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Message-ID: <ZBCSAsUBeNvTPj/s@JNXK7M3>
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2023 10:25:54 -0500
From: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@...udflare.com>
To: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@...il.com>
Cc: lorenzo@...nel.org,
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...nel.org>,
makita.toshiaki@....ntt.co.jp, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...udflare.com
Subject: Re: KASAN veth use after free in XDP_REDIRECT
On Tue, Mar 14, 2023 at 05:02:40PM +0900, Toshiaki Makita wrote:
> On 2023/03/09 7:33, Shawn Bohrer wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 11:07:32AM +0900, Toshiaki Makita wrote:
> > > On 2023/01/25 10:54, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen wrote:
> > > > Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@...udflare.com> writes:
> > > >
> > > > > Hello,
> > > > >
> > > > > We've seen the following KASAN report on our systems. When using
> > > > > AF_XDP on a veth.
> > > > >
> > > > > KASAN report:
> > > > >
> > > > > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __xsk_rcv+0x18d/0x2c0
> > > > > Read of size 78 at addr ffff888976250154 by task napi/iconduit-g/148640
> > > > >
> > > > > CPU: 5 PID: 148640 Comm: napi/iconduit-g Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 6.1.4-cloudflare-kasan-2023.1.2 #1
> > > > > Hardware name: Quanta Computer Inc. QuantaPlex T41S-2U/S2S-MB, BIOS S2S_3B10.03 06/21/2018
> > > > > Call Trace:
> > > > > <TASK>
> > > > > dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
> > > > > print_report+0x170/0x473
> > > > > ? __xsk_rcv+0x18d/0x2c0
> > > > > kasan_report+0xad/0x130
> > > > > ? __xsk_rcv+0x18d/0x2c0
> > > > > kasan_check_range+0x149/0x1a0
> > > > > memcpy+0x20/0x60
> > > > > __xsk_rcv+0x18d/0x2c0
> > > > > __xsk_map_redirect+0x1f3/0x490
> > > > > ? veth_xdp_rcv_skb+0x89c/0x1ba0 [veth]
> > > > > xdp_do_redirect+0x5ca/0xd60
> > > > > veth_xdp_rcv_skb+0x935/0x1ba0 [veth]
> > > > > ? __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x671/0x920
> > > > > ? veth_xdp+0x670/0x670 [veth]
> > > > > veth_xdp_rcv+0x304/0xa20 [veth]
> > > > > ? do_xdp_generic+0x150/0x150
> > > > > ? veth_xdp_rcv_one+0xde0/0xde0 [veth]
> > > > > ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0xe0/0xe0
> > > > > ? newidle_balance+0x887/0xe30
> > > > > ? __perf_event_task_sched_in+0xdb/0x800
> > > > > veth_poll+0x139/0x571 [veth]
> > > > > ? veth_xdp_rcv+0xa20/0xa20 [veth]
> > > > > ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x39/0x70
> > > > > ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x17e/0x7d0
> > > > > ? __switch_to+0x5cf/0x1070
> > > > > ? __schedule+0x95b/0x2640
> > > > > ? io_schedule_timeout+0x160/0x160
> > > > > __napi_poll+0xa1/0x440
> > > > > napi_threaded_poll+0x3d1/0x460
> > > > > ? __napi_poll+0x440/0x440
> > > > > ? __kthread_parkme+0xc6/0x1f0
> > > > > ? __napi_poll+0x440/0x440
> > > > > kthread+0x2a2/0x340
> > > > > ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
> > > > > ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> > > > > </TASK>
> > > > >
> > > > > Freed by task 148640:
> > > > > kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x50
> > > > > kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
> > > > > kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x40
> > > > > ____kasan_slab_free+0x169/0x1d0
> > > > > slab_free_freelist_hook+0xd2/0x190
> > > > > __kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x2f0
> > > > > skb_release_data+0x449/0x600
> > > > > consume_skb+0x9f/0x1c0
> > > > > veth_xdp_rcv_skb+0x89c/0x1ba0 [veth]
> > > > > veth_xdp_rcv+0x304/0xa20 [veth]
> > > > > veth_poll+0x139/0x571 [veth]
> > > > > __napi_poll+0xa1/0x440
> > > > > napi_threaded_poll+0x3d1/0x460
> > > > > kthread+0x2a2/0x340
> > > > > ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888976250000
> > > > > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
> > > > > The buggy address is located 340 bytes inside of
> > > > > 2048-byte region [ffff888976250000, ffff888976250800)
> > > > >
> > > > > The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> > > > > page:00000000ae18262a refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x976250
> > > > > head:00000000ae18262a order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
> > > > > flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
> > > > > raw: 002ffff800010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88810004cf00
> > > > > raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000002ffffffff 0000000000000000
> > > > > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> > > > >
> > > > > Memory state around the buggy address:
> > > > > ffff888976250000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > > > > ffff888976250080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > > > > > ffff888976250100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > > > > ^
> > > > > ffff888976250180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > > > > ffff888976250200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > If I understand the code correctly it looks like a xdp_buf is
> > > > > constructed pointing to the memory backed by a skb but consume_skb()
> > > > > is called while the xdp_buf() is still in use.
> > > > >
> > > > > ```
> > > > > case XDP_REDIRECT:
> > > > > veth_xdp_get(&xdp);
> > > > > consume_skb(skb);
> > > > > xdp.rxq->mem = rq->xdp_mem;
> > > > > if (xdp_do_redirect(rq->dev, &xdp, xdp_prog)) {
> > > > > stats->rx_drops++;
> > > > > goto err_xdp;
> > > > > }
> > > > > stats->xdp_redirect++;
> > > > > rcu_read_unlock();
> > > > > goto xdp_xmit;
> > > > > ```
> > > > >
> > > > > It is worth noting that I think XDP_TX has the exact same problem.
> > > > >
> > > > > Again assuming I understand the problem one naive solution might be to
> > > > > move the consum_skb() call after xdp_do_redirect(). I think this
> > > > > might work for BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP, BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP, and
> > > > > BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH since those all seem to copy the xdb_buf to
> > > > > new memory. The copy happens for XSKMAP in __xsk_rcv() and for the
> > > > > DEVMAP cases happens in dev_map_enqueue_clone().
> > > > >
> > > > > However, it would appear that for BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP that memory can
> > > > > live much longer, possibly even after xdp_do_flush(). If I'm correct,
> > > > > I'm not really sure where it would be safe to call consume_skb().
> > > >
> > > > So the idea is that veth_xdp_get() does a
> > > > get_page(virt_to_page(xdp->data)), where xdp->data in this case points
> > > > to skb->head. This should keep the data page alive even if the skb
> > > > surrounding it is freed by the call to consume_skb().
> > > >
> > > > However, because the skb->head in this case was allocated from a slab
> > > > allocator, taking a page refcount is not enough to prevent it from being
> > > > freed.
> > >
> > > Not sure why skb->head is kmallocked here.
> > > skb_head_is_locked() check in veth_convert_skb_to_xdp_buff() should ensure that
> > > skb head is a page fragment.
> >
> > I have a few more details here. We have some machines running 5.15
> > kernels and some are running 6.1 kernels. So far it appears this only
> > happens on 6.1. We also have a couple of different network cards but
> > it appears that only the machines with Solarflare cards using the sfc
> > driver hit the KASAN BUG.
> >
> > 718a18a0c8a67f97781e40bdef7cdd055c430996 "veth: Rework
> > veth_xdp_rcv_skb in order to accept non-linear skb" reworked and added
> > the veth_convert_skb_to_xdp_buff() call you mentioned. Importantly it
> > also added a call to pskb_expand_head() which will kmalloc() the
> > skb->head. This looks like a path that could be causing the KASAN
> > BUG, but I have not yet confirmed that is the path we are hitting.
> > This change was also added in 5.18 so might explain why we don't see
> > it on 5.15.
>
> I think you made a valid point. It looks like pskb_expand_head() is incorrect here.
> At least I did not expect kmallocked skb->data at this point when I introduced
> veth XDP.
>
> Also I looked into the discussion on the suspected patch,
> https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=&submitter=&state=*&q=rework+veth_xdp_rcv_skb&archive=both&delegate=
> But there was no discussion on pskb_expand_head() nor kmallocked data.
>
> Lorenzo, what do you think?
I have confirmed this is the cause of the bug we are hitting and I've
also tested a change that simply does what the old code did and
follows the same code to allocate a new skb if the headroom is less
than XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM. That fixes the issue but maybe there is a
better solution. I'll send the patch I've tested in a reply.
--
Shawn
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