| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <b91cc429-2772-e96c-7fb1-53f4b8d79abc@digikod.net>
Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 12:31:55 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: "Konstantin Meskhidze (A)" <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com, gnoack3000@...il.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, yusongping@...wei.com,
artem.kuzin@...wei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks
support
On 05/04/2023 21:19, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 4/4/2023 8:02 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>
>> On 04/04/2023 18:42, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>
>>> On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>>>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>>>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>>>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>>>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>>>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>>>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>>>>> to specific ports.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>>>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>>>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>>>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>>>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>>>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v6:
>>>>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>>>>> because it OR values.
>>>>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>>>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>>>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>>>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>>>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v5:
>>>>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>>>>> syscall.
>>>>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v4:
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>>>>> masks checks.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>>>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>>>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>>>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v3:
>>>>>> * Splits commit.
>>>>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>>>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>>>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>>>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>>>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>>>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>>>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>>>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>
>>
>>>>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>>>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>>>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>>>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>>>>> + .key.data = port,
>>>>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>>>>> + };
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>>>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>>>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>>>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>>>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>>>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>>>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>>>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>>>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>>>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>>>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + fallthrough;
>>>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>>>> +#endif
>>
>> Some more fixes:
>>
>> You can move the port/id.key.data block from my patch here, where it is
>> actually used.
>>
> Ok. Thank you. I will apply it.
>>
>>>>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>>>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>>>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>>>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>>>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>>>>> + &layer_masks,
>>>>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>
>> The `return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;` should be here.
>>
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>
>> We should have `return 0;` here.
>>
> Got it. Thanks
>
>> We need a test for an sa_family different than AF_UNSPEC, AF_INET, and
>> AF_INET6 to make sure everything else is allowed (e.g. AF_UNIX with
>> SOCK_STREAM and another test with SOCK_DGRAM). Please make sure this new
>> test will not pass with SOCK_STREAM and the current patch series, but of
>> course it should pass with the next one.
>
> Do you mean AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM will not be passed as well as
> AF_UNIX with SOCK_DGRAM?
AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM would be denied with this patch series, which
is a bug. AF_UNIX with SOCK_DGRAM should always be allowed with this
patch series, which is correct.
AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM should always be allowed, and the
next patch series should come with a new test to check this two kind of
sockets.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists