mind.
> > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y/ht6gQL+u6fj3dG@hog/
> >
> > Ack, I read the messages out of order, sorry.
> >
> > > do_tls_setsockopt_conf fills crypto_info immediately from what
> > > userspace gives us (and clears it on exit in case of failure), which
> > > getsockopt could see since it's not locking the socket when it checks
> > > TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY. So getsockopt would progress up to the point it
> > > finally locks the socket, but if setsockopt failed, we could have
> > > cleared TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY and freed iv/rec_seq.
> >
> > Makes sense. We should just take the socket lock around all of
> > do_tls_getsockopt(), then?
>
> That would make things simple and consistent. My idea was just taking
> the existing lock_sock in do_tls_getsockopt_conf out of the switch and
> put it just above TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY.
>
> While we're at it, should we move the
>
> ctx->prot_info.version != TLS_1_3_VERSION
>
> check in do_tls_setsockopt_no_pad under lock_sock?
Yes, or READ_ONCE(), same for do_tls_getsockopt_tx_zc() and its access
on ctx->zerocopy_sendfile.
> I don't think that
> can do anything wrong (we'd have to get past this check just before a
> failing setsockopt clears crypto_info, and even then we're just
> reading a bit from the context), it just looks a bit strange. Or just
> lock the socket around all of do_tls_setsockopt_no_pad, like the other
> options we have.
The delayed locking feels like a premature optimization, we'll keep
having such issues with new options. Hence my vote to lock all of
do_tls_getsockopt().
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