Date:   Mon, 6 Mar 2023 16:43:25 +0300
From:   "Konstantin Meskhidze (A)" <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
To:     Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
        Günther Noack <gnoack3000@...il.com>
CC:     <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>,
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <yusongping@...wei.com>,
        <artem.kuzin@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 12/12] landlock: Document Landlock's network support



2/21/2023 7:16 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
> 
> On 30/01/2023 11:03, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 1/27/2023 9:22 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>
>>> On 23/01/2023 10:38, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 1/22/2023 2:07 AM, Günther Noack пишет:
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>>>> @@ -143,10 +157,24 @@ for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock
>>>>>>    ABI version.  In this example, this is not required because all of the requested
>>>>>>    ``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1.
>>>>>>    
>>>>>> -We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while
>>>>>> -denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem.  The next step is to
>>>>>> -restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges (e.g. thanks to a SUID
>>>>>> -binary).
>>>>>> +For network access-control, we can add a set of rules that allow to use a port
>>>>>> +number for a specific action. All ports values must be defined in network byte
>>>>>> +order.
>>>>>
>>>>> What is the point of asking user space to convert this to network byte
>>>>> order? It seems to me that the kernel would be able to convert it to
>>>>> network byte order very easily internally and in a single place -- why
>>>>> ask all of the users to deal with that complexity? Am I overlooking
>>>>> something?
>>>>
>>>>     I had a discussion about this issue with Mickaёl.
>>>>     Please check these threads:
>>>>     1.
>>>> https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/49391484-7401-e7c7-d909-3bd6bd024731@digikod.net/
>>>>     2.
>>>> https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/1ed20e34-c252-b849-ab92-78c82901c979@huawei.com/
>>>
>>> I'm definitely not sure if this is the right solution, or if there is
>>> one. The rationale is to make it close to the current (POSIX) API. We
>>> didn't get many opinion about that but I'd really like to have a
>>> discussion about port endianness for this Landlock API.
>> 
>>     As for me, the kernel should take care about port converting. This
>> work should be done under the hood.
>> 
>>     Any thoughts?
>> 
>>>
>>> I looked at some code (e.g. see [1]) and it seems that using htons()
>>> might make application patching more complex after all. What do you
>>> think? Is there some network (syscall) API that don't use this convention?
>>>
>>> [1] https://github.com/landlock-lsm/tuto-lighttpd
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +.. code-block:: c
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +    struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
>>>>>> +        .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>>>>>> +        .port = htons(8080),
>>>>>> +    };
>>>>>
>>>>> This is a more high-level comment:
>>>>>
>>>>> The notion of a 16-bit "port" seems to be specific to TCP and UDP --
>>>>> how do you envision this struct to evolve if other protocols need to
>>>>> be supported in the future?
>>>>
>>>>      When TCP restrictions land into Linux, we need to think about UDP
>>>> support. Then other protocols will be on the road. Anyway you are right
>>>> this struct will be evolving in long term, but I don't have a particular
>>>> envision now. Thanks for the question - we need to think about it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Should this struct and the associated constants have "TCP" in its
>>>>> name, and other protocols use a separate struct in the future?
>>>
>>> Other protocols such as AF_VSOCK uses a 32-bit port. We could use a
>>> 32-bits port field or ever a 64-bit one. The later could make more sense
>>> because each field would eventually be aligned on 64-bit. Picking a
>>> 16-bit value was to help developers (and compilers/linters) with the
>>> "correct" type (for TCP).
> 
> Thinking more about this, let's use a __u64 port (and remove the
> explicit packing). The landlock_append_net_rule() function should use a
> __u16 port argument, but the add_rule_net_service() function should
> check that there is no overflow with the port attribute (not higher than
> U16_MAX) before passing it to landlock_append_net_rule(). We should
> prioritize flexibility for the kernel UAPI over stricter types. User
> space libraries can improve this kind of types with a more complex API.
> 
> Big endian can make sense for a pure network API because the port value
> (and the IP address) is passed to other machines through the network,
> as-is. However, with Landlock, the port value is only used by the
> kernel. Moreover, in practice, port values are mostly converted when
> filling the sockaddr*_in structs. It would then make it more risky to
> ask developers another explicit htons() conversion for Landlock
> syscalls. Let's stick to the host endianess and let the kernel do the
> conversion.
> 
> Please include these rationales in code comments. We also need to update
> the tests for endianess, but still check big and little endian
> consistency as it is currently done in these tests. A new test should be
> added to check port boundaries with:
> - port = 0
> - port = U16_MAX
     port = U16_MAX value passes.

> - port = U16_MAX + 1 (which should get an EINVAL)
     port = U16_MAX + 1 after casting is 0, EINVAL is returned.

> - port = U16_MAX + 2 (to check u16 casting != 0)
     port = U16_MAX + 2 after casting is 1, is it passes?

> - port = U32_MAX + 1
> - port = U32_MAX + 2

     Don't you think that all port values >= U16_MAX + 1, EINVAL should
     be returned?
> 
> 
>>>
>>> If we think about protocols other than TCP and UDP (e.g. AF_VSOCK), it
>>> could make sense to have a dedicated attr struct specifying other
>>> properties (e.g. CID). Anyway, the API is flexible but it would be nice
>>> to not mess with it too much. What do you think?
>>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +    err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>>>>>> +                            &net_service, 0);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +The next step is to restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges
>>>>>> +(e.g. thanks to a SUID binary). We now have a ruleset with the first rule allowing
>>>>>             ^^^^^^
>>>>>             "through" a SUID binary? "thanks to" sounds like it's desired
>>>>>             to do that, while we're actually trying to prevent it here?
>>>>
>>>>      This is Mickaёl's part. Let's ask his opinion here.
>>>>
>>>>      Mickaёl, any thoughts?
>>>
>>> Yep, "through" looks better.
>>> .
> .

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