[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20230403075946.26ad71ee@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 07:59:46 -0700
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@...mberg.me>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
Boris Pismenny <borisp@...dia.com>, john.fastabend@...il.com,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Keith Busch <kbusch@...nel.org>,
linux-nvme@...ts.infradead.org,
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>,
kernel-tls-handshake@...ts.linux.dev,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/18] nvme-tcp: fixup send workflow for kTLS
On Mon, 3 Apr 2023 15:20:13 +0300 Sagi Grimberg wrote:
> >> Some of the flags are call specific, others may be internal to the
> >> networking stack (e.g. the DECRYPTED flag). Old protocols didn't do
> >> any validation because people coded more haphazardly in the 90s.
> >> This lack of validation is a major source of technical debt :(
> >
> > A-ha. So what is the plan?
> > Should the stack validate flags?
> > And should the rules for validating be the same for all protocols?
>
> MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST is not an internal flag, I thought it was
> essentially similar semantics to MSG_MORE but for sendpage. It'd
> be great if this can be allowed in tls (again, at the very least
> don't fail but continue as if it wasn't passed).
.. but.. MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST is supported in TLS, isn't it?
Why are we talking about it?
Powered by blists - more mailing lists