| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <20230313182123.483057-14-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 11:21:22 -0700
From: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@...el.com>
To: davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org, pabeni@...hat.com,
edumazet@...gle.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>,
anthony.l.nguyen@...el.com,
Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@...ux.intel.com>,
Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH net-next 13/14] ice: move ice_is_malicious_vf() to ice_virtchnl.c
From: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>
The ice_is_malicious_vf() function is currently implemented in ice_sriov.c
This function is not Single Root specific, and a future change is going to
refactor the ice_vc_process_vf_msg() function to call this instead of
calling it before ice_vc_process_vf_msg() in the main loop of
__ice_clean_ctrlq.
To make that change easier to review, first move this function into
ice_virtchnl.c but leave the call in __ice_clean_ctrlq() alone.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@...ux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@...el.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 45 -------------------
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.h | 11 -----
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h | 11 +++++
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
index f0daeda236de..6fa62c3cedb0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c
@@ -1777,48 +1777,3 @@ void ice_restore_all_vfs_msi_state(struct pci_dev *pdev)
}
}
}
-
-/**
- * ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF
- * @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf
- * @event: pointer to the AQ event
- * @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox
- */
-bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
- struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
-{
- s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
- struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
- bool report_malvf = false;
- struct ice_vf *vf;
- int status;
-
- vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id);
- if (!vf)
- return false;
-
- if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states))
- goto out_put_vf;
-
- /* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */
- status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info,
- &report_malvf);
- if (status)
- dev_warn_ratelimited(dev, "Unable to check status of mailbox overflow for VF %u MAC %pM, status %d\n",
- vf->vf_id, vf->dev_lan_addr, status);
-
- if (report_malvf) {
- struct ice_vsi *pf_vsi = ice_get_main_vsi(pf);
- u8 zero_addr[ETH_ALEN] = {};
-
- dev_warn(dev, "VF MAC %pM on PF MAC %pM is generating asynchronous messages and may be overflowing the PF message queue. Please see the Adapter User Guide for more information\n",
- vf->dev_lan_addr,
- pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr);
- }
-
-out_put_vf:
- ice_put_vf(vf);
-
- return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
-}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.h
index 8fa61d954fae..346cb2666f3a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.h
@@ -34,9 +34,6 @@ ice_get_vf_cfg(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, struct ifla_vf_info *ivi);
void ice_free_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf);
void ice_restore_all_vfs_msi_state(struct pci_dev *pdev);
-bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
- struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata);
int
ice_set_vf_port_vlan(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, u16 vlan_id, u8 qos,
@@ -72,14 +69,6 @@ static inline void ice_print_vfs_mdd_events(struct ice_pf *pf) { }
static inline void ice_print_vf_rx_mdd_event(struct ice_vf *vf) { }
static inline void ice_restore_all_vfs_msi_state(struct pci_dev *pdev) { }
-static inline bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf __always_unused *pf,
- struct ice_rq_event_info __always_unused *event,
- struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
-{
- return false;
-}
-
static inline int
ice_sriov_configure(struct pci_dev __always_unused *pdev,
int __always_unused num_vfs)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
index e24e3f5017ca..e0c573d9d1b9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
@@ -3833,6 +3833,51 @@ void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf)
vf->virtchnl_ops = &ice_virtchnl_repr_ops;
}
+/**
+ * ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF
+ * @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf
+ * @event: pointer to the AQ event
+ * @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox
+ */
+bool
+ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+ struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
+{
+ s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
+ struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
+ bool report_malvf = false;
+ struct ice_vf *vf;
+ int status;
+
+ vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id);
+ if (!vf)
+ return false;
+
+ if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states))
+ goto out_put_vf;
+
+ /* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */
+ status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info,
+ &report_malvf);
+ if (status)
+ dev_warn_ratelimited(dev, "Unable to check status of mailbox overflow for VF %u MAC %pM, status %d\n",
+ vf->vf_id, vf->dev_lan_addr, status);
+
+ if (report_malvf) {
+ struct ice_vsi *pf_vsi = ice_get_main_vsi(pf);
+ u8 zero_addr[ETH_ALEN] = {};
+
+ dev_warn(dev, "VF MAC %pM on PF MAC %pM is generating asynchronous messages and may be overflowing the PF message queue. Please see the Adapter User Guide for more information\n",
+ vf->dev_lan_addr,
+ pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr);
+ }
+
+out_put_vf:
+ ice_put_vf(vf);
+
+ return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
+}
+
/**
* ice_vc_process_vf_msg - Process request from VF
* @pf: pointer to the PF structure
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h
index 6d5af29c855e..648a383fad85 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ int
ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 v_opcode,
enum virtchnl_status_code v_retval, u8 *msg, u16 msglen);
bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id);
+bool
+ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+ struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata);
void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event);
#else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_dflt_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { }
@@ -83,6 +86,14 @@ static inline bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id)
return false;
}
+static inline bool
+ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf __always_unused *pf,
+ struct ice_rq_event_info __always_unused *event,
+ struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
static inline void
ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
{
--
2.38.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists